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AUTHOR: 


WYLD,  ROBERT 


77/77 


THE  WORLD  AS 
DYNAMICAL  AND 

PLA  CE: 

EDINBURGH 

DATE: 

1868 


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THE  WOKLD 


AS 


DYNAMICAL  AND   IMMATERIAL; 


AM), 


THE  NATURE  OF  PERCEPTION. 


Br 


R.    S.   WYLD,   F.R.S.E. 


EDINBURGH : 
OLIVER    AND    BOYD,   TWEEDDALE    COURT. 

LONDON:    8IMPKIN,  MARSHALL,  AND  CO. 


1868. 


TO 


F.KIVHfKon  :    PRINTKn    BY    OLIVKK    AMU    BOVI». 


ALEXANDER  CAMPBELL  FBASEB,  M.A., 

PBOFE8SOR  OP  LOGIC  AND  METAPHYSICS, 
EUIXBUROH  UMVEIWITY. 


My  dear  Sir, 

Some  time  ago  you  suggested  that  I  should 
present  my  views  on  the  Perception  of  Power  to  the 
public.  This  I  now  do.  They  are  chiefly  contained 
in  Chapters  VII.,  VIII.,  and  IX.  of  this  little  volume, 
which  I  have  the  pleasure  of  dedicating  to  you. 

I  know  no  one  who  is  a  more  earnest  and  successful 
teacher  of  Philosophy  ;  and  I  know  no  one  more  tolerant 
of  the  efforts  of  others,  even  though  they  should  tend 
to  promote  views  diflfering  materially  from  those  which 
you  yourself  incline  to  espouse. 


I  am, 


My  dear  Sir, 

Yours  sincerely. 


ROBERT  S.  WYLD. 


19  Inverijeith  Row,  Edinbukoh, 
January  1868. 


80358 


PREFACE. 


That  the  world  is  governed  by  Physical  Laws, 
no  one  can  dispute  ;  but  whether  or  not  the  world, 
and  all  the  objects  contained  in  it,  have  a  Material 
nature — whether  there  be  such  a  thing  as  Matter, 
is  a  question  confessedly  open  for  philosophical 
discussion. 

The  question  has  very  important  bearings  in 
relation  to  Natural  Science,  to  Philosophy,  and  to 
Theology.  It  ought,  therefore,  to  possess  interest 
for  those  who  inquire  into  subjects  which  go  be- 
yond the  limits  of  ordinary  every-day  thought. 
-  The  acquiring  an  intelligent  apprehension  of 
subjects  such  as  are  discussed  in  this  volume, — 
even  irrespective  of  the  conclusions  to  which  the 


VI 


PREFACE. 


reader  may  be  brought,— will,  it  is  hoped,  not  be 
labour  lost.  Tlie  tendency  of  all  such  studies  is 
to  elevate  the  mind,  and  to  enlarge  its  range. 

There  are  three  points  to  which  we  would 
specially  direct  attention,  as  being  important  in 
themselves,  and  capable  of  a  novel  application  in 
connexion  with  the  subject  of  which  this  volume 

treats. 

Firstj  The  peculiar  views  regarding  the  physical 

constitution  of  the  world. 

Second,  The  bearing  which  the  Experiments  of 
Hirsch,  Bezold,  Schelske,  and  others,  on  the  rate  of 
transmission  of  volition  and  sensation  has  on  the 
subject  of  perception. 

Third,  The  application  made  of  the  New  Theory 
of  Force,  as  investigated  •  by  Faraday,  Joule, 
Mayer,  Helmholtz,  Thomson,  Carpenter,  and  others. 
The  author  believes  that  these  investigations  have 
elicited  views  in  the  highest  degree  important,  not 
only  to  Natural  Science,  but  to  Mental  Philosophy. 
He  has,  accordingly,  freely  explained  his  opinions 
with  reference  to  this  subject. 


PREFACE. 


vii 


Every  theory  of  Perception  has  hitherto  been  un- 
satisfactory and  incomplete,  and  that  of  one  of  our 
most  eminent  Philosophers  in  recent  times,  has  sig- 
nally broken  down.  Philosophy  thus  stands,  as  it 
were,  discomfited ;  and,  as  a  natural  consequence, 
metaphysics  fall  into  disrepute.  A  childish  Ideal- 
ism—as it  appears  to  us — and  a  very  objectionable 
form  of  Materialism  have  the  field  left  open  to 
them,  and  they  have  not  failed  to  avail  themselves 
of  their  opportunity.  This  is  not  to  be  wondered 
at,  after  the  failure  of  every  nobler  attempt  at  a 
theory  of  the  world. 

As,  after  a  hot  and  unsuccessfij  assault  the  com- 
batants are  driven  back,  and  have  nothing  before 
their  eyes  but  the  cold  hard  stones  of  the  battle- 
ments they  could  not  scale — so  it  appears  to  be 
with  us  Realists  at  this  moment. 

Rising  among  the  ruins  of  overthrown  philos- 
ophies, and,  with  an  exultant  air,  claiming  to  be 
the  only  rightful  expositor  of  Truth,  we  behold 
Positivism,  or  the  Philosophy  of  Fact.  This 
French    philosophy  has  already  proceeded   some 


VIU 


PREFACE. 


length  in  the  erection  of  its  huge  and  gaunt 
temple — if  temple  that  can  be  called,  within 
whose  walls  are  to  be  stored  as  our  only  philo- 
sophy nothing  but  the  bare  records  of  the  Past, 
the  Present,  and  the  Future, — within  whose  walls 
no  ray  of  heaven's  light  is  to  enter,  nor  any  in- 
stincts of  the  human  soul  are  to  whisper, — from 
whose  precincts.  Religion — God — the  unseen  in 
every  form  are  to  be  carefully  excluded, — and  in 
their  stead,  the  fact  only  that  a  belief  in  such 
things  once  existed  is  to  be  registered,  in  order  to 
preserve  from  oblivion  this  past  phase  in  man's 
moral  history. 

Strange  to  say,  the  extremes  of  Materialism  and 
of  Idealism  have,  in  some  instances,  joined  hands 
in  this  hopeful  work.  To  us  the  religion  of 
Paganism  is  a  thousand  times  fresher  and  nobler 
than  the  aspect  of  this  newest  philosophy  of  the 
latter  half  of  our  century. 

The  author  finds  refuge  from  these  gloomy 
overshadowings  in  the  more  sure  Word  of  Inspired 
Wisdom,  and  in  the  principles  of  his  own  philos- 


PREFACE. 


IX 


ophy,  which  stand  in  natural  harmony  with  it.  He 
believes  that  these  views  are  solid  and  consistent, 
and  will  stand  the  brunt  of  criticism.  Under  this 
conviction  he  offers  them  to  the  public,  which  is 
the  ultimate  tribunal  in  all  questions,  whether 
philosophical,  speculative,  or  practical. 


CONTENTS. 


PART   I. 


THE  WORLD  AS  DYNAMICAL  AND  IMMATERIAL. 


Chap. 

1.  Idealism  and  Materialism— Objections  to  each, 

II.  Physical  Proofs  against  the  Existence  of  Matter; 
and  Physical  Proofs  of  what  supplies  its  place,   . 

1 1 1.  Philosophical  and  Common-sense  Arguments  against 
the  Existence  of  Matter.— The  Simplicity,  Con- 
sistency, and  Grandeur  of  the  opposite  Theory,  . 


P«ge 
1 


23 


50 


IV.  Further  Explanations— the  Reality  of  a  Dynamical 
World  explained— certain  Difficulties  are  removed 
by  this  Theory, 76 

PART    II. 

THE  NATURE  OF  PERCEPTION. 

V.   Introductory  Statements  and  Speculations — the  Con- 
nexion of  Mind  and  Matter, 92 


WMMMfliimiigfiliyilifTi 


Sii 


XI 1  CONTENTS. 

Chap.  p^^^ 

VI.  Have  we  a  Direct  and  Intuitional  Perception  of 

External  Nature,  as  Hamilton  generally  asserts?     121 

VII.  Power:  Do  we  Perceive  it,  or  do  we  only  Infer  its 

Existence? 155 

VIII.  The  Direct  Perception  of  Power— the  Mind  Pos- 
sesses Power,  Exerts  Power,  and  F^erceives  Power, 
Physical  and  Mental, 175 

IX.  The  Physical  Powers  of  the  Mind, 194 

X.  Hamilton's   modified  Views  on  Direct  Perception 

— Concluding  Remarks 211 


PAKT  I. 


THE  WORLD  AS  DYNAMICAL  AND  IMMATERIAL. 


CHAPTER   I. 

IDEALISM  AND  MATERIALISM — OBJECTIONS 

TO  EACH. 

The  insufficiency  of  the  senses  for  the  discovery 
of  Truth,  it  is  well  known,  was  a  favourite  topic 
of  discussion  among  the  Greek  Philosophers.  It 
has  continued  to  be  a  principal  subject  of  dis- 
cussion from  their  remote  times  down  to  the  days 
in  which  we  live.  The  question,  therefore,  What 
is  the  nature  of  man's  knowledge  of  the  external 
world?  must  needs  involve  more  difficulties  than 
practical  men,  who  take  the  world  as  it  appears  to 
them,  are  disposed  to  think.  It  is,  in  fact,  one 
of  the  greatest  and  most  interesting  questions  of 
philosophy. 


2 


IDEALISM  AND  MATERIALISM  : 


Is  our  knowledge  of  the  world  real,  as  the  senses 
would  lead  us  to  think,  or  is  it  merely  relative? 
Or  is  our  knowledge  of  the  world  entirely  unreal, 
imaginary,  ideal?  Such  are  the  questions  still 
agitated,  not  by  visionaries,  but  by  men  of  the  ablest 
minds  at  home  and  abroad ;  by  all,  indeed,  who 
take  an  interest  in  the  discovery  of  absolute  truth, 
and  who  allow  themselves  to  meditate  or  to  specu- 
late upon  the  deep  enigma  of  existence — the  ex- 
istence of  a  seemingly  inanimate  substance  — 
yet  possessed  of  active  properties,  and  the  exist- 
ence of  consciousness  and  intelligence — attributes 
implying  a  spiritual  nature — yet  held  in  connexion 
with  a  thing  insensible,  unconscious,  and  of  an 
essence  seemingly  entirely  different. 

A  duality  of  being  such  as  this  is  so  mysterious 
that  we  need  not  wonder  at  the  very  different 
conclusions  to  which  men  of  independent  minds 

* 

have  come  when  considering  it. 

Some,  regarding  their  own  consciousness  as  the 
only  thing  certain,  have  rejected  as  a  figment  the 
existence  of  an  external  world.  Others,  more  ob- 
jective in  their  tendencies,  have  believed  only  in 
what  was  seen  and  felt,  and  have  refused  to  believe 


OBJECTIONS  TO  EACH.  3 

in  mind  as  an  entity  separate  from  matter  and 
organization. 

It  will  be  sufficient  for  our  purpose,  that  we 
merely,  in  a  very  cursory  and  prefatory  manner, 
allude  to  some  of  the  well-known  views  of  eminent 
men  of  recent  and  modern  times. 

Kant,   one   of  the   most    profound   of   modem 
metaphysicians,    we    need    scarcely    remind    the 
reader,  devotes  the  first  portion  of  his  celebrated 
"  Critique  of  Pure  Reason  "  ^  to  prove  that  neither 
time  nor  space  have  any  real  existence,  but  are 
mere  forms  of  thought  determined   by  the   con- 
stitution of  the  human  mind.      We  may  easily 
imagine   how  this    belief,   and   the   principle   on 
which  it  is  founded,  must  mould  and  colour  the 
whole  tenor  of  his  philosophy.     He  owns,  indeed, 
to   a    belief   that    the    perceptive    faculty   is,    in 
some  way  or  other,  called  into  exercise  by   the 
objects   of  the  external   world;    but  what   these 
outward  objects  in  themselves  are,  he  denies  that 
we  can  form  even  the  most  remote  conception.    He 
holds  that  space  (or  extension)  neither  represents 
any  property  of  objects,  as  things  in  themselves, 
nor  represents  them  in  their  relations  to  each  other. 

»  Published  in  178L 


IDEALISM  AND  MATERIALISM  : 


Fichte  went  a  step  further,  and  denied  that 
there  was  an  external  world.  He  held  that  the 
varying  phenomena  we  seem  to  observe,  were 
purely  ideal  images,  due  to  the  law  of  the  mind's 
activity.  That  the  mind,  in  fact,  generated  all  the 
impressions  we  have  of  an  external  world. 

Bishop  Berkeley,  who  died  at  Oxford  in  1753, 
was  one  of  the  most  acute  and  ingenious  writers  of 
whom  our  country  can  boast.  He  was,  moreover, 
an  eminently  pious,  benevolent,  and  earnest  man  ; 
and  his  scientific  writings  have  increased  sensibly 
the  sum  of  human  knowledge.  Some  of  his  most 
cherished  views  have,  however,  earned  for  him, 
with  the  unlearned  majority  of  mankind,  the  repu- 
tation of  being  in  the  highest  degree  eccentric,  ex- 
travagant, and  unintelligible.  He  denied  the  ex- 
ternal  existence   of  the   physical   universe.^     He 

1  "  Some  traths  there  are  so  near  and  obvious  to  the  mind,  that  a 
man  need  only  open  his  eyes  to  see  them.  Such  I  take  this  import- 
ant one  to  be,  to  wit,  that  all  the  choir  of  heaven,  and  furniture  of 
the  earth — in  a  word,  all  those  bodies  which  compose  the  mighty 
frame  of  the  world— have  not  any  subsistence  without  a  mind,  that 
their  being  [ease)  is  to  be  perceived,  or  known ;  that,  consequently, 
so  long  as  they  are  not  actually  perceived  by  me,  or  do  not  exist  in 
my  mind  or  that  of  any  other  created  spirit^  they  must  either  have  no 
existence  at  all,  or  else  subsist  in  the  mind  of  some  eternal  spirit." — 
**  The  Principles  of  Human  Knowledge,"  section  vi. 


OBJECTIONS  TO  EACH.  O 

believed  only  in  mind  :  in  his  own  mind,  and,  we 
must  infer,  in  the  minds  of  other  men  also,  though 
this  point  is  not  very  prominently  stated  in  his 
philosophy;  nor  are  we  informed  how  these  fel- 
low-souls communicate  with  one  another.  Emi- 
nently and  most  clearly,  however,  he  believed  in 
the  Supreme  mind.  His  theory  of  perception — 
his  theory  of  the  world,  was  this — that  the  Deity 
communicated  directly  to  the  human  mind  those 
impressions  which  we  falsely  imagine  to  flow  from 
the  perception  of  external  nature.  Perception  was 
thus,  as  it  were,  a  divine  discoursing  of  Deity  with 
his  creatures.^ 


»  "  Take  here,  in  brief,  my  meaning.    It  is  evident  that  the  things 
I  perceive  are  my  own  ideas,  and  that  no  idea  can  exist  unless  it  be 
in  a  mind ;  nor  is  it  less  plain  that  these  ideas  or  things  by  me  per- 
ceived,   either    themselves  or  their   archetypes,  exist    independ- 
ently of  my  mind,  since  I  know  myself  not  to  be  their  author,  it 
being  out  of  my  power  to  determine  at  pleasure  what  particular 
idea  I  shall  be  affected  with  upon  opening  my  eyes  or  ears.    They 
must,  therefore,  exist  in  some  other  mind,  whose  will  it  is  they 
should  be  exhibited  to  me.    The  things,  I  say,  immediately  per- 
ceived are  ideas  or  sensations,  call  them  which  you  will.    But  how 
can  any  idea  or  sensation  exist  in,  or  be  produced  by,  anything  but  a 
mind  or  spirit?    From  all  which,  I  conclude,  there  is  a  mind  which 
affects  me  every  moment  voith  aU  the  sensible  impressions  I  perceive  ; 
and  from  the  variety,  order,  and  manner  of  these,  I  conclude  the 
author  of  them  to  be  Mrwe,  powerful,  and  good  beyond  comprehension. 


f 


6 


IDEALISM  AND  MATERIALISM  : 


This  form  of  Idealism,  though  supported  by  very 
ingenious  arguments,  and  by  very  close  reasoning, 
and  recommended  by  an  enthusiasm  and  an  elo- 
quence which  have  been  surpassed  by  no  English 
metaphysical  writer,  does  not  appear  to  have 
obtained  from  the  men  of  that  day  any  very  dis- 
tinguished or  extensive  support.  It  must  appear 
strange,  therefore,  that  in  the  eminently  practical 
times  in  which  we  live.  Bishop  Berkeley's  views, 
or  others  almost  equally  idealistic,  should  be  found 
decidedly  on  the  ascendant ;  and  that  they  should 
even  be  threatening  to  supersede  the  boasted  school 
of  Scottish  Realism,  dignified  by  the  names  of 
Reid,  Stewart,  Brown,  and  Hamilton. 

The  late  Professor  of  Moral  Philosophy  in  the 
University  of  St  Andrews,  in  his  ^'  Institutes  of 
Metaphysics,  or  the  Theory  of  Knowing  and 
Being,"  endeavours  to  prove  matter  entirely  un- 
knowable by  any  intelligence,  human  or  angelic. 
"  It  cannot  be  known,''  says  he,  "  by  any  intelli- 

Mark  it  well :  I  do  not  say  I  see  things  by  perceiving  that  which 
represents  them  in  the  intelligible  substance  of  God.  This  I  do  not 
understand ;  but  I  say  the  things  by  me  perceived  are  known  by  the 
understanding,  and  produced  by  the  will,  of  an  infinite  spirit"— 
"  Hylas  and  Philonous,"  Second  Dialogue. 


OBJECTIONS  TO  EACH.  7 

gence,  actual  or  possible.  In  that  case  it  undoubt- 
edly becomes  the  contradictory,  for  what  is  a  con- 
tradiction but  that  which  cannot  be  known  or 
conceived  on  any  terms  by  any  possible  intelli- 
gence." 

Lewes,  in  his,  in  many  respects  useful  work/ 
"  The  History  of  Philosophy  "  (1867),  founding  on 
the  admitted  fact,  that  the  mind  is  conscious  of  its 
own  states,  conclude?  from  that  fact,  that  it  can 
know  nothing  beyond  this  sphere,  and  therefore 
can  know  nothing  truly  of  external  nature.  "  The 
world  per  se,"  says  he,  "  is  in  all  likelihood  some- 
thing utterly  different  from  the  world  as  we  know 
it ;  for  all  we  know  of  it  is  derived  through  our 
consciousness  of  what  its  effects  are  on  us  ;  and  our 
consciousness  is  obviously  only  a  state  of  ourselves, 
not  a  copy  of  external  things  "  (vol.  i.,  p.  371). 

And  again,  says  this  writer,  "  as  I  cannot  trans- 
cend the  sphere  of  my  consciousness,  I  can  never 
know  things  except  as  they  act  upon  me — as  they 

1  We  cannot  but  observe  with  regret  the  enthusiastic  adherence 
expressed  in  this  edition  (1867)  to  the  philosophy  of  Comte;  a  philo- 
sophy which,  notwithstanding  the  amount  of  truth  which  its  prin 
ciples  contein,  has  hitherto  been  closely  allied  with  Materialism  and 
many  other  dangerous  errors. 


P7 


8 


IDEALISM  AND  MATERIALISM  : 


OBJECTIONS  TO  EACH, 


9 


affect  my  consciousness.  In  other  words,  a  know- 
ledge of  an  external  world  otherwise  than  as  it 
appears  to  my  sense,  which  transforms  and  distorts 
it,  is  impossible  "  (vol.  ii.,  p.  382). 

These  are   surely  unjustifiable   and   gratuitous 
assumptions   against  the  veracity  of  the   senses, 
and  we  would  wish  to  know  what  ground  Kant, 
Berkeley,  Ferrier,  and  this  last  author  have  for 
assuming  that  the  physical  system  of  the  world, 
the  parts  of  which  are  so  consistent,   so  ingenious, 
so  beautiful,  is  either  unreal,  or  distorted  by  the 
senses.     Do  such  writers  not  put  themselves  wil- 
fully into  a  position   of  ignorance?     Our  sensa- 
tions indeed,  we  admit,  do  not  correspond  with 
anything  external—how  could  they  ?     How  can  a 
mental  state  be  identical  with  the  condition  of  an 
insensible  physical  object  ?    But  though  this  is  the 
case,  our  sensations  having  been  given  us  as  our 
means  of  knowledge,  they  are  surely  entitled  to  be 
held  as  sufficient  guides,  until  we  can  point  out  any 
distinct  and  specific  proof  of  their  being  delusive. 
A  vague,  indefinite,  and  sweeping  charge  against 
human  knowledge,  such  as  some  of  these  writers 
make,  we  utterly  reject.      It   appears   to   us   at 


once  presumptuous  and  unphilosophical ;  and,  so 
far  as  has  yet  been  shown,  it  has  neither  proof  nor 
probability  in  its  favour ;  and,  certainly,  it  is  far 
from  being  either  satisfying  or  instructive,  to  such 
as  are  seeking  after  truth,  to  assume  that  the 
senses  transform  and  distort  the  objects  perceived, 
80  as  to  prevent  reason  pronouncing  any  judgment 
regarding  them. 

Our  sensations,  it   is   said,  do  not  correspond 
with  the  external  objects.    We  admit  the  fact ;  but 
does  not  our  perception  of  this  fact  afford  us  a  proof 
that  the  mind  has  a  judging  and  discriminating 
faculty,   seeing   it    can    distinguish    between    the 
bodily  sensations,  and   the   external  causes   pro- 
ducing  them?     Our   sensations   come   to   us,   as 
impressions   on,    or    affections    of,    our    extended 
physical   frame,   produced   by  extended   external 
physical  causes,  and  a  perception  of  this  kind,  we 
maintain,  affords  us  grounds  to  form  a  theory  of 
the  external  world,  at  once  rational,  consistent,  and 
philosophical,  though  it  be  imperfect,  as  befits  the 
nature  of  finite  beings  under  physical  conditions 
and  relations. 

Few,  we  think,  will  be  satisfied  with  an  avowal 


Hiiiiniiitfiiiiiiiiiiii  imiiiinii  ffiiinifliiirritif  it  liiaMiiiiiij 


10 


IDEALISM  AND  MATERIALISM  : 


OBJECTIONS  TO  EACH. 


11 


of  total  ignorance,  such  as  seems  to  content  some  of 
these  authors ;  and  such  as  view  with  reluctance 
and  pain  the  avowal  of  an  absolute  negation  of 
knowledge,  maj  join  with  us  in  trying  to  constmct 
for  themselves  some  definite  and  intelligible  form 
of  belief. 

Buckle,  whom  we  refer  to,  as  being  one  of  our 
instructive  and  popular  authors,  though  on  meta- 
physical subjects,  as  also  on  some  others,  no  infal- 
lible authority,  declares,  with  reference  to  Keid's 
philosophy,— "That  notwithstanding  the  attempts, 
first  of  M.  Cousin,  and  afterwards  of  Sir  W.  Hamil- 
ton, to  prop  up  his  declining  reputation,  his  philo- 
sophy, as  an  independent  system,  is  untenable, 
and  will  not  live"  ("  Hist,  of  Civilization  in  Eng- 
land," vol.  ii.,  chap.  6). 

J.  S.  Mill,  in  his  "  Examination  of  Hamilton," 
has  proclaimed  a  psychological  theory  of  percep- 
tion,  which,  if  we  rightly  understand  his  meaning, 
indicates  opinions  quite  as  idealistic  as  those  of 
Fichte. 

And,  lastly,  the  able  and  active-minded  successor 
of  Hamilton  in  the  chair  of  Metaphysics,  besides 
various  papers  contributed  to  the  leading  periodi- 


cals  of  the.day,  written  in  a  spirit  not  only  tolerant 
of,  but,  one  would  almost  think,  favourable  to  Bishop 
Berkeley's  views,  is,  it  is  alleged,  at  the  request  of 
the  most  venerable  seat  of  learning  of  which  our 
country  can  boast,  preparing  a  complete  edition  of 
that  eminent  writer's  works.  All  this,  it  will  be 
admitted,  bodes  ill  for  the  common-sense  realism 
of  Reid  and  Hamilton.  But  let  us  not  tremble, 
for  we  cannot  doubt  but  by  each  well-considered 
effort  of  each  able  and  honest  explorer  we  shall 
be  brought  ever  a  step— it  may  be  but  an  insensible 
one— nearer  a  rational  and  satisfying  stability  of 

belief. 

Certain  minds  incline,  much  more  powerfully  than 
others,  to  idealism ;  but  there  is  a  natural  tendency 
in  this  direction  which  is  experienced  nearly  by 
every  man  who  yields  himself  earnestly  to  the  claims 
which  the  study  of  metaphysics  demands.  When 
we  enter  the  world  of  thought,  the  region  is  so  vast, 
and  profound,  that  the  world  of  matter  is  swallowed 
up  in  it.  But  not  only  does  the  mysterious  and 
illimitable  nature  of  the  study  lead  to  idealism ; 
other  causes  conduct  silently,  but  as  surely,  to  the 
same  end.     Engaged  entirely  with  the  operations 


12 


IDEALISM  AND  MATERIALISM  : 


OBJECTIONS  TO  EACH. 


13 


of  the  mind,   and  with   the   examination  of  the 
shifting  phenomena  furnished  to  consciousness,  our 
ideas  become  by  degrees  the  chief  objects  of  our 
observation.     They  are  the  things  real  to  us,  and 
hence  they  gradually  become  our  only  realities, 
while  the  world  of  sense,  as  an  outward  reality,  fades 
out  of  view.     To  help  this  tendency  still  further, 
when  we  turn  from  this  inner  world  to  consider  the 
nature  of  outer  things,  here,  also,  idealism  presses 
itself  upon  us.     Whether  it  be  from  a  defect  in  the 
nature  of  our  faculties,  or  from  a  fundamental  error 
in  that  which  we  constitute  as  the  object  of  our 
examination,  we  cannot  tell ;  but  certain  it  is,  that 
when  the  material  world  is  made  the  subject  of 
metaphysical  scrutiny,  unless  that  scrutiny  is  pro- 
perly conducted,  it  very  quickly  eludes  our  gaze, 
and  becomes   unreal  and   unsubstantial,  even   as 
those  spectra  which  dazzle  the  eyes  on  a  summer 
evening  as  we  watch  the  sun  sink  behind  the  dis- 
tant hills,— the  red  orb  is  gone,  but  various  coun- 
terfeits remain,  which,  as  we  try  to  fasten  the  eyes 
upon  them,  mock  us  with  their  changing  colours 
and  flitting  postures,--a  sadness  steals  over  us  at 
such  times,  and  we  turn  homeward,  feeling  as  if 


the  extinguished  sun  and  the  extinguished  earth 
were  never  again  to  rise,  so  vivid  and  so  real, 
as  we  have  known  them  ;  and  as  if  the  silent 
air  were  never  again  to  resound  with  its  living 
melody. 

And  so  it  is,  even  with  things  the  most  common, 
when,  as  philosophers,  we  seek  to  know  their  nature. 
They  begin  forthwith  to  undergo  positions  and 
transformations  the  most  strange  and  unexpected ; 
and  as  we  follow  them,  step  by  step,  they  fade 
either  into  abstractions,  or  into  self-contradictions, 
assuming  forms  which  the  mind  can  neither 
explain  to  itself,  nor  translate  into  words  for  the 
edification  of  others. 

Having  said  so  much  of  Idealism,  let  us  turn 
from  it  to  the  other  side,  and  consider,  though 
briefly,  the  world  of  the  Materialist. 

Now,  if  on  the  one  hand,  in  our  own  day,  amidst 
the  din  and  the  disturbing  influences  of  a  money- 
making  community,  we  observe  flourishing  a  small 
and  silent  class  of  thinkers,  known  and  talked  of 
as  Idealists,  we  need  not  be  surprised  to  find  that, 
in  the  same  country,  as  the  fmit  of  our  ardent 
pursuit  of  physical  knowledge,  an  opposite  school, 


14 


IDEALISM  AND  MATERIALISM  : 


OBJECTIONS  TO  EACH. 


15 


.  1 


much  more  powerful  numerically,  should  be  estab- 
lishing itself. 

If  that  is  most  truly  real  which  a  man  holds 
most  firmly  rooted  in  his  mind,  while  that  is  to  us 
as  non-existent  of  which  we  have  no  living  con- 
sciousness, 80,  on  this  principle,  we  may  expect  to 
find  that  men  who  have  devoted  themselves  exclu- 
sively to  natural  science,  should  incline  to  regard  as 
a  childish  superstition  the  belief  in  mind,  soul,  spirit, 
or  any  principle  or  thing  which  is  not  discoverable 
by  the  senses.     It  has  been  proved  that  sensation 
and  thought  are  dependent  on,  or  at  least  intimately 
connected  with,  the  flow  of  nervous  energy.    What 
then,  is  more  natural  than  to  conclude  that  these 
mental  operations  are  a  product  of  the  hrain  f     The 
reproductive  cell  is  a  combination   of  animal  or 
vegetable  principles  plus  the  globular  form,  what 
IS  more  natural  than  for  a  mere  microscopist  to 
conclude  that  the   result  of  this  arrangement  is 
life   in  its  rudimentary  form?      And   thus   it  is 
that,  to  their  own  satisfaction,  and  to  the  distress 
of  a  numerous  class  of  religious  men  and  women, 
many  of  our  scientific  men  conceive  they  are  ex- 
tending the  domain  of  truth  on  a  basis  of  material- 


ism, and  proving  the  belief  in  mind  to  be  a  species 
of  belief  unsuited  for  a  scientific  age. 

Now,  let  us  examine  for  one  moment  this 
opinion.  If  Hume,  by  his  universal  scepticism,  did 
some  evil,  or  at  least  created  some  alarm,  let  us 
not  refuse  him  the  meed  of  gratitude  which  is 
certainly  due  to  him  for  checking  the  assumptions 
of  empty  dogmatism.  None  of  his  philosophical 
writings  have  been  more  influential  towards  this 
than  his  essay,  justly  celebrated,  on  "  Our  Idea  of 
Necessary  Connexion."  In  this  essay  he  directs  at- 
tention to  what  seems,  so  far  at  least  as  we  here  state 
it,  to  be  recognised  as  an  axiom  in  philosophy,  viz., 
that  we  never  perceive  a  cause  in  any  natural  phenome- 
non. When  we  are  told  then,  by  the  man  of  science, 
that  no  other  physical  links  exist  between  the  exist- 
ence of  an  organic  frame  and  life,  between  the  flow 
of  cerebral  electricity  and  thought,  between  the  prox- 
imity of  material  bodies  and  gravity,  the  axiom  of 
Hume  at  once  comes  to  our  relief,  and  reminds  us 
that  none  of  these  antecedents  afford  any  explana- 
tion of  the  consequents  which  follow  them.  The 
proximity  of  physical  masses  does  not  explain 
gravitation, — the  existence  of  animal  or  vegetable 


16 


IDEALISM  AND  MATERIALISM  : 


principles  in  an  organic  form,  in  no  measure  ex- 
plains the  phenomenon  of  life.^  The  flow  of 
nervous  fluid  from  the  brain  does  not  explain 
thought,  —  the  act  of  volition  does  not  explain 
muscular  movement,  neither  does  the  flow  of  ner- 
vous electricity  explain  it.  Hume  was  undoubtedly 
right  when  he  pointed  out  that  we  fail  to  discover  any 
necessary  connexion  between  any  of  these  antecedents 
and  their  respective  consequents^ — ice  fail  to  discover 
the  one  to  be  in  any  respect  the  cause  of  the  other. 

The  physical  investigator  may  prove  that  every 
sensation,  nay,  every  act  of  reflection,  is  accom- 
panied by  an  action  of  the  brain,  and  an  expenditure 
of  the  nervous  fluid ;  but  he  cannot  prove  that  this 
action  of  the  brain  is  the  cause  of  thought,  or 
sensation  ;  or  that  it  has  any  intelligible  connexion 
with  them,  except  the  uninstructive  and  unmeaning 
one  of  proximity  in  time  and  place.  Thought  may 
accompany  or  may  follow  an  action  of  the  brain 
and  nervous  fluid,  but  where  is  the  proof  that  the 

'  Even  if  we  could  succeed  in  compounding  animal  or  vegetable 
principles,  and  from  them  evolving  life— still,  even  in  this  hypotheti- 
cal and  improbable  case,  we  would  have  no  title  to  be  stated  as  the 
cause  of  life.  We  would  be  but  mere  subordinate  agents  in  the 
hands  of  a  Higher  Power,  who  is  the  true  cause. 


OBJECTIONS  TO  EACH. 


17 


one  is  the  cause  of  the  other?  A  stone  falls  to  the 
ground — this  is  a  physical  fact — but  we  see  no 
physical  cause  for  it.  We  cannot  say  that  we  dis- 
cover anything  in  the  earth  to  produce  such  a 
downward  motion. 

Now,  there  are  some  reflections  which  present 
themselves  in  connexion  with  this  strange  circum- 
stance of  which  we  have  been  speaking,— /r*^,  no 
man,  not  even  Mr  J.  S.  Mill,  can  bring  himself  to 
believe  that  any  event  happens  without  a  cause. 
When,  therefore,  we  perceive  no  physical  or  visible 
cause,  and  can  imagine  none,  for  the  stone  falling, 
we  have  no  alternative,  but  are  compelled  of 
necessity  to  believe  in  an  invisible,  irnmaterialj  or 
spiritual  cause  of  this  great  law  of  the  physical 
world. 

And  so  also  with  reference  to  the  phenomenon 

of  animal  or  vegetable  life,  and  of  thought,  and  of 

sensibility,  we  have  no  choice,  but  are  compelled 

to  believe  in  a  spiritual  cause.     If  any  thinking 

man  can  find  an  escape  from  this  conclusion,  we  will 

be  glad  that  he  make  known  his  discovery.     But, 

in  a  philosophical  question  of  this  kind,  it  will  not 

suffice  to  say  that  because  one  event  goes  before 

B 


18 


IDEALISM  AND  MATERIALISM  : 


OBJECTIONS  TO  EACH. 


19 


\ 


another,  the  one  is  to  be  regarded  as  the  cause  of 
the  other.  The  proximity  in  itself  gives  no  ex- 
planation. What  we  ask  the  Materialist  is,  that 
he  point  out,  in  physical  bodies,  the  cause  of  action, 
and  make  it  apparent  to  the  understanding.  The 
philosopher  is  not  a  mere  chronicler  of  facts ; 
reason  imperatively  demands  a  cause  for  every 
interesting  event ;  and  because  the  man  of  science 
cannot  find  one,  he  is  not  entitled  to  present  us 
with  what  comes  first  to  hand,  and  to  say  that  the 
fact  of  proximity  is  a  sufficient  explanation. 

What,  we  ask,  is  the  cause  of  gravitation,  or 
repulsion,  or  power,  in  any  form  ?  The  physical 
philosopher,  not  accustomed  to  look  deeper  than 
the  senses,  alleges  j)erhaps  the  action  of  an  ethereal 
medium ;  or  he  may  allude  to  electrical  currents 
pervading  all  physical  bodies,  and  all  their  atoms ; 
and,  perhaps,  he  may  illustrate  his  opinion  by  the 
instance  of  a  bar  of  soft  iron  being  converted 
into  a  magnet  instantly  that  galvanic  currents  are 
caused  to  flow  round  it.  Such  an  explanation,  if 
offered,  would  only  show  that  the  nature  of  the 
inquiry  was  not  understood, — the  inquiry  being,  not 
regarding  the  arrangements  of  the  physical  ma- 


chine, but  regarding  the  moving  power.  Electricity, 
or  an  ethereal  medium,  may  be  a  part  of  the  appa- 
ratus, but  the  presence  of  either  of  these  would  not 
explain  the  cause  of  its  existence,  nor  whence  its 
power  is  derived,  nor  in  what  way  it  acts. 

In  the  same  way  as  regards  thought.  It  is  ac- 
companied by  cerebral  action  ;  but  the  important 
question  is — Do  we  discover  any  resemblance  be- 
tween electrical  vibrations  and  the  phenomena  of 
consciousness,  or  sensation,  or  thought,  volition, 
judgment,  imagination?  Does  the  one  explain  the 
other  to  the  satisfaction  of  an  exact  thinker  ? 

If  the  mind,  indeed,  is  to  be  in  connexion  with 
a  physical  world,  we  see  very  clearly  that  it  must 
be  subjected  to  the  influence  of  physical  laws, 
and  be  put  in  connexion  with  an  organic  body 
amenable  to  physical  influences.  The  body  must  in 
some  way  afford  us  a  measure  of  the  soul's  feelings 
and  powers, — for,  were  it  not  so,  the  mind  could 
have  no  connexion  with  the  world  at  all, — the 
world  would,  in  fact,  be  to  it  as  nothing, — neither 
influencing  it,  nor  being  acted  on  by  it.  Though, 
therefore,  of  design,  and,  we  may  say,  of  necessity, 
the  operations  of  the  mind  are  limited  and  adjusted 


20 


IDEALISM  AND  MATERIALISM  : 


OBJECTIONS  TO  EACH. 


21 


ll 


in  conformity  with  the  laws  of  the  physical  world, 
yet  we  challenge  the  most  ingenious  materialist 
to  show  that  the  operations  of  mind  are  the  pro- 
duct of  physical  or  organic  action. 

When  we  reflect  on  the  subject  of  Power,  whether 
physical  or  mental,  and  try  to  form  a  conception 
of  it,  we  are  drawn  inevitably  to  conceive  it  as 
the  action  of  an  unseen  and  immaterial  cause ;  and 
we  maintain  firmly  that  no  thinking  man  can, 
in  the  true  sense  of  the  word,  ever  think  himself 
into  Materialism.  He  becomes,  on  the  contrary,  a 
materialist  by  refusing  to  think,  by  using  his 
eyes  and  sparing  his  head.  Materialism  is  the 
result  of  taking  facts  for  causes,  whether  they  are 
suitable  or  not,  and  so  superseding  or  stultifying 
the  reason. 

Materialism  has  ever  been  the  stronghold  ot 
Atheism.  The  following  pages  may  therefore  have 
some  interest,  from  showing  that  arguments,  both 
physical  and  metaphysical,  may  be  adduced  in 
proof  that  matter  does  not  exist.  By  matter  we 
mean  an  entity^  or  thing  occupying  space,  in  es- 
sence different  from  spirit,  and  having  a  self-de- 
pendent existence, — the  supposed  substratum  of  all 


the  qualities  observed  in  physical  objects, — and 
which,  if  all  these  qualities  were  taken  away, 
would  still  be  there,  as  the  substantial  thing  /  they, 
the  properties,  being  only  the  adjectives,  while  it 
is  the  thing,  or  noun.  Such  is  matter,  according 
to  the  general  conception  formed  of  it ;  and  it  is 
against  this  that  we  shall  direct  our  arguments. 

The  writer  has  already  alluded  to  some  strange, 
and,  as  it  seems  to  him,  extravagant  theories  which 
have  been  supported  by  men  of  eminence  on  the 
idealistic  side — in  which  matter  and  the  existence 
of  an  external  world  are  alike  denied;  and  he 
has  alluded  to  the  contrary,  or  Sadducean  position, 
dignified  by  no  very  eminent  names,  but  yet  gain- 
ing the  acceptance  of  many  shrewd  and  active 
prosecutors  of  natural  science,  who,  holding  that 
matter  is  the  only  thing  of  which  we  have  a  sure 
cognition,  reject,  or  discountenance  the  venerable 
doctrine  of  a  spiritual  principle,  or  of  any  imma- 
terial power  not  discoverable  by  the  senses. 

The  ^vriter  will  endeavour  to  show  that  a  safer 
position,  intermediate  betw^n  the  belief  in  Matter, 
which  leads  so  many  philosophers  to  Atheism,  and 
such  Idealism  as  we  have  alluded  to,  which  con- 


22 


IDEALISM  AND  MATERIALISM. 


23 


II    > 


founds  the  reason  and  the  natural  convictions  of 
mankind,  may  be  defended  on  grounds  scientific 
and  philosophical.  This  is  all  the  length  he  wishes 
to  go.  He  wishes  to  compel  no  belief, — he  shall 
only  endeavour  to  show  that  the  highest,  the 
soundest,  and  most  consistent  arguments  are  to  be 
found  on  the  side  he  espouses ;  while  inconsisten- 
cies, contradictions,  and  absurdities  range  them- 
selves thick  on  the  side  of  the  believer  in  matter. 
At  the  same  time,  in  a  case  like  this,  where  there 
is  no  possibility  either  of  a  visible  proof,  or  of  a 
mathematical  demonstration,  he  will  be  content  to 
be  allowed  to  present  the  appeal,  leaving  it  to 
reason  to  pronounce  its  own  decision  upon  it. 


i  I 


CHAPTER   II. 

1>HYSICAL  PROOFS  AGAINST  THE  EXISTENCE  OF 
matter;  AND  PHYSICAL  PROOF  OF  WHAT  SUP- 
PLIES ITS  PLACE. 

The  common  belief  of  Realists  is,  that  the  mate- 
rial world  was  created  by  Deity,  and  is  sustained 
by  Him.  This  broad  general  view,  however, 
divides  itself  into  two  sub-theories,  one  or  other  of 
which  must  be  accepted  by  every  religious  Realist 
who  believes  in  matter. 

First,  the  theory  of  those  who  hold  that  matter 
is  in  itself  naturally  inert,  but  that  it  has  conferred 
on  it  active  properties,  which  enable  it  to  dis- 
charge all  the  operations  of  a  physical  world,  from 
the  simplest  movements  caused  by  gravitation,  up 
to  the  most  complex  exercise  of  animal  and  vege- 
table function. 

Second,  the  theory  of  such  as  are  unable  to 
look  upon  matter  as  endowed  with  such  wonderful 
powers,  and  who  are  not  willing  to  admit  that  a 


24 


PHYSICAL  PROOFS  AGAINST 


THE  EXISTENCE  OF  MATTER. 


25 


a  ^ 


}  f 


dead,  unconscious  thing  is  capable  of  conducting 
the  wonderful  processes  observed  in  nature.  This 
section,  therefore,  regard  matter  as  merely  the 
occasion  or  occasional  cause,  as  it  has  been  called,  of 
physical  events,  Deity  being  held  by  them  as  the 
real  or  eflScient  cause;  and  very  evidently  the 
only  cause  which  reason  can  sanction.  Descartes, 
Malebranche,  and  a  host  of  able  men,  have  held 
this  second  view;  and  the  explanation  given  by 
Reid  and  Stewart  of  perception,  and  their  modes 
of  expression,  in  various  parts,  regarding  natural 
phenomena,  would  indicate  that  such  was  also 
their  opinion  ;  though  they  refrain  from  identifying 
themselves  with  the  party  who  openly  maintained 
•  the  doctrine  that  matter  is  only  the  occasional  or 
apparent  cause. 

The  doctrine  of  matter,  under  whichsoever  of 
these  alternatives  we  regard  it,  appears  so  fraught 
with  difficulty  and  contradiction,  that  there  is  an 
evident  necessity  for  examining  its  pretensions, 
and  considering  whether  the  world  cannot  be 
better  understood  when  matter,  as  an  entity,  is 
entirely  discharged  from  our  creed,  and  a  dynami- 
cal world  is  established  in  its  place.     The  ground 


we  have  for  holding  this  position  we  shall  en- 
deavour to  exhibit  in  as  condensed  and  simple  a 
manner  as  the  subject  will  admit:  stating  first 
the  physical  and  then  the  metaphysical  argu- 
ments which  have  occurred  to  us. 

As  a  preliminary  argument,  then,  we  say  that 
the  phenomena  met  with  in  prosecuting  chemical 
science,  are  frequently  so  marvellous  and  unex- 
pected, as  to  raise  in  the  mind  of  an  abstract 
thinker  doubts  as  to  the  theory  that  the  atoms 
with  which  he  is  dealing  are  material  atoms.  The 
idea  of  matter  or  substance — that  which  remains  or 
stands  under  the  properties — implies,  to  every  man 
who  considers  it,  the  possession  of  certain  specific 
qualities  permanently  inherent  in  each  substance 
or  elementary  body.  This  idea,  inseparable  from 
the  conception  of  matter,  is  found  to  be  the  reverse 
of  a  true  one.  • 

The  most  trifling  difference  in  the  proportions 
in  which  substances  are  combined  frequently  creates 
the  most  entire  change  of  property.  Witness  the 
results  of  the  various  combinations  of  oxygen  with 
carbon,  with  hydrogen,  or  with  nitrogen;  and 
witness  the  still  more  surprising  animal  and  vege- 


26 


PHYSICAL  PROOFS  AGAINST 


THE  EXISTENCE  OF  MATTER. 


27 


table  productions  which  result  from  the  united 
combination  of  these  four  simple  or  elementary 
substances — the  oils,  the  gums,  the  dyes,  the  flesh, 
the  fish,  the  vegetables,  the  medicines,  the  poisons 
— in  fact  the  countless  products  and  principles, 
animal  and  vegetable,  composing  the  vast  catalogue 
of  nature,  which  are  nearly  all  compounded  of 
these  four  simple  substances.  Quinine,  for  in- 
stance, is  composed  of  seventy  atoms  of  these  four 
substances,  and  so  is  strychnine.  The  only  dif- 
ference between  the  poison  and  the  tonic  being, 
that  the  poison  lias  two  atoms  less  of  hydrogen 
than  the  tonic — their  place  being  supplied  by  two 
atoms  of  carbon. 

All  such  facts  indicate  that  the  ultimate  ele- 
ments and  their  combinations  act  dynamically ; 
certainly  they  do  not  act  in  the  way  we  would 
expect  substances  to  act.  Consider  the  atoms  as 
matter,  and  all  seems  contradiction.  Consider 
them  as  dynamical  bodies,  and  the  phenomena  we 
observe  become  comparatively  easy  to  understand, 
or  to  conceive. 

For  example,  the  tissues  of  the  animal  frame 
are  a  nicely  balanced  combination  of  elementary 


atoms.  All  animal  and  vegetable  tissues  are 
composed  of  clusters  or  groups  of  these  atoms, 
and  the  nature  of  the  grouping  implies,  as  the 
organic  chemist  well  knows,  that  they  are  held  in 
comparatively  feeble  combination.  What  is  flesh 
to-day  is  corruption  to-morrow,  resolving  itself 
into  new  combinations.  This  is  an  essential  con- 
dition, and  without  it,  nutrition,  assimilation,  and 
renovation  would  be  impossible;  for  it  is  only 
where  all  is  feebly  held  together  that  the  transfer 
of  the  parts,  which  is  necessary  in  animal  life,  can 
be  effected.  If,  then,  we  regard  our  bodies,  and 
the  substances  we  take  as  food  or  as  medicine,  as 
nicely  balanced  collocations  of  specific  forces,  we 
can  understand  how  the  two  may  act  concun-ently, 
or  may  act  antagonistically — the  one  group,  if  w^e 
may  use  ordinary  language,  nourishing  us,  or 
becoming  incorporated  with  our  bodies,  in  whole 
or  in  part,  while  another  slightly  different  colloca- 
tion may  dissolve,  or  break  up,  or  neutralize,  the 
specific  force  binding  the  substance  of  the  animal 
tissues  together;  may  stifle,  or  may  strengthen, 
the  nervous  energy ;  or  may  invigorate  or  paralyze 
the   organ  where   this  vital   agent   is   generated. 


28 


PHYSICAL  PROOFS  AGAINST 


THE  EXISTENCE  OF  MATTER. 


29 


!  .1    1 


ri 


Whereas  if  we  regard  the  substances  as  composed 
of  matter,  having  substantial  or  enduring  quali- 
ties, it  is  impossible  to  account  reasonably  for  the 
results  effected  by  the  most  trifling  changes  in  the 
proportions  of  the  constituent  elements  of  the 
articles  used. 

But  leaving  this.  The  following  facts  and  con- 
siderations of  a  more  specific  nature,  derived  from 
physical  science,  when  followed  up  by  the  reflec- 
tions they  suggest,  lead  us  step  by  step  to  the  same 
conclusion — that  matter  does  not  exist. 

Isty  All  objects  in  nature  act  external  to  them- 
selves. The  sun  acts  on  the  earth,  and  the  earth 
acts  on  the  moon.  The  power  of  attraction 
between  these  large  bodies,  considered  as  a  me- 
chanical force,  is  enormous.  Now,  as  we  know  ot 
no  material  link  between  these  bodies  which  can 
explain  so  strange  a  fact,  we  are  compelled  to 
believe  in  the  existence  of  this  tremendous  me- 
chanical or  physical  force,  without  the  existence  of 
a  mechanical  agent  to  produce  it. 

2dj  In  like  manner,  it  is  evident  that  chemical 
atoms,  when  they  act  on  each  other,  if  they  be 
material  atoms,  must  also  act  external  to  themselves. 


Let  us  conceive  these  three  bodies  to  be  chemi- 
cal, or  ultimate  atoms,  in  a  state  of  what,  if 
they  are  material  atoms,  is  incorrectly 
called  chemical  combination.  It  is  evi- 
dent they  are  acting  on  each  other 
external  to  tliemselvesj  and  they  must 
ever  do  so  if  they  be  material  and  ultimate, 
therefore,  according  to  chemical  doctrine,  indi- 
visible atoms.  It  is  therefore,  here  again,  even 
if  we  adopt  the  general  materialistic  theory,  not 
matter  which  acts  on  matter,  but  it  is  an  in- 
visible and  immaterial  power,  external  to  the 
atoms,  which  rules  their  movements  and  affinities, 
and  draws  them  together  with  that  extraordinary 
force  which  is  known  to  exist  in  very  many 
chemical  combinations. 

In  strict  language,  it  is  evident  there  can  be 
no  such  thing  as  combination  of  material  elements — 
there  can  be  nothing  but  a  mixing  of  their  parts. 
Combination,  which  is  necessary  to  account  for 
chemical  changes,  is  a  state  only  possible  with 
dynamical  bodies  or  forces;  for  these  alone  can 
be  combined  so  as  to  act  with  or  against  each 
other,  by  addition  to  their  respective  powers, — or 


30 


PHYSICAL  PROOFS  AGAINST 


THE  EXISTENCE  OF  MATTER. 


31 


i^ 


by  subtraction  therefrom, — or  by  giving  their 
action  a  new  direction.  Thus,  and  thus  alone, 
can  chemical  changes  and  combinations  be  ac- 
counted for. 

Sd,  It  can  be  proved  that  no  one  portion  of 
matter  ever  touches  another.  The  elasticity  of 
all  bodies  proves  this.  And  when  it  is  objected 
to  this  argument,  that  the  ultimate  parts  of  matter 
may  be  compressible — the  objection,  it  will  be 
observed,  is  a  virtual  admission  of  the  fact  objected 
to,  for  it  is  equivalent  to  saying  that  the  parts 
of  objects  may  come  closer ^  and  that  they  are  not 
absolutely  close.  In  gases,  the  intervals  between 
the  atoms,  even  in  ordinary  circumstances,  must 
be  enormous,  compared  with  the  size  of  the  atoms 
themselves ;  and  it  would  seem  that  the  interval 
may  be  indelinitely  extended;  for  it  is  found 
that  these  atoms,  even  under  the  nearly  fully 
exhausted  receiver  of  an  air-pump,  when  they  are 
removed  infinitely  further  from  each  other,  still 
repel  each  other,  acting  thus  ever  external  to 
themselves. 

Ath^  A  ray  of  light  falling  on  a  polished  surface, 
e.g,^  on  coloured  glass,  or  on  a  polished  mahogany 


table,  is  reflected,  without  acquiring  any  of  the 
colour  of  the  body  reflecting  it.  This  proves 
that  the  action  in  reflection  is  excited  external 
to  the  surface  of  the  glass  or  other  reflecting 
body,  and  that  none  of  the  reflected  ray  touches 
the  reflecting  surface,  so  as  to  have  any  of  the 
constituents  of  the  pure  ray  absorbed  or  trans- 
mitted, and  the  reflected  ray  thereby  rendered  a 
coloured  ray. 

6thj  We  shall  give  some  more  elaborate  proofs 
that  matter  does  not  act  on  matter,  but  force  on 
force.  It  is  known  that  light  when  it  falls  on 
the  polished  surface  of  a  transparent  polished 
body,  part  of  the  ray  is  reflected  and  part  is 
refracted,  and  passes  through  the  transparent  body. 
In  the  case  of  reflection,  the  angle  of  reflection 
is  equal  to  the  angle  of  incidence.  Now,  Sir 
John  Herschel,  in  his  elaborate  article  on  Light 
(Ency.  Metrop.),  shows  clearly  that  this  could 
not  be  possible  if  the  light  actually  touched  the 
polished  surface.  "The  process  of  polishing  a 
piece  of  glass,"  says  he,  "  is,  in  fact,  nothing  more 
than  the  rounding  down  larger  asperities  into 
smaller  ones,  by  the  use  of  hard  gritty  powders, 


32 


PHYSICAL  PROOFS  AGAINST 


which,  whatever  degree  of  mechanical  comminu- 
tion we  may  give  them,  are  yet  but  masses,  in 
comparison  with  the  ultimate  molecules  of  matter." 

Let  us  consider  the  accompanying  figure  in 
explanation  of  the  facts  of  reflection  and  refrac- 
tion ;  and  first  with  regard  to  reflection : — It  will 
be  apparent  that  the  molecules  of  light,  forming 
the  ray  AB,  or  the  molecules  of  the  ether  propelled 
forward  and  backward  by  luminous  vibration,  are 
reflected  not  at  the  surface  SS  of  the  glass  GG, 
whose  roughness  would  cause  it  to  become  scattered, 
but  somewhere  at  a  sensible  distance  from  it,  in 
the  zone  of  force  FF,  where  the  action  of  the 
only  partially  polished  surface  comes  into  play, 
and  is  sufficient  to  repel  it. 

6th,  In  the  case  of  refraction  again,  the  bending 
down  of  the  ray  RR,  it  is  equally  apparent,  is 
commenced  not  at  the  surface  of  the  glass,  but 
at  a  certain  distance  above  it,  in  the  zone  of 
force  FF. 

After  the  ray  has  entered  the  supposed  substance 
of  the  transparent  body,  or,  according  to  our 
theory,  has  passed  through  the  first  plane  of  atomic 
centres  of  force  at  SS,  where  action  will  be  equal 


THE  EXISTENCE  OF  MATTER 


33 


on  all  sides,  its  course,  it  is  well  known,  is  in  a 
straight  line,  till  it  passes  the  lower  surface,  at  S'S'. 


Now  mark — this  passage  of  the  refracted  ray 
RR  through  a  rectangular  prism  of  polished  glass, 
affords  to  our  mind  the  strongest  proof  physics 
can  give  us  that  the  glass  is  not  a  material,  but 
a  dynamical  body ;  and  we  beg  the  reader's  atten- 
tion to  this  proof. 

When  the  ray  RR  has  passed  through  the 
plane  of  force  commencing  at  FF,  and  has  reached 
the  supposed  substance  of  the  glass  at  SS,  it 
must  be  assumed  to  meet  it,  owing  to  the  partial 
roughness  of  the  surface,  at  every  conceivable 
angle.  If,  then,  the  glass  were  matter,  it  is  self- 
evident  that  the  ray  could  not  impinge  upon,  and 


34 


PHYSICAL  PROOFS  AGAINST 


pass  through  the  rough  surface,  without  being 
jostled  and  scattered  in  every  direction.  It  is, 
in  like  manner,  equally  irreconcilable  with  the 
laws  of  physics  that  the  ray  of  light  should 
emerge  at  the  lower  surface  S'S',  which  is  also — 
as  Sir  John  Herschel  shows — rough,  and  still 
maintain  its  parallel  form.  Neither  light  nor  any 
other  moving  physical  body  can  impinge  obliquely 
upon  solid  bodies  at  rest,  without  being  deflected 
from  its  course.  The  fact  that  the  constituent 
parts  of  the  ray  are  not  so  deflected  and  scattered 
in  passing  through  the  upper  and  under  rough 
surfaces,  is  to  us  a  proof  that  no  matter^  according 
to  the  usual  conception  we  have  of  matter,  is  there 
to  deflect  them. 

I  claim  this  fact,  then,  as  a  proof  that  the 
surfaces  are  not  material  surfaces,  but  are  to  be 
regarded  as  the  planes  of  the  outermost  centres  of 
the  atomic  forces  of  which  the  glass  is  composed ; 
and  the  phenomena  can,  we  think,  be  explained  on 
no  other  hypothesis  than  that  glass  and  other  trans- 
parent bodies  are  immaterial  and  dynamical. 

1th,  The  rapidity  of  the  vibrations  of  luminiferous 
ether,  and  the  free  passage  of  the  ray  of  light 


THE  EXISTENCE  OF  MATTER. 


35 


through  transparent  bodies,  if  they  do  not  afford  a 
proof,  at  least  strengthen  the  probability  of  these 
bodies  being  dynamical  and  immaterial.  For  here 
we  have  the  most  rapid  movements  that  can  be 
conceived  conducted  in  the  substance  often  of  the 
densest  bodies,  such  as  the  diamond,  the  ruby, 
glass,  water,  and  crystals.  This,  it  will  be  allowed, 
is  not  easily  reconcilable  with  the  usual  concep- 
tion entertained  of  these  bodies  being  either  solid 
bodies,  or  bodies  composed  of  innumerable  material 
atoms,  held  sensibly  apart.  That  the  luminous 
vibration  should  emerge  from  such  an  ordeal  un- 
impaired in  strength,  and  maintaining  its  original 
parallelism,  is  inconsistent  with  the  known  laws 
regulating  the  transmission  either  of  atmospheric 
vibrations,  or  of  small  projectiles,  through  the 
obstructing  influence  of  larger  bodies  in  a  state 
of  rest, — or  through  bodies  called  solid  j  while 
it  is  quite  compatible  with  the  principles  which 
would  govern  their  transmission  through  a  perfectly 
elastic  immaterial  medium,  freely  permeated  by 
the  vibrating  medium,  t.e ,  through  a  medium  of 
atomic  forces  combined  closely  enough  everywhere 
to  interpenetrate  each  other,  and  so  to  afford  a 


ifeMB-titritr\iiiVtAiif«iiiiiliiiitii'fffiil^^ 


36 


PHYSICAL  PROOFS  AGAINST 


course  to  the  projectiles  or  to  the  waves  of  vibra- 
tion, free  of  disturbing  lateral  action  from  individual 
circles  of  force. 

Were  the  glass  composed  of  separate  and  inde- 
pendent particles,  whether  material  or  dynamical, 
the  effect  would  be  as  when  the  sun  shines  through 
a  cloud,  whose  particles  reflect  and  transmit  the 
light  at  every  possible  angle.  The  cloud,  if  a 
dense  one,  reflects  the  whole  light  falling  upon  its 
upper  surface,  which  thence  appears  of  a  brilliant 
whiteness,  while  its  lower  side,  which  receives  no 
transmitted  light,  is  perfectly  dark.  If  the  cloud 
be  less  dense,  it  appears  as  a  white  object,  and 
not  as  one  which  is  transparent,  though  each 
particle  of  it  possesses  the  character  of  transparency. 
Now,  if  the  fact  of  the  vesicles  of  the  cloud  being 
apart  from  each  other,  and  not  in  dynamical  inter- 
penetration,  deprives  the  cloud  of  transparency — 
how  much  more  certainly,  if  we  may  be  allowed 
to  draw  an  argument  from  the  data  with  which  the 
materialists  furnish  us,— how  much  more  certainly 
would  the  ray  be  obstructed  and  dispersed  were 
the  glass,  or  were  the  misty  particles  composing 
the  cloud  to  consist  of  particles  of  matter  which 


THE  EXISTENCE  OF  MATTER. 


37 


we  are  told  are  solid  and  impenetrable.  We  are 
therefore  led  to  conclude,  that  transparent  bodies 
are  composed  of  atomic  circles,  whose  forces  fully 
interpenetrate  each  other,  and  that  all  other  bodies 
are  likewise  composed  merely  of  atomic  circles  of 
force. 

Sthy  Our  inability  to  interrupt  the  attracting  or 
repelling  action  of  the  magnet  by  the  intervention 
of  numerous  plates  of  non-magnetic  dense  bodies, 
such  as  glass,  copper,  lead,  pasteboard,  etc.,  either 
singly  or  in  combination,  affords  another  presump- 
tion, that  these  bodies  interposed  do  not  consist  of 
solid  matter,  but  are  the  combinations  of  imma- 
terial forces. 

9th,  And  lastly,  and  to  illustrate,  as  far  as 
possible,  the  universality  of  the  principle  we  have 
been  enforcing,  we  instance  the  operations  of  some 
of  the  most  important  laws  of  nature.  All  the 
forces  exerted  on  the  earth's  surface,  if  we  consider 
them  in  detail,  are  found  to  operate  without  the 
destruction,  or  alteration,  of  a-  single  elementary 
atom ;  and  a  good  deal  of  heavy  work  has  been, 
and  is  still  being  accomplished.  The  mountains 
have  been  upheaved, — a  notable  quantity  of  the 


UaS^sAiaailMSaiiiiiiiMiiitaiii^im'&MiiiriMr^''''''-  '■"■'  "■'■^■^-  ■"*"■  "-^"vjmi'  ^nWiif  miii«i?ifliiM 


I 


38 


PHYSICAL  PROOFS  AGAINST 


earth's  crust  has  been  ground  down, — strata  several 
miles  in  thickness  have  been  deposited, — Niagara 
and  thousands  of  other  cataracts  and  rivers  have 
ceaselessly  been  pouring  their  floods.  All  this 
indicates  a  force  in  constant  operation,  scarcely  cal- 
culable, it  is  so  great.  Other  forces  have  caused 
the  gi'owth  of  forests,  and  every  variety  of  vegeta- 
tion.^ All  this  has  been  accomplished  by  the  forces 
inherent  in  the  physical  world.  If  we  consider 
it  atomically,  or  with  reference  to  its  physical 
source,  it  has  been  effected  by  the  forces  of  the 
elementary  atoms ;  and  yet,  what  is  strange,  these 
atoms  remain  unaltered.     To  explain  our  meaning 

by  examples  with  which  we  are  all  familiar: 

Coal  is  the  principal  agent  at  the  disposal  of  man 
for  the  production  of  physical  power.  Every  ton 
of  coal  used  in  working  a  steam-engine  produces 
a  certain  amount  of  work.  Now,  we  naturally 
connect  the  destruction  of  the  coal  with  the  amount 
of  work  done.  We  consider  the  work  as  an  equi- 
valent for  the  loss  of  the  coal.     And  so  it  is.     But 

»  The  forces  which  have  executed  these  operations  are  derived 
from  various  sources,— from  the  earth,  from  the  sun,  from  the  moon, 
and  from  the  mysterious  principle  called  vital  force,  which  acts  in 
concert  with  the  sun  in  rearing  up  the  various  vegetable  structures. 


THE  EXISTENCE  OF  MATTER. 


39 


are  the  materials  forming  the  coal  really  lost? 
They  are  not.      Coal  consists   mainly  of  certain 

proportions  of  carbon,  hydrogen,  and  earthy  matter 
— not  one  atom  of  these  is  destroyed,  lost,  or  used 
up,  in  the  production  of  heat  and  mechanical  force. 
They  are  merely  loosened  from  one  form  of  com- 
bination, and  set  abroad  in  other  combinations. 

Observe,  then,  that  here  we  have  something 
given  off  by  the  atoms,  and  yet  the  atoms  remain 
unaltered.  What  they  have  given  us  is  not  mate- 
rial, but  it  is,  notwithstanding,  most  substantial 
and  valuable.  The  atoms  have  pumped  water 
from  the  mine — they  have  sawn  wood,  they  have 
ground  com — they  have  spun  several  thousand 
yards  of  yarn,  and  yet  here  are  the  atoms  the  same 
in  number  and  property  as  before  the  work  was 
done.  Whatever  these  atoms  may  be,  then,  one 
thing  is  certain,  that  force  is  a  thing,  or  let  us  say 
an  action,  which  they  can  put  forth  without  im- 
pairing their  own  nature,  substance,  or  being.  We 
are  not  going  to  explain  how  they  do  this,  because 
we  wish  the  attention  confined  to  the  simple  fact 
that  they  do  it ;  and  we  wish  the  fact  to  be  viewed 
in  its  simplest  fonn,  for  if  we  do  so,  we  see  at 


40 


PHYSICAL  PROOFS  AGAINST 


once,  both  from  the  instance  given  and  from  some 
of  the  previous  facts  adduced,  that  a  clear  demon- 
stration is  afforded  us  that  physical  force  ia  an 
immaterial  thing,  and  that  the  production  of  this 
physical  force,  and  its  employment  in  work,  do 
not  affect  the  substance  of  the  bodies  producing  it. 
We  shall  give  now  an  instance  bearing  on  the 
same    principle,   drawn  from   the   phenomena  of 
animal  force.     It  is  well  known  that  there  is  a 
constant  tear  and  wear  of  the  bodily  organs  pro- 
duced by  bodily  work,  and  even  by  the  operations 
of  life,  and  that  the  organs  are  restored  by  food. 
This  being  premised,  we  state  it  as  a  fact  equally 
indisputable,  that  not  one  of  the  constituent  ele- 
ments of  the  food  which  goes  to  produce  our  bodily 
strength  is  destroyed  or  used  up  in  accomplishing 
this  result.      They  all  pass   off  from   the   body 
unaltered  in  number  and  quality.     Tliis  is  a  very 
singular  fact.      Certain   elements,  or  elementary 
atomic  forces  are  taken  into  the  system,  and  for  a 
time  incorporated  with  our  organs  and  then  ex- 
pelled at  the  lungs,  and  the  valuable  and  available 
results  are  the  two  immaterial  products,  heat  and 
physical  force.     We  leave  it  to  the  chemist  and 


THE  EXISTENCE  OF  MATTER. 


41 


physiologist  to  explain,  if  they  can,  precisely,  how 
this  is  effected  through  the  composition  and  decom- 
position of  the  arrangement  of  the  atoms  taken  as 
food;  sufficient  for  our  purpose  is  the  fact  as  we 
have  stated  it.  We  may  take  it  in  any  practical 
way  we  dhoose.  Let  us  suppose,  for  instance,  that 
half  a  pound  of  meat  will  send  us  comfortably  to 
the  top  of  Lochnagar  or  Cairngorm — or  let  us  con- 
sider that  six  cwt.  of  good  food  will  maintain  a 
hard-working  man  for  twelve  months  in  health  and 
strength ;  and  yet,  in  accomplishing  this,  not  one 
elementary  atom  is  lost,  used  up,  or  changed. 
It  is  evident  that  that  which  performs  the  work  is 
not  the  atoms  themselves,  but  an  immaterial  energy 
which  they  possess,  and  which  they  are  enabled 
to  communicate  to  our  bodies,  or  to  put  forth, 
when  incorporated  in  our  organs,  and  all  without 
impairing  their  own  strength  or  altering  their 
nature. 

It  must  be  remembered,  also,  that  some  of  the 
previous  physical  facts  given  by  us  establish  that 
chemical  atoms  are  surrounded  by  attracting  and 
repelling  forces,  which  prevent  our  ever  reaching 
the  real  substance  of  the  atom,  if  such  substance 


■awifey-Hi^ja-.--,.^..-,..  ^■ij^,-^.r^. 


MAja*MiM^iaaMBilaaaaMfiaa*iMtaiiiMgMMi^^iMi 


\ 


42 


PHYSICAL  PROOFS  AGAINST 


THE  EXISTENCE  OF  MATTER. 


43 


i 


or  nucleus  exists,  and  which  repelling  forces  also 
prevent  the  atoms  ever  coming  into  contact  with 
each  other,  and  that  the  atoms  therefore  act  on 
each  other  only  through  the  influence  of  forces 
external  to  themselves,  even  if  they  be  material 
bodies. 

Several  questions  will,  however,  be  very  natu- 
rally  proposed  in  opposition  to  our  denial  of  matter; 
and  first,  it  will  be  asked,  Do  we  not  see  matter? 
Now,  no  question  can  be  more  easily  and  confi- 
dently  answered  in  the  negative  than  this  one.     It 
must  be  evident,  indeed,  to  eveiy  one  who  takes  the 
trouble  to  reflect  on  the  nature  of  this  sense,  that 
vision  gives  us  a  sensation  of  form  and  colour,  and 
that  it  is  produced  by  an  impulse  on  the  optic 
nerve,  caused  by  the  vibratory  movements  of  an 
elastic  medium  which  extends   between   the   ob- 
server and  the  objects.    A  sense  of  this  kind,  then, 
which  brings  us  not  into  contact  with  objects,  and 
which  is  cognisant  only  of  colour  and  form,  can 
evidently  give  us  no  insight  into  the  constitution 
of  external  objects.     That  there  are  external  ob- 
jects is   not   denied-that  they  possess  physical 
properties  and  powers  is  admitted—but  before  we 


can  admit  that  they  are  material  as  well  as  phy- 
sical it  is  reasonable  to  demand  something  at  least 
in  the  form  of  proof;  for  the  idea,  however  univer- 
sally received,  is  yet,  as  we  have  shown,  not  founded 
on  reason,  but  is,  on  the  contrary,  when  examined 
into,  as  we  mean  to  do,  found  to  be  opposed  alike 
to  philosophy  and  to  common-sense. 

Let  us  advance  a  step  further  in  our  inquiries. 
It  will  probably  be  admitted  by  most  readers  that 
the  forces  of  repulsion  and  attraction  which  chemi- 
cal atoms  exert,  are  the  efficient  and  important 
properties  of  these  atoms — that,  in  fact,  the  action 
of  these  forces,  regulated  according  to  the  laws 
impressed  upon  each  particular  elementary  sub- 
stance, is  all  that  we  can  prove  to  exist. 

It  may,  however,  very  reasonably  be  asked.  Is 
it  not  probable  that  there  may  be  a  nucleus  of 
matter  within  the  circle  of  force  which  we  call  an 
atom.  This  question  the  reader  can  best  answer 
for  himself.  If  the  forces  of  whose  existence  we 
are  alone  conscious  are  the  important  and  efficient 
properties  observed  in  a  physical  world  and  in 
chemical  atoms,  what  necessity  is  there  to  assume 
the  existence  within  the  centre  of  force  of  an  inert 


44 


PHYSICAL  PROOFS  AGAINST 


and  insensible  part  which  furnishes  no  explanation 
of  physical  phenomena— which    is   never   seen— 
which  is  never  felt  ?     Have  we  no  more  rational 
way  of  explaining  the  existence  of  power  of  which 
we  are  conscious?    Do   we  never  ask  ourselves 
—How  comes  the  hard  insensible  centre  by  its 
powers?      How  comes  it   to  possess  that  which 
appears  rather  the  attribute  of  a  Divine  Being  than 
of  an  insensible  gritty  particle?     Is  it  not  irra- 
tional to  suppose  a  thing  to  exist  which  explains 
nothing?     Such   are  the  questions  which  reason 
puts. 

Suppose  these  three  circles  to  be  atoms  in  chemi- 
cal combination,  and  to  represent  thus  a  physical 
molecule  of  which  the  individual  circles 
represent  the  limits  of  the  efficient  ac- 
tion of  each  atom,  and  the  spots  within 
represent  the  material  nucleus.  The 
physical  philosopher  admits  there  is  a  space  be- 
tween the  accessible  circle  of  force  and  the  inac- 
cessible nucleus  of  matter.  But  what  that  space 
is,  what  is  the  relative  size  of  the  one  and  the 
other,  he  does  not  attempt  to  determine.  The  sup- 
posed material  centre  may  be  very  small— it  may 


THE  EXISTENCE  OF  MATTER. 


45 


be  a  mere  physical  point.  We  ask,  why  may  it 
not  be  a  mathematical  point — position  without 
magnitude — a  nothing?  If  there  be  a  circle  of 
force  which  does  all  the  work,  what,  we  ask,  is  the 
necessity  or  the  object  of  imagining  an  unknown, 
inaccessible,  and  inoperative  core  of  matter  to  exist 
within  ?  The  law  of  Parsimony  imperatively  for- 
bids such  a  supposition,  and  justifies  us  in  dis- 
charging this  material  core  entirely  from  the  atom 
and  from  our  creed.  For  it  is  an  established  law, 
which  is  applicable  here  if  anywhere,  that  nothing 
exists  in  nature  which  subserves  no  use,  and  this, 
so  far  as  can  be  shown,  is  the  position  of  this 
imaginary  entity. 

The  universe  then,  in  this  light,  becomes  a  vast 
and  glorious  exhibition  of  power,  acting  and  dis- 
played according  to  those  laws  which  have  been 
designed  and  appointed  by  the  Creator,  and  which 
laws  and  system  we  designate  the  Laws  of  Nature. 

Sir  John  Leslie,  a  pian  of  various  accomplish- 
ments, profound  in  mathematical  science,  and  most 
ingenious  in  all  his  physical  researches,  in  his 
Dissertation  prefixed  to  the  "  Encyclopaedia  Bri- 
tannica,"  seems  to  exhibit  no  disfavour  to  Bosco- 


46 


PHYSICAL  PROOFS  AGAINST 


wicli's  rather  fanciful  "Theory  of  Dynamics," 
except  that  the  material  points  within  his  atoms 
are  made  mathematical  points.  The  reader  may 
smile,  but  we  regard  this  nawe  objection  as  affording 
an  interesting  trait  of  the  breadth  and  versatility 
of  this  eminent  physicist's  mind.  Leslie  suggests 
that,  in  order  to  get  over  this  prejudice  to  Bosco- 
wich's  dynamical  atoms,  we  may  conceive  the 
material  centres  "  to  have  real  dimensions,  though 
far  smaller  than  any  assigned  measure.''^ 

Professor   Forbes,   in   his    Dissertation   in    the 
same  work,   expresses  a  difficulty  in  reconciling 
this  theory  of  Boscowich  to  the  law  of  inertia. 
This  is  probably  a  chief  difficulty  felt   by  most 
men,  namely,  to  conceive  of  inertia  or  ponderosity 
being  possessed  by  immaterial  bodies.     But  this 
difficulty  is  entirely  one  of  the  mind's  own  creation,    ' 
and  rests  upon  a  syllogism  having  false  premises, 
and  an  inconsecutive  conclusion.     It  arises  from 
our  habit  of  considering  that  physical  bodies  are 
material  bodies,   and  arguing   illogically  on   this 
assumption,  that  because  they  have  inertia,  therefore 
nothing  that  is   not   material  can  have  it.     The 
reader  will  perceive  how  worthless  this  argument 


THE  EXISTENCE  OF  MATTER. 


47 


is.  Surely  it  is  evident  that  if  immaterial  atoms 
may  possess  that  force  which,  in  all  natural  objects, 
binds  them  to  one  another,  no  argument  can  be 
established  on  abstract  grounds  to  prove  that  they 
may  not  have  that  force  which  draws  them  when 
in  mass  to  the  earth,  or  to  other  larger  masses. 

If  it  is  thus  easy  to  silence  the  objection  against 
their  possessing  weighty  it  is  equally  easy  to  prove 
that  if  dynamical  bodies  exist,  they  must  be 
conceived  to  possess  inertia  and  ponderosity.  Let 
us  suppose  the  smallest  mass  or  molecule  of  a 
dynamical  body  at  rest  It  is  evident  that  such  a 
body  will  not  movej  unless  physical  force  is  applied 
to  it,  A  certain  amount  of  force  will  he  necessary 
to  give  it  a  certain  velocity.  If  this  be  admitted, 
then  it  follows  that  if  the  molecule  be  increased 
ten,  a  hundred,  or  a  thousand  times  in  mass,  it 
must  require  just  ten,  a  hundred,  or  a  thousand 
times  the  amount  of  force  to  produce  a  similar 
velocity. 

So  far,  then,  as  we  have  analogy  and  argument 
to  guide  us,  these  immaterial  bodies  must  have 
inertia.  At  least  the  mouth  of  a  caviller  is  shut 
against  asserting  that  they  cannot  have  it. 


48 


PHYSICAL  PROOFS  AGAINST 


THE  EXISTENCE  OF  MATTER. 


49 


* 


If  any  difficulty  still  remains  to  prevent  our 
realizing  immaterial  masses  as  capable  of  inertia, 
or  the  possession  of  ponderosity,  or  immobility,  the 
difficulty  should  vanish  when  it  is  kept  in  mind 
that  all  our  perceptions  of  force  are  only  relative  to 
our  strength,  and  not  absolute.  If  our  living  bodies, 
then,  and  the  substance  of  all  external  objects, 
possess  the  same  immaterial  nature — as  is  assumed 
in  our  theory — we  should  not  be  surprised,  but 
should  rather  view  it  as  a  necessary  consequence, 
that  the  inertia  of  external  immaterial  objects 
should  appear  in  proportion  to  their  masses,  and 
that  its  amount  should  have  a  strict  relation  to  the 
strength  and  mass  of  our  percipient  bodies  :  the 
sentient  body,  originating  the  movement,  and  the 
inert  object  moved,  being  alike  composed  of  the 
same  immaterial  substance. 

We  close  our  physical  proof  by  informing  the 
reader  that  Professor  Faraday,  in  a  paper  published 
in  the  "  Philosophical  Magazine  "  in  1844,  avows 
his  belief  in  the  immateriality  of  physical  objects.* 
This  conclusion  was  forced  upon  him  while  reflect- 

*  For  directing  his  attention  to  this  fact  the  author  is  indebted  to 
Professor  Tait,  of  Edinburgh. 


ing  on  the  conduction  and  isolation  of  electricity ; 
and  also  on  the  remarkable  condensation  which 
potassium  undergoes  when  combined  with  oxygen 
and  hydrogen.  He  calculated  that  a  certain  volume 
of  this  metal  contained  700  atoms,  and  that  when 
it  is  converted  into  hydrate  of  potassa,  the  com- 
pound contains  2800  atoms.  Its  bulk,  however, 
instead  of  being  thereby  increased,  is  reduced  by 
this  large  addition  to  little  more  than  one-third 
the  volume  of  the  original  metal.  This  singular 
collapse  of  a  solid  metal,  joined  no  doubt  with 
many  other  equally  surprising  anomalies  encoun- 
tered by  that  ardent  investigator,  prepared  him  to 
regard  it,  as  no  absurd  whim,  but  as  a  very  prob- 
able conclusion  that  physical  atoms  are  not  material, 
but  mere  dynamical  bodies. 

Many  more  physical  proofs  than  those  given 
above  might  be  found.  The  writer  has  only  pre- 
sented such  as  have  occurred  to  his  own  mind. 
He  leaves  the  subject  to  be  prosecuted  by  such  aa 
may  take  an  interest  in  it,  and  who  may  possess 
greater  diligence  and  a  more  extensive  acquaintance 
with  physical  phenomena  than  he  is  able  to  profess. 


D 


50 


CHAPTER   III. 

PHILOSOPHICAL  AND  COMMON-SENSE  ARGUMENTS 
AGAINST  THE  EXISTENCE  OF  MATTER. — THE  SIM- 
PLICITY, CONSISTENCY,  AND  GRANDEUR  OF  THE 
OPPOSITE  THEORY. 

It  does  not  appear  necessary  to  seek,  at  this  time, 
for  more  physical  facts  to  support  these  views. 
Certain  reflections,  however,  of  a  metaphysical 
nature  arise  in  the  mind  to  strengthen  the  convic- 
tions we  have  avowed  in  the  preceding  pages. 
These  have,  to  persons  who  can  enter  into  such 
considerations,  a  force  superior  to  any  which  mere 
physical  phenomena  can  furnish. 

The  writer  is  well  aware  that  judgments  formed 
by  the  mind  while  engaged  in  such  subtleties, 
carry  weight  only  with  those  who  have  been  in 
the  habit  of  earnestly  dealing  with  them  ;  and  the 
decisions  arrived  at  in  this  way,  we  are  ready  to 
admit,  may  be  in  great  measure  dependent  on  the 
natural  and  educational  idiosyncrasies  of  the  in- 


ARGUMENTS  AGAINST  MATTER. 


51 


quirer.  Nevertheless,  it  is  no  less  certain  than 
curious,  that  when  a  judgment  has  once  been 
formed  under  this  appeal  of  a  thinker  to  his  own 
reason,  the  conclusions  reached  are  held  almost  as 
firmly  as  if  they  had  been  established  by  demon- 
stration. 

All  reflection  upon  the  ultimate  nature  of  things 
impresses  with  the  conviction  that  there-  is  a 
mystery  connected  with  our  present  physical  exist- 
ence,— that  in  no  instance  do  we  know  anything  of 
substance,  of  real  existence,  of  Being;  that  the 
nature  of  things,  as  they  are  in  themselves,  is  hid 
from  our  perception,  and,  generally,  even  from  our 
imagination ;  and  that  our  knowledge  of  physical 
objects  is  entirely  relative.  We  see  certain  physi- 
cal masses  affect  other  masses,  and  we  are  conscious 
of  our  animal  frame  being  affected  by  them,  but 
our  senses  are  inadequate  to  discover  either  the 
nature  or  tlie  cause  of  the  physical  changes  fleeting 
around  us. 

The  mind  in  the  perplexity  thus  occasioned,  can 
only,  as  we  have  already  said,  refer  the  cause  of 
natural  phenomena  to  a  Great  Unseen  Agent. 
The  question  may  be  asked.  Is  this  a  rational  and 


52 


PHILOSOPHICAL  AND  COMMON-SENSE 


philosophical  conclusion  ?  or  is  it  merely  an  indo- 
lent and  superstitious  way  of  terminating  a  felt 
diflficulty  ?  We  hold  that  it  is  the  only  conclusion 
which  reason  can  come  to,  and  that  it  is  merely  in- 
dolence, or  some  mental  defect  that  leads  the  man 
of  science  so  often  to  rest  content  with  the  visible 
and  tangible  phenomena  he  has  before  him,  and 
to  be  indifferent  about  working  out  the  important 
problem  of  cause. 

Regarding,  then,  the  subject  of  inquiry — Is  the 
world  material  or  immaterial? — the  first  prelimi- 
nary question  to  ask  the  believer  in  matter  is 
evidently  this.  What  is  the  nature  of  this  thing  in 
which  you  believe  ?  The  answer  will  doubtless  be 
— That  matter  is  a  something  hard  and  insensible, 
but  that  with  our  limited  faculties  we  cannot  tell 
its  inherent  nature,  for  that  all  our  knowledge  of 
what  it  is,  is  limited  to  the  knowledge  of  what  it 
does.  This  is  a  fair  and  a  judicious  answer.  We 
inquire,  then,  What  is  it  that  this  hard  or  in*- 
compressible  insensible  thing  does?  What  are 
those  functions  in  a  physical  world  which  the 
materialist  feels  himself  justified  in  assigning  to 
it?  for,  knowing  this,  we  shall  be  able  to  judge 


ARGUMENTS  AGAINST  MATTER. 


53 


whether  it  is  likely  to  discharge  the  offices  as- 
signed to  it.  We  ask,  therefore.  Has  this  sup- 
posed thing  the  power  of  conducting  all  the  opera- 
tions of  nature,  including,  of  course,  the  formation  of 
plants  and  animals  ?  The  atheistic  materialist  says 
it  has;  and  that  it  evolves,  moreover,  mind  or  thought 
as  the  natural  function  of  the  brain's  action. 

The  religious  man  who  believes  in  matter,  also 
says  that  matter  has  this  power ;  but  he  saves  his 
religious  feelings  by  holding  that  the  powers  of 
matter  are  all  sustained  by  the  Being  who  created 
it,  and  who  gave  it  its  powers.  Both  these  views 
seem  to  us  equally  foolish  and  untenable. 

To  the  atheist  we  would  adduce  proofs  geo- 
logical and  astronomical,  showing  that  the  world 
was  not  eternal,  but  was  created  or  caused.  For, 
if  matter  were  an  independent  uncreated  thing, 
a  thing  which  had  ever  been,  we  would  discover 
none  of  those  marks  of  a  beginning  and  of  a 
progress  which  are  exhibited  in  the  earth's 
crust.  We  would  tell  him,  moreover,  that  we 
discover  evidence  of  design  in  its  plan, — marks 
of  the  operation  of  that  mental  faculty  of  in- 
telligence  in   which   he   prides    himself,    and   of 


54 


PHILOSOPHICAL  AND  COMMON-SENSE 


which  man  is  tlie  conscious  possessor.  We  would 
submit  these  grounds,  requesting  him  to  consider 
whether  the  forms  and  the  powers  of  nature 
can  he  accounted  for  otherwise  than  by  pre- 
dicating an  intelh'gent  and  designing  cause.  To 
the  moralist  we  would  have  other  considerations 
to  offer;  and  to  the  metaphysician,  others  again 
of  a  different  nature :  but  to  the  pure  concrete 
physicist,  a  being — if  such  there  is — with  only 
one-fourth  the  human  faculties  and  instincts,  we 
can  present  nothing  to  draw  him  from  his  phy- 
sics but  arguments  of  this  sort. 

To  the  religious  materialist  we  would  present 
the  following  questions : — If  a  material  world  has 
been  created,  and  if  its  powers  are  sustained  by 
the  Being  who  created  it,  what  function  does 
matter  discharge  in  this  arrangement?  For  if 
it  is  to  be  regarded  as  always  present,  but  never 
doing  anything,  this  appears  to  us  to  be  an  ex- 
ceedingly awkward  and  ridiculous  position  for  it. 
To  be  told  that  it  exists,  and  that  it  appears 
to  conduct  the  operations  of  nature,  but  that  its 
ability  to  conduct  such  onerous  duties  is  only 
apparent  because  all  the  powers  of  nature  flow 


ARGUMENTS  AGAINST  MATTER. 


55 


from  the  Creator,  who  is  also  the  sustainer  of  the 
energy  we  observe  in  everything — this  makes 
matter  occupy,  as  we  have  said,  a  very  ridiculous 
place,  and  be,  in  fact,  a  nonentity.  And  we  ask. 
Is  it  credible  that  a  wise  Being  should  create  a 
thing  which  is  of  no  use,  and  which  requires  thus 
to  be  "bolstered  up.  Power  is  the  only  thing 
essential  and  operative  in  creation;  and  a  thing 
which  has  no  inherent  power  is  of  no  conceivable 
use,  and  reason  and  common  sense  at  once  compel 
us  to  reject  it. 

The  above  is  only  one  difficulty  which  stands 
in  the  way  of  the  believer  in  matter.  There  is 
another,  equally  intractable,  which  is  this, — the 
human  mind  encounters  a  difficulty,  so  great  as 
to  be  almost  insurmountable,  when  it  endeavours 
to  conceive  a  Being  whose  essence  is  spiritual, 
creating  a  thing  of  a  different  essence  from  him- 
self, which  matter  is  conceived  to  be.  The 
ancient  philosophers  of  Greece,  feeling  this,  de- 
clared that  matter  was  uncreated  and  eternal. 
Spinoza,  one  of  the  acutest  minds,  felt  the  same 
difficulty,  and  in  his  Ethics  he  lays  it  down  as  an 
axiom  of  reason  that  "  the  knowledge  of  an  effect 


56 


PHILOSOPHICAL  AND  COMMON-SENSE 


ARGUMENTS  AGAINST  MATTER. 


57 


(the  world  for  instance)  depends  on  the  knowledge 
of  the  cause,  and  things  that  have  nothing  in 
common  with  each  other  (e.^.,  matter  and  spirit) 
cannot  be  understood  by  means  of  each  other." 
Hence  the  one  cannot  be  the  cause  of  the  other. 

It  would  seem  that  the  views  thus  expressed 
by  Spinoza,  and  which  are  probably  Held  by 
every  man  who  thinks  patiently  and  clearly  on 
the  subject,  were  also  those  of  Sir  W.  Hamilton — 
at  least  we  must  infer  this.  In  his  Lectures  on 
Causation  he  says,  "  If  we  analyze  our  thoughts, 
we  shall  find  that  our  idea  of  cause  simply  means 
that,  as  we  cannot  conceive  new  existence  to 
commence,  therefore  all  that  now  is  seen  to  arise 
under  a  new  appearance  had  previously  an  exist- 
ence under  a  prior  form.  When  God  is  said  to 
create  out  of  nothing,  we  construe  this  to  thought 
by  supposing  that  he  evokes  existence  out  of 
himself."  And  again, — "  We  think  the  cause  to 
contain  all  that  is  contained  in  the  effect, — the 
effect  to  contain  nothing  which  is  not  contained 
in  the  cause"  (Lectures,  vol.  ii.,  pp.  377-378). 

It  is  curious  also  to  find  Sir  Isaac  Newton 
exercising  his   mind   on   the   same   subject,   and 


coming  substantially  to  the  conclusion  that  the 
world  was  immaterial.  "We  may  be  enabled," 
he  is  represented  as  saying  in  a  conversation 
with  Mr  Locke,  and  the  Earl  of  Pembroke,— 
"We  may  be  enabled  to  form  some  rude  con- 
ception of  the  creation  of  matter,  if  we  suppose 
that  God  by  his  power  had  prevented  the  entrance 
of  anything  into  a  certain  portion  of  pure  space, 
which  is  of  its  nature  penetrable,  eternal,  necessary, 
infinite,— from  henceforward  this  portion  of  space 
would  be  endowed  witii  impenetrability,  one  of 
the  essential  qualities  of  matter  ;  and  as  pure 
space  is  absolutely  uniform,  we  have  only  again 
to  suppose  that  God  communicated  the  same  im- 
penetrability to  another  portion  of  space,  and  we 
should  then  obtain,  in  a  certain  sort,  the  notion 
of  the  mobility  of  matter,  another  quality  which 
is  also  very  essential  to  it"  (see  Sir  W.  Hamilton's 
Note  F  on  Eeid's  Works). 

We  may  now  present  the  result  of  the  foregoing 
facts  and  reflections  in  the  following  propositions  :— 

1.  The  existence  of  matter  cannot  be  proved. 
We  never  see  it,  nor  feel  it,  nor  can  we  form  any 
distinct  conception  of  it. 


/ 


58 


PHILOSOPHICAL  AND  COMMON-SENSE 


ARGUMENTS  AGAINST  MATTER. 


59 


2.  Physical  objects  we  imagine  to  consist  of 
matter;  but  their  active  properties  indicate  much 
more  rationally  their  possessing  a  spiritual  than 
a  material  essence. 

3.  Reason  does  not  sanction  the  existence  of 
an  insensible,  unconscious,  unintelligent  entity  pos- 
sessing active  powers.  And  that  such  an  entity 
should  have  the  ability  to  conduct  the  complex 
arrangements  of  the  physical  world,  appears  a  sup- 
position so  contradictory  and  absurd,  that  we  feel 
certain  few  persons  will  be  found  willing  to  identify 
themselves  with  such  a  theory.  For,  of  course,  if 
matter  does  anything ^  it  does  everything ;  and  no 
man  can  reasonably  suggest  a  point  where  its 
operations  cease. 

4.  Power  J  when  we  reflect  closely  on  its  nature 
and  meaning,  appears  an  attribute  of  an  intelligent 
spiritual  being,  and  not  of  an  unconscious  inanimate 
thing.  We  can  never,  indeed,  conceive  power  as 
an  attribute  of  an  unconscious  thing,  such  as  we 
suppose  matter  to  be.  And  when  we  see  power 
combined  with  intelligence,  working  out  useful 
ends,  we  can  have  still  less  hesitation  in  attributing 
it  to  an  intelligent  self-conscious  spiritual  cause. 


5.  We  have  shown  in  the  foregoing  pages 
that  physical  phenomena,  when  examined  closely, 
prove  that  physical  objects  acting  in  the  mass — 
and  physical  atoms  acting  chemically— act  ex- 
ternal to  themselves,  and  therefore  through  the 
medium  of  an  ifnmaterial  copula. 

6.  We  have  adduced  several  physical  phe- 
nomena which  are  quite  incompatible  with  the 
belief  in  matter  as  an  impenetrable  entity. 

7.  We  never  see  the  cause  of  any  physical 
phenomena.  We  never  see  a  physical  cause  suf- 
ficient to  explain  or  account  for  any  one  funda- 
mental laio  of  physics,  Hume's  essay  brings  this 
strongly  out.  We  are  therefore  compelled  either  to 
assign  an  immaterial  cause  for  these  laws,  or  to 
believe  that  physical  events  occur  without  a  cause. 

8.  If,  again,  we  assume,  as  the  believer  in 
matter  does,  that  the  powers  of  nature  are  con- 
nected with  matter,  and  sustained  in  it  by  Deity, 
we  reduce  ourselves  by  such  a  supposition  to  the 
absurdity  of  believing  in  the  existence  every- 
where throughout  nature  of  a  thing  which  has 
no  power  of  its  own,  and  which  is  therefore 
superfluous;    and    we    involve   ourselves    in    the 


60 


PHILOSOPHICAL  AND  COMMON-SENSE 


ARGUMENTS  AGAINST  MATTER. 


61 


double  absurdity  of  believing  that  the  Diety  has 
created  a  thing  which  has  neither  power  nor 
utility — which,  in  fact,  occupies  space,  and  yet  does 
nothing  in  it. 

9.  It  has  been  declared  by  philosophers  in  all 
ages  that  it  is  impossible  to  conceive  the  creation 
of  an  entity  like  matter  out  of  nothing,  by  a  being 
having  himself  a  different  or  spiritual  essence,  and 
Sir  William  Hamilton  homologates  this  opinion. 

10.  Lastly,  let  us  remember  that  it  is  admitted 
by  all  philosophers  that  we  never  acquire  any 
direct  knowledge  of  matter,  or  of  any  other  thing, 
as  a  thing  in  itself.  We  merely  know  of  things 
and  learn  to  describe  them  by  their  actings.  Keep- 
ing this  in  mind,  it  is  evident  that  we  are,  by  this 
circumstance,  left  at  complete  liberty  to  select  an 
adequate  cause  to  account  for  the  powers  exhibited 
in  external  nature,  and  we  are  under  no  necessity 
whatever  to  select  an  insensible  and  evidently 
inadequate  cause,  which  matter,  by  the  materialist's 
own  showing,  is. 

Seeing  then,  everywhere  around  us  in  the 
world,  marks  not  only  of  power,  but  of  wisdom, 
of  design,   of  order,   of  beauty — the  combination 


of  parts,  the  many  antecedents  contributing  to  pro- 
duce   the   definite   results,    we    can    have    little 
hesitation    in   discarding    matter,   as   an   entirely 
insufficient  cause  whereby  to  account  for  all  this, 
and  for  the  constant  and  methodical  flux  of  physical 
events;    and  we   can    have   just    as    little   hesi- 
tation   in    coming    to    the    conclusion    that   the 
world  is  not  a  material  entity  at  all,  but  an  ever 
active  cause — an  immaterial  and  spiritual  cause — 
a  manifestation  of  power  ever  working  in  connexion 
with  intelligence — therefore  an  ever  present  intelli- 
gent cause  in  direct  operation.     The  Infinite  sub- 
jecting his  power  to  finity,  and  manifesting  himself 
in  the  laws  of  time  and  space,  and  all  those  other 
laws  which  we  call  mechanical  or  physical,  and 
which  He  himself  has  appointed  as  the  conditions 
of  this  physical  world.      This  is  the  conclusion, 
we  think,  to  which  reason  is  compelled  to  come 
when  it  realizes  the  existence  of  power  in  an  organic 
world,  and  feels  the  necessity  of  accounting  for  it. 

If  we  are  brought  to  the  acceptance  of  this  con- 
clusion, then  the  theory  o{ perception^  which  has  so 
much  puzzled  metaphysicians,  becomes  simple;  for 
by  the  dynamical  and  immaterial  theory  of  the 


62 


PHILOSOPHICAL  AND  COMMON-SENSE 


world  we  are  brought  everywhere  in  contact  with 
external  powerj  whereby  our  bodily  senses  are 
acted  on,  and  the  necessary  sensation  is  evoked 
in  the  mind,  and  this  we  may  state  as  an  additional 
or  supplementary  argument  in  favour  of  our  views. 

If  the  only  source  of  power  is  Deity,  then  in 
perception  we  are  brought  into  direct  contact  and 
connexion  with  the  Deity. 

It  may  be  said  that  this  was  Berkeley's  theory, 
and  we  may  admit  that  it  is  so,  but  with  this  dis- 
tinction, and  that  a  very  important  one :— By  our 
theory  the  world  does  not  give  the  constant  lie  to 
our  reason  and  our  natural  belief,  which  Berkeley's 
ideal  world  did.  We  believe  in  an  external  phy- 
sical world,  and  in  our  being  possessed  of  an 
organic  bodily  frame.  Berkeley  believed  in  neither. 
Time  and  space  are  with  us  attributes  with  which 
Deity  in  the  arrangements  of  a  physical  world 
clothes  himself ;  and  wherever  the  laws  of  a  phy- 
sical world  extend,  there  the  mind,  through  the 
senses,  is  brought  into  contact  with  Deity.  Deity 
produces  in  the  mind  the  necessary  sensation  which 
we  interpret  as  being  caused  by  the  external 
object.     The  generality  call  these  external  objects 


ARGUMENTS  AGAINST  MATTER. 


63 


matter,  because  they  must  assign  a  cause  for  their 
properties,  and  for  the  permanence  and  fixity  of 
their  laws,  and  there  is  no  great  evil  in  viewing 
the  world  in  this  light ;  but  so  soon  as  we  wish  to 
account  to  ourselves  intelligently,  we  are  driven  to 
a  more  rational  explanation  of  what  our  meaning 
is  as  to  that  thing,  which  we  hold  to  possess  the  pro- 
perties and  powers  which  rule  in  a  physical  world ; 
and  we  come  to  the  conclusion,  as  we  have  said,  that 
power  is  of  an  immaterial  and  spiritual  nature,  and 
therefore,  that  the  world  is  immaterial  and  spiritual. 
It  may  be  asked  by  some  of  our  readers.  Is  not 
this  Pantheism?  It  is  not.  It  has  none  of  the 
dangerous  features  of  that  heresy.  Pantheism  an- 
nihilates the  independent  existence  of  man's  mind, 
and  involves  all  things  in  the  meshes  of  fatalism. 
We  reserve  the  freedom  of  the  human  will.  We 
regard  the  soul  of  man  and  the  sentient  principle 
of  the  lower  animals  as  created  by  the  Deity,  and 
gifted  with  that  individuality  which  we  and  they 
are  conscious  of  possessing,  and  having  this,  we 
are  at  liberty  to  exercise  the  gift  of  reason,  and  to 
speculate  on  or  to  demonstrate  the  nature  of  that 
world  which  is  external  to  us.    Our  theory  does  not 


64  PHILOSOPHICAL  AND  COMMON-SENSE 

• 

attempt  to  alter  a  single  principle  of  theology,  nor 
does  it,  if  it  were   demonstrated,  affect  a  single 
principle  of  science.    It  is  mainly  an  abstract  ques- 
tion, important  and  practical  only  in  so  far  as  it  sim- 
plifies philosophy,  and  gives  a  sublimer  and  a  more 
consistent  apprehension  to  the  man  of  religious  mind, 
of  the  world  viewed  in  connexion  with  Divine  power. 
Before  leaving  this  part  of  our  subject  we  may 
show  the  position  which  is  taken  by  the  mate- 
rialist, and  view  it  as  in  contrast  with  our  theory. 
The  materialist  states  his  case  thus:  I  admit  I  see  no 
reason  for  power  being  in  matter,  I  simply  accept 
the  fact.     I  see  matter,  and  I  see  that  it  possesses 
active  properties  or  powers,  and  to  believe  what 
one  sees  is  the  only  safe  and  sure  philosophy. 

How  many  thousands  rest  on  this  foundation, 
proclaiming  that  it  is  the  only  rational  principle 
to  believe  in  what  one  sees,  and  yet  mark  how 
entirely  hollow  is  their  foundation.  They  who 
thus  profess  to  rest  on  a  fact  are  unaware  that 
their  fact  is  no  fact,  but  a  mere  assumption  of  the 
imagination;  for  it  is  acknowledged  by  all  who 
have  considered  the  subject,  that  we  neither  see 
nor  feel,  nor  in  any  way  perceive  matter,  and  that, 


ARGUMENTS  AGAINST  MATTER. 


65 


whether  de  facto  it  exists  or  not,  we  have  no  means 
of  proving  its  existence.  This  is  a  formidable 
objection  to  their  philosophy  of  fact,  and  it  should 
be  held  sufficient.  But  the  foundation  being  swept 
away,  it  may  be  as  well  to  demolish  the  superstruc- 
ture, by  showing  that  if  there  is  no  proof 'of  the 
existence  of  matter,  the  materialist  exhibits  a  sin- 
gular want  of  judgment  and  consistency  in  assum- 
ing its  existence,  and  still  more  in  installing  it,  an 
unintelligent  thing,  as  the  cause,  in  some  way  not 
understood  or  explained,  of  the  power  and  motion, 
the  arrangement  and  government  of  the  universe. 
And,  be  it  observed,  doing  this,  while  at  the  same 
time  it  is  admitted,  that  to  construct  or  put  to- 
gether even  the  most  insignificant  machine,  re- 
quires mind  and  intelligence. 

We  cannot  better  bring  our  reflections  on  the 
external  world,  as  a  manifestation  of  power,  to  a 
close,  than  by  directing  our  attention,  for  a  little, 
to  the  modem  theory  of  heat.  For  in  this,  if  in 
anything,  we  shall  see  that  all  physical  effects  are 
only  various  operations  of  the  same  physical  power : 
and  thus  the  fond  belief  of  an  all-embracing  unity 
which  the  Grecian  sages  thought  and  spoke  of  so 


E 


) 


66  PHILOSOPHICAL  AND  COMMON-SENSE 

much,  but  which,  with  them,  was  rather  an  in- 
spired  idea  than  a  sure  knowledge,  will  be  found, 
after  the  lapse  of  many  ages,  established  in  our 
day,  by  direct  and  laborious  scientific  research. 

The  most  interesting  and  important  discovery  of 
our  time  has  probably  been  the  connexion  of  heat 
vf-Mh  physical  force.    They  are  identical.    The  one 
is  exactly  commensurate  with  the  other,  and  they 
are  convertible  the  one  into  the  other.     A  given 
quantity  of  physical  or  mechanical  force  produces 
a  definite  quantity  of  heat,  and  this  amount  of 
heat  again,  if  it  can  be  preserved  and  applied,  is 
reconvertible  into  exactly  the  original  quantity  of 
mechanical  force.     How  is  this  ? 

There  is  a  physical  agent  existing  all  around 
us.     We  have  a  certainty  of  its  existence,  and  we 
know  it  to  discharge  one  of  the  most  important 
offices  in  creation.     We  seldom  speak  of  it.     The 
bulk  of  mankind  smile  when  it  is  named,  ad  if  it 
had  only  a  fanciful  or  imaginary  existence.     The 
agent  of  which  we  speak  is  the  ether  which  per- 
vades all  space.     It  is  an  elastic  medium.     We 
neither  see  it,  hear  it,  nor  feel  it  objectively ;  and 
from  this  circumstance  the  unlearned  think  it  must 


ARGUMENTS  AGAINST  MATTER. 


67 


be  a  something  of  the  finest,  most  subtle,  and  im- 
palpable character— as  indeed  its  name  would 
imply.  Instead  of  this,  we  have  evidence  that  it  is 
the  most  tremendous  power  which  exists  in  Nature, 
and  the  fittest  emblem  of  Divine  power  by  its 
ubiquity,  its  grandeur,  and  the  vastness  of  its 
operations.  It  may,  indeed,  from  this  not  irreve- 
rently be  called  the  right  hand  of  Deity ;  for  He 
stretches  it  throughout  all  space,  and  everywhere 
it  works  Ilis  will. 

Its  pressure  must  almost  exceed  the  bounds  of 
our  belief.  Tlie  writer  has  never  heard  any  sur- 
mise made  as  to  the  actual  pressure  of  this  world- 
embracing  medium,  but  we  may,  by  a  calculation, 
assist  the  mind  to  some  conception  of  the  gi-eat- 
ness  of  its  amount. 

The  velocity  of  the  propagation  of  vibrations  in 
any  elastic  medium  depends  on  the  relation  which 
the  elasticity  or  tension  of  the  medium  bears  to  the 
inertia  or  weight  of  the  molecules  of  which  the 
medium  consists.  The  greater  the  pressure  or  ten- 
sion of  the  medium,  and  the  lighter  the  molecules 
composing  it,  the  greater  the  velocity  of  the  vibra- 
tions propagated  through  it. 


68 


PHILOSOPHICAL  AND  COMMON-SENSE 


The  velocity  of  sound  through  air  is  about  1100 
feet   a  second.     The  velocity  of  light  is  nearly 
200,000  miles  in  the  same  brief  time.     We  have, 
of  course,  no  means  of  ascertaining  the  fact,  but  it 
is  probable  that  the  molecules  of  this  wonderful 
medium  of  which  we  speak  may  be  inconceivably 
light.    Let  us  assume  that  they  are  one-hundredth 
part  the  weight  of  a  molecule  of  air :  on  this  sup- 
position the  pressure  and  tension  of  the  ether  must 
be  960,000  times  the  pressure  of  our  atmosphere ; 
and  if  we  suppose  them  to  be  a  thousandth  part 
the  weight  of  a  molecule  of  air,  the  pressure  of  the 
ether  will  be  96,000  times  that  of  the  atmosphere  ; 
which,  let  it  be  remembered,  bears  with  a  force  of 
about  15  lbs.  on  every  inch  of  the  surface  of  the 
earth  and  of  our  bodies.     As  the  ether,  however, 
penetrates  all  substances,  it  does  not  affect  them 
as  a  weight  or  pressure.     It  is  only  by  its  move- 
ments or  vibrations  that  we  have  any  conscious- 
ness of  its  existence,  as  it  is  only  by  these  that  it 
disturbs,  or  in  any  way  affects  physical  bodies. 

This  subtle  medium  penetrates  all  substances, 
even  the  densest,  and  is,  in  fact,  the  cushion  on 
which  the  ultimate  atoms  of  all  things  rest.     It 


ARGUMENTS  AGAINST  MATTER. 


69 


surrounds  every  atom,  and  by  its  movements, 
which  never  cease,  it  keeps  them  in  constant 
though  invisible  motion.  The  mountains,  the 
solid  earth,  and  everything  on  its  surface  are  thus, 
as  it  were,  alive  with  constant  motion. 

But  though  its  absolute  pressure  is  so  tre- 
mendous, yet  mark  how  Nature's  agents  work  foi 
Nature's  ends.  This  vast  ethereal  ocean  which, 
when  in  any  part  it  is  lashed  into  violent  action, 
has  power  to  dissolve  the  most  obdurate  materials 
—metals,  rocks,  cities,  with  their  palaces  and 
temples,  yielding  before  it,  and  becoming  reduced 
to  ashes,  or  resolved  into  their  original  elements. 
This  same  medium,  whose  destructive  energy  is 
so  great,  becomes  in  its  ordinary  and  tamer 
moods,  like  the  calm  ocean  which,  with  soft  and 
musical  ripple,  plays  idly  with  straws  and  leaves. 
In  these  its  gentler  movements  it  appears — so  per- 
fect is  its  elasticity — as  if  it  were  mastered  even 
by  the  weakest  and  most  trifling  objects.  It  is 
entangled  by  a  cobweb ;  and  in  furs,  and  flannels, 
and  feathers,  its  vibrations  become  lost  in  endless 
reflexions,  and  with  difficulty  do  they  extricate 
themselves. 


70 


PHILOSOPHICAL  AND  COMMON-SENSE 


ARGUMENTS  AGAINST  MATTEK. 


71 


In   its  wide,  but  peaceful   play,  it  causes  the 
vapours  to  ascend  from  the  earth's  surface,  and  the 
rivers  to  flow.      With  an  invisible  and  delicate 
hand,  it  also  enables  the  vegetable   and  animal 
creation  to  build  up  tlieir  tender  organisms ;  and 
though  it  does  not  guide  their  materials  to  their 
places,  it  helps  forward  the  mechanical  work.     It 
keeps  every  atom  in  constant  motion,  so  that  one 
may  pass  another   as  they  hurry  on    under  the 
directing  energy  of  the  living  organism,  to  be  built 
each  into   its  proper  place.     Without  it,  motion 
were  impossible,  and  the  whole  earth,  organic  and 
inorganic,  would  become  sealed  up  in    the  close 
lock  of  an  eternal  stillness,  darkness,  and  death. 

The  mighty  agent  in  producing  this  all-im- 
portant motion  in  the  ethereal  ocean  is  the  sun. 
He  is  the  great  mechanical  operator  on  the  earth's 
surface.  This  mighty  orb,  which  holds  the  planets 
in  their  places  with  a  power  which  only  astrono- 
mers can  calculate,  and  which,  while  it  holds  them, 
bathes  them  with  a  constant  stream  of  ethereal 
vibrations,  is  at  once  the  great  originator  and  dis- 
tributor of  mechanical  power;  for,  as  we  have 
explained,  this   vibration,  which   deals   not   with 


masses,  but  with  the  atoms  of  which  everything 
consists,  is  a  mechanical  operation  of  immense 
power  and  eflScacy. 

Whence  is  this  power  derived,  how  is  it  main- 
tained, and  how  is  it  transmitted  to  us?  It  is 
most  instructive,  in  a  philosophical  point  of  view, 
to  note  how  the  great  Architect  has,  in  a  physical 
world,  subjected  all  His  workings  to  law.  And  it 
IS  especially  gratifying  to  mark  how  an  object  so 
transcendently  important  as  the  one  we  are  con- 
sidering has  been  accomplished. 

This  very  peculiar  vibratory  motion  of  which 
we  speak,  originates  from  a  sudden  stroke  or 
shock.  Science  informs  us  that  we  have  grounds 
for  believing  that  the  sun,  by  virtue  of  the  mighty 
attractive  power  with  which  he  is  endowed,  draws 
constantly,  though  at  intervals,  to  his  surface, 
asteroids  and  other  large  bodies  from  space.  That 
the  shock  or  impulse  thus  obtained  is  stored  up 
in  his  huge  bulk  in  the  form  of  an  intense  vibra- 
tory motion.  That  this  motion,  gradually  and 
continuously,  is  communicated  to  the  elastic  ethe- 
real medium  which  we  have  described,  and  that 
it  is  by  it  transmitted  with  inconceivable  speed  to 


72 


PHILOSOPHICAL  AND  COMMON-SENSE 


the  earth  and  to  all  the  planets  which  circle  round 
and  form  the  members  of  the  sun's  system. 

These  vibrations,  which  diflfer  sensibly  in  pitch, 
when  they  are  received  in  our  sentient  bodies,  affect 
us  with  the  sensation  which  w^e  call  heat^ — when 
they  are  received  on  the  optic  nerve,  we  call  the 
sensation  light.  Heat  and  light  are  thus  the  bass 
and  the  treble  notes  of  the  same  ethereal  instrument, 
or  we  may  call  them  twin  brother  and  sister. 
Heat  does  all  the  heavy  work,  and  light  possesses 
all  the  beauty  and  the  grace ;  and  how  useful  is 
she  besides ! 

Let  us  now  sum  up.     Heat  is  physical  power  in 
rapid  motion ;  the  attractions  of  gravity  and  the 
attractions   and  repulsions  of  chemical  action  are 
the  same  'physical  force^  and  the  entire  external 
world  is  thus  nothing  but  a  manifestation  of  force 
or  power — a  simple  and  a  sublime  conception — 
and  one  which  enters  alike  the  domain  of  physics,  of 
speculative  philosophy,  and  of  theology,  and  which, 
in  all  of  these  sciences,  is  of  equal  importance.    It 
represents  the  external  world  and  its  Creator  as  of 
one  immaterial  and  spiritual  essence, — power  and 
intelligence   infinite    being    the   attribute   qf  the 


ARGUMENTS  AGAINST  MATTER. 


73 


Creator,  and  power  finite  the  characteristic  of  the 
creation. 

We  thus  get  quit  of  the  many  difiiculties  involved 
in  the  question  of  efficient  and  occasional  causes^ 
which  still  so  completely  puzzle  philosophers  and 
divines ;  for  the  physical  world,  in  our  view,  is  an 
exhibition  of  Divine  Power  in  direct  and  immediate 
action,  with  no  intermediate  and  useless  quiddity 
interposed  to  puzzle  us. 

But  it  may  be  asked  by  a  metaphysician.  What 
is  this  mechanical  power  or  force  f  In  using  these 
terms  we  confess  that  we  use  words  which,  though 
convenient  and  necessary,  we  nevertheless  cannot 
properly  explain.  We  cannot  analyze  or  explain 
any  one  of  the  simple  and  fundamental  conceptions 
of  the  human  mind.  What  is  time  ?  We  cannot 
tell.  What  is  space?  What  is  power?  These 
are  the  three  ever  present  elements  in  our  concep- 
tions of  a  physical  world.  Yet  each  is  entirely 
incomprehensible,  and  in  attempting  to  comprehend 
them  reason  gets  bewildered.  Are  they  entities  ? 
Are  they  relations,  applicable  exclusively  to  a 
physical  world?  Are  they  the  forms  of  thought 
engendered  in  such  a  world?    Are  they  the  out- 


74  PHILOSOPHICAL  AND  COMMON-SENSE 

ward  garments  in  which  the  Infinite  chooses  in 
part  to  conceal,  in  part  to  reveal  himself  to  created 
minds  ?  Such  are  the  questions  asked  by  philo- 
sophers. But  the  whole  is  a  deep  mystery,  which 
philosophy  cannot  solve. 

And  when  we  inquire  still  further,  and  try  to 
embody  into  thought  the  mode  of  working  of  the 
great  Cause  of  all  things— the  nature,  and  even 
the  possibility  of  His  existence,— our  questionings  " 
meet  with  a  still  more  absolute  rebuke.     We  feel 
as  if  standing  on  the  brink  of  an  abyss  infinitely 
profound,  from  whose  hollow  comes   neither  ray 
of  light,  nor  even  the  faintest  echo   of  a  sound. 
We  turn  therefore,  though  reluctantly,  from  our 
insoluble    and    self-inflicted   abstractions    to    the 
living  world   around  us.      Here  we  are    at  once 
refreshed,  and    relieved    from    metaphysical   per- 
plexities—for here  we  see  a  result  pleasing  to  our 
nature.    We  believe  in  it  as  an  effect — we  admire 
it  objectively  as  a  stage  fitted  up  skilfully  for  the 
use  of  sentient  beings ;  and  as  firmly  as  we  admire 
the  world,  with  equal  firmness — being  rational  in 
our   nature — do  we   believe    in   and   admire    the 
invisible  cause  of  this  physical  result,  which  is 


ARGUMENTS  AGAINST  MATTER. 


75 


standing  out  actual  and  before  our  eyes, — a  cause 
greater  than  the  earth  and  all  its  furnishings, — 
a  Being,  the  author  at  once  of  the  intellectual, 
the  moral,  and  the  physical  world. 

Thus,  through  a  principle  of  admiration,  love, 
and  faith,  do  we  accept  the  fact  that,  out  of  this 
seemingly  empty  infinite,  which  we  had  been 
attempting  to  consider  objectively — but  in  vain — 
has  welled  into  being  all  tlie  forms  of  life,  and 
beauty,  and  grandeur  which  we  behold  ;  the  starry 
lieavens,  the  sun,  the  earth — and  man — tlie  most 
wondrous  of  all.  All  these  motes  have  proceeded 
from  what,  because  not  fully  comprehended  by  the 
metaphysical  eye,  seemed  a  moment  ago  but  dark- 
ness and  nothinimess.  Ex  nihilo  nihil  is  an  axiom 
of  reason.  Ex  invisihlli  omnia  is  the  declaration 
alike  of  reason  and  of  faith ;  though  it  is  not,  we 
regret  to  say,  universally  so  understood  by  un- 
reasoning men,  but  only  by  such  as  apply  their 
minds  lovingly  and  earnestly  to  the  solution  of  the 
problem. 


76 


CHAPTER    IV. 

FURTHER  EXPLANATIONS  —  THE  REALITY  OF  A 
DYNAMICAL  WORLD  EXPLAINED — CERTAIN  DIF- 
FICULTIES  ARE   REMOVED    BY   THIS   THEORY. 

In  the  preceding  chapters  wc  have  established  the 
possibility,  and  we  think  also  the  probability,  of 
the  world  being  immaterial  and  dynamical.  We 
might  therefore  leave  our  readers,  according  to 
their  judgments,  either  to  accept  or  reject  the 
theory — or,  as  is  quite  as  probable,  to  place  it  on 
the  list  of  those  many  things  which  are  not  cap- 
able of  absolute  demonstration. 

We  are,  however,  aware  how  much  a  new  idea 
must  suffer  unless  it  is  fully  understood.  We 
shall  therefore  endeavour  to  protect  our  views  from 
this  disadvantage  by  giving  some  additional  ex- 
planations, in  the  form  of  distinct  propositions,  in 
which  w^  shall  reason  out  and  place  in  articulate 
shape  the  supposed  essential  points  of  a  dynamical 
world. 


A  DYNAMICAL  WORLD  EXPLAINED. 


77 


Certain  considerations  are,  moreover,  involved  in 
the  theory  which,  though  they  may  not  be  stated 
as  proofs  or  as  arguments,  may  yet  be  presented 
as  recommendations  of  the  theory,  from  showing 
that  certain  substantial  advantages  attend  the 
reception  of  it. 


PROPOSITIONS. 

1.  We  view  the  physical  world  as  a  vast 
arrangement  of  localized  forces  acting  according  to 
definite  laws. 

2.  The  laws  or  modes  of  action  of  these  forces 
are  prescribed  by  the  Supreme  Being,  who  is  the 
sole  efficient  agent  in  tlie  physical  world.  The 
external  world  is  thus  a  manifestation  of  his  ever- 
present  operative  power. 

3.  A  physical  substance  or  object  we  regard  as 
a  cluster  of  atomic  forces,  having  a  mutual  con- 
nexion or  relation,  and  occupying  a  given  space. 
It  is  a  vacuity  in  respect  that  matter  does  not 
exist  in  it ;  but  it  is  a  body  and  a  substance,  inas- 
much as  energy  is  there  expanded  round  millions 
of  centres,  which  w^e  may  therefore  call  dynamical 
atoms  or  centres  of  force. 


78 


THE  REALITY  OF  A 


4.  Each  atom  has  its  position  and  its  law  of 
action,  physical  and  chemical. 

5.  These  atoms  are,  as  we  have  said,  held  to- 
gether by  a  law  of  attracting  force,  and  they  thus 
form  a  body  or  substance  when  aggregated. 

6.  They  are    solid   or   impenetrable,   for    they 
possess  repelling  forces ;    and  no  other  group  of 
dynamical  atoms  can  enter  and  occupy  the  same 
space  without    encountering  and   displacing    the" 
group  previously  existing  in  that  place. 

7.  The  atomic  forces  of  one  body,  when  ap- 
proached to  another  body,  do  not  necessarily  resist 
such  approach ;  on  the  contrary,  the  two  may 
combine,  and  rearrange  their  forces,  thereby 
entirely  altering  the  law  of  their  action  with  refer- 
ence to  other  bodies  brought  within  their  influence. 
From  their  dynamical  powers  being  thus  altered, 
we  call  the  compound  a  new  substance,  or  a  sub- 
stance having  new  properties. 

8.  Substances  or  bodies  are  visible  or  invisible, 
according  as  they  allow,  or  as  they  repel  the  free 
movement  among  their  atoms  of  the  whole  or  any 
part  of  the  ethereal  vibrations  which  pervade  space. 

9.  Such  is  the  character  of  physical  objects,  and 


DYNAMICAL  WORLD  EXPLAINED. 


79 


of  the  whole  physical  world,— a  certain  space 
occupied  by  forces  grouped  and  acting  according 
to  definite  laws.  They  are  real  existences,  true 
and  absolute.  What  is  so  true  and  absolute  as  the 
power  of  the  Supreme  Being,  and  those  laws  which 
he  has  prescribed  for  the  regulation  of  his  will  in 
the  physical  world  ?  They  are  real,  because  they 
exist  in  space ;  they  are  real,  because  they  act  on 
other  bodies  occupying  different  spaces ;  they  are 
real,  because  they  act  on  our  bodies,  which  are 
also  dynamical  and  immaterial;  and,  lastly,  we 
know  them  to  he  real,  because  when  our  bodies  are 
thus  acted  on,  the  conscious  sensitive  principle 
which  we  possess  is  affected  thereby,  and  sensations 
follow  the  contact— sensations  of  vision,  touch, 
heat  and  cold,  taste  and  smell,  etc.,  according  to 
the  nature  of  the  exciting  force,  and  the  organ 
affected  thereby. 

10.  Under  the  general  and  comprehensive  defi- 
nitions which  we  have  given— that  it  is  an  action 
betwixt  parts  which  constitutes  a  body,— a  body, 
as  Professor  Faraday  well  remarked,  may  be  said 
to  extend  so  far  as  its  forces  extend.  On  this 
principle,  we  may  hold  the  sun  and  moon,  and 


80 


THE  REALITY  OF  A 


planetary  system,  as  one  body.  They  are  bound 
to  one  anotlier  by  the  law  of  attraction,  and  may 
therefore,  in  this  sense,  be  regarded  as  one  body, 
as  truly  as  the  different  ends  of  a  piece  of  iron  are 
considered  parts  of  the  iron  rod.  The  similarity 
is  complete,  for  no  one  atom  of  the  iron  is  supposed 
by  the  materialist  to  touch  another,  but  merely  to 
act  on  it.  The  fact  of  motion  existing  among  the 
different  members  of  our  solar  system,  does  not 
destroy  the  connexion.  There  is  motion  in  a  river 
— there  is  motion  in  the  blood  flowing  through  our 
bodies  ;  and  there  is  constant  molecular  motion 
in   the  parts   of  all  bodies,   whether  organic   or 


inorganic. 


If  gravitation,  as  is  supposed,  extends  throughout 
all  space,  we  may,  under  Professor  Faraday's 
definition,  say  that  the  universe  is  one  body,  in- 
asmuch as  each  part  acts  on  the  whole,  and  the 
whole  acts  on  each  part.  It  is  only  because  the 
action  between  distant  stars  is  not  reducible  to 
calculation,  and  because  of  the  feebleness  of  our 
apprehensions,  that  we  do  not  regard  them  and  our 
planetary  system  as  parts  of  one  system,  and  as 
one  body ;    for,  if  mutual  action  exists  between 


DYNAMICAL  WORLD  EXPLAINED. 


81 


^ 


them,  they  are  all  but  as  the  wheels  in  the  vast 
cosmical  machine,  and  we  know  that  some  great 
problem  of  forces  must  ultimately  be  wrought  out 
by  their  action. 

11.  If  the  eye  could  take  in  the  whole  universe 
at  once,  as  it  takes  in  a  distant  nebula  of  stars, 
and  if  the  mind  could  grasp  the  mutual  relations  of 
its  parts,  we  should  view  it  as  an  unity  in  respect 
of  its  transcendent  completeness. 

12.  There  is  an  unity  in  a  higher  sense,  if  we 
regard  those  forces  which  constitute  the  substance 
of  the  universe  as  being  the  same  immaterial 
energy,  acting  in  accordance  with  the  same  code 
of  physical  law. 

13.  And  there  is  an  unity  in  the  highest  sense, 
when  we  regard  the  regulated  and  localized  power 
which  constitutes  the  visible  creation  as  a  mani- 
festation of  the  same  Divine  Power. 


t 


Let  us  now  allude  to  some  of  the  supposed 
advantages  of  the  theory. 

Materialism  starts  on  the  assumption  that  there 
is  matter, — that  it  is  self-dependent,  and  that  it 
is  endowed  with  certain  inherent  and  inalienable 


82 


CERTAIN  DIFFICULTIES  ARE 


REMOVED  BY  THIS  THEORY. 


83 


i 


powers,  and  that  by  virtue  of  these  it  evolves  not 
only  inorganic  changes,  but  also  vegetable  and 
animal  life  and  growth — and,  as  a  consequence, 
sensation  and  thought.  The  presence  of  the  Su- 
preme Being  is,  according  to  this  dangerous  belief, 
virtually  unnecessary,  and  his  existence  is  very 
frequently  denied  or  lost  sight  of  by  thorough 
Materialists. 

It  is  impossible  to  conceive  the  existence  of  force 
in  operation  without  a  substratum  or  cause.  If  we 
assume  the  Supreme  Being  to  be  the  cause,  it 
satisfies  our  reason,  and  it  cuts  the  foundation  from 
atheistic  Materialism. 

Idealism  takes  possession  of  an  abstract  and 
thoughtful  or  imaginative  class  of  men.  It  recog- 
nises only  mind  or  thought  as  existing.  If  it 
admits  a  duality  of  being,  which  is  not  always  the 
case,  it  acknowledges  the  possibility  of  the  Deity. 
It  deceives  us,  however,  by  denying  the  reality  of 
our  perceptions  of  the  world,  and  thus  it  makes  our 
belief  of  externality,  and,  consequently,  our  whole 
life,  a  deception  and  a  mockery. 

A  dynamical  theory  affords  a  stepping-stone  from 
Idealism  back  to  Realism;  perhaps  it  may  also 


help  the  Pantheist  to  a  sounder  faith,  in  so  far  as 
it  affords  a  rational  explanation  of  the  connexion 
of  the  human  mind  with  the  external  world,  and 
represents  the  forces  of  Nature  as  formed  for  con- 
necting sentient  beings  at  once  with  externality 
and  with  Deity. 

It  removes  the  difficulty  experienced  by  many 
serious  minds  in  realizing  the  possibility  of  a 
Spiritual  Being  creating  a  thing  different  from 
his  own  essence — which  matter  is  supposed  to  be. 

It  has  the  recommendation  of  being  at  once 
simple  and  rational ;  for  instead  of  first  postulating 
the  creation  of  an  inert  thing  in  space,  and  then 
accounting  for  its  operative  energies  by  investing 
it  with  immaterial  powers,  it  represents  the  imma- 
terial operative  energy  as  flowing  direct  from  the 
Deity,  and  manifesting  itself  to  his  creatures  in 
a  physical  world. 

It  settles  all  questions  regarding  efficient  and 
occasional  causes,  making  the  source  of  all  power 
the  real  and  efficient  cause, — acting  at  every  link  of 
the  chain  of  cause  and  effect  which  jve  witness 
in  external  nature,  and  not  applying  the  hand 
only  at  the  last  and  hidden  link  of  the  chain. 


84 


CERTAIN  DIFFICULTIES  ARE 


The  theory  of  an   immaterial   and   dynamical 
world  has  also,  it  seems  to  us,  some  interesting 
bearings  in  connexion  with  man's  highest  hopes 
and  interests.     We  can  only,  and  with  diffidence, 
offer  a  few  reflections  on  a  subject  which  is  gene- 
rally regarded  as  beyond  the  reach  of  legitimate 
speculation.     As  we  approach  an  inquiry  of  this 
kind,  where  neither  reason  nor  experience,  nor  any 
form  of  proof,  can  guide  us,  we  are  well  aware  that 
we  at  once  cease  to  be  philosophers,  and  become 
but  as  children  who  are  talking  ignorantly  on  a 
mystery  which  affects  their  hearts  and  imagina- 
tions,  but  regarding  which  they  know  there  is 
neither  revelation  to  be  found  in  the  Bible  nor 
explanation  in  their  catechism — so  let  it  be  with 
us  at  the  present  time. 

The  realization  of  an  inevitable  end  to  mortal 
existence  has  its  terrors,  even  with  those  who  have 
the  firmest  belief  in  the  reality  of  a  future  life. 
It  is  the  breaking  up  of  our  present  ties  and  enjoy- 
ments. It  is  the  dissolving  of  the  body,  with  its 
various  sei^ibilities.  It  is  a  plunge  into  a  state 
the  nature  of  which  we  dare  scarcely  venture  to 
embody  in  thought.     Amidst  such  shrinkings  and 


. 


REMOVED  BY  THIS  THEORY. 


85 


fears,  is  there  not  an  alleviation  afforded  by 
viewing  the  matter  in  its  truer  and  more  tender 
light;  and  considering  that  it  is  the  Being  who 
through  life  has  sustained  our  vital  forces,  and 
who  has  given  to  the  organism  its  every  movement, 
who,  at  the  proper  time,  comes  forward  to  throw 
the  machine  out  of  gear,  in  order  that  it  may 
by-and-by  be  re-edified  on  a  nobler  and  more 
enduring  plan  ? 

It  is  consolatory  also  to  know  that  the  individual 
forces — the  materials  which  constitute  the  substance 
of  our  bodies — do  not  perish,  but  that  out  of  these 
our  bodies  may  be  again  constructed. 

In  our  present  state  we  are  united  to  what  is 
called  a  fleshly  body — that  is  to  say,  a  body  com- 
posed of  certain  simple  elementary  atoms  or  forces  ; 
these,  though  in  themselves  subject  to  no  decay, 
are  combined  and  grouped  together  so  that  tlie 
organic  mass  is  daily  and  hourly  undergoing  de- 
composition and  restoration.  A  contest  is  thus 
constantly  waging  between  life  and  death,  and  in 
which  the  latter  power  is  destined  eventually  to 
triumph,  casting  us  back  upon  Nature  through  the 
successive  stages  of  organic  and  inorganic  condi- 


■^''i-»r""llWIHI>8a»MljjM81B 


86 


CERTAIN  DIFFICULTIES   ARE 


REMOVED  BY  THIS  THEORY. 


87 


tion,  and  at  last  resolving  us  into  the  original 
pure  and  simple  elements.  It  is  natural,  therefore, 
that  the  terrified  and  unreflecting  mind  should  per- 
sonify Death  as  the  king  of  terrors — as  a  power 
who  tyrannizes  over  his  human  victims,  and  who  is 
permitted  to  make  us  his  prey.  This  is  evidently, 
liowever,  a  false  and  a  very  reprehensible  way  of 
speaking  and  thinking. 

It  is  surely  better  to  keep  nearer  to  Christianity 
in   our   conceptions    and    language.      It    is    the 
Being   who   fitted   us   for  a  temporary  and  trial 
state,  whose   hand  will,   at   the   time   appointed, 
advisedly,  through  the  operation  of  his  own  phy- 
sical laws,  take  down  the  tabernacle,  either  by  a 
sudden  stroke,  or  deliberately,  by  loosing  the  cords 
and  removing  the  stakes.     And  we  may  the  more 
willingly  submit  to  this  process,  knowing  that  the 
best  and  most  revered  of  men  have  submitted  to  it 
before  us ;  and  knowing  also  that  it  does  not  infer 
an  eternal  farewell  to  a  physical  world — and  to 
our  much  cherished  physical  bodies — and  feeling 
assured  that  the  elements  of  force  which  connect 
us  with  external  nature  shall  be  preserved  till  that 
day  when  we  may  be  more  worthily  clothed  in 


corporeal  humanity — the  same  in  outward  linea- 
ments and  form,  it  may  be,  but  subject  neither  to 
waste  nor  change,  nor  probably  to  the  necessity 
of  constant  nourishment  and  restoration — that 
painful  arrangement  by  which  the  higher  or  stronger 
animal  borrows  life  and  strength  by  the  destruction 
of  organisms  below  it  in  the  scale— and  incorporates 
into  its  substance  the  life  and  physical  force  of 
unwilling  victims. 

The   highest   minds   have  formed   the   highest 
standards  of  ideal  beauty,  and  the  Greeks  long 
since  embodied  theirs  in  the  Apollo— the  perfection 
of  manly  and  intellectual  strength— god-like,  yet 
human;    breathing    the   empyrean    air,   and  yet 
treading  the  earth;  entirely  unsensual,  unsordid, 
unoccupied  with  bodily  wants,  and  yet  the  whole 
lithe  body  yielding  in  every  movement  a  sense  of 
pleasure,  freedom,  and  power.     It  is  agreeable  to 
contemplate  the  possibility  of  such  a  lodgment  for 
the    human   spirit,    and   that  the  body   shall   be 
sustained,  not  by  incorporating   animal   or  vege- 
table organisms,  but  directly  by  Him  who  sustains 
all  the  elementary  forces  of  Nature,  and  that  it 
shall   therefore    be,    as    they   are,    imperishable: 


88 


CERTAIN  DIFFICULTIES  ARE 


that  it  shall  be  animated  by  the  indwelling  soul, 
and  be  subjected  fully  to  its  control,  its  forces 
being  varied,  directed,  and  applied,  as  the  go- 
verning will  may  dictate. 

Gravity,  incompressibility,  and  the  other  phy- 
sical properties — of  whose  rigid  nature  we  have 
such  painful  experience — we  may  expect  to  be,  at 
will,  modified  or  suspended.  How  vastly  the 
power  of  locomotion,  which  is  one  of  the  greatest 
privileges  of  intelligent  physical  beings,  would 
be  enlarged  by  such  an  arrangement,  it  is  unneces- 
sary  to  specify. 

On  the  supposition  that  there  is  matter,  we  can- 
not escape  from  the  belief  that  a  heavy  and  incom- 
pressible thing  like  a  millstone  is  bound  up  with 
us.  But  with  the  belief  in  immaterial  forces  as 
the  substance  of  all  things,  what  bounds  need  be 
put  to  the  versatility  of  our  powers  ?  objects  which 
appear  to  be  solid  and  impenetrable,  such  as  rocks 
and  walls,  may  yield  at  once  before  us — the  forces 
of  the  spiritual  body  neutralizing  the  resisting 
forces  of  inorganic  nature,  so  that,  without  let  or 
hindrance,  man,  as  lord  of  the  physical  world,  may 
pass  through  their  substance.     We  see  something 


REMOVED  BY  THIS  THEORY. 


89 


not  unlike  this  in  chemical  phenomena  when  one 
element,  as  if  by  a  miracle,  entirely  annihilates  the 
peculiar  energies  of  another  element. 

It  is  singular  that  some  of  those  important  organs 
which  in  our  present  state  minister  to  our  intellec- 
tual faculties,  discharge  at  the  same  time  an  animal 
function.  The  brain,  which  is  the  organ  of  thought 
and  voluntary  motion,  is  also  an  organ  essential  in 
digestion  and  other  functions  of  animal  life.  The 
lungs,  in  like  manner,  while  they  are  the  organs  ot 
speech,  are  also  the  organs  by  which  the  effete 
matter  is  removed  from  the  blood :  may  we  not 
suppose  that  in  a  higher  state  the  one  class  of 
functions  may  be  retained  while  the  other  becomes 
obsolete,  because  no  longer  required  ? 

These  are  but  free,  passing  imaginings,  but  in 
entertaining  them  as  conjectural  ideas,  it  seems  as 
if  the  doctrine  of  the  resurrection  were  rendered 
more  conceivable,  as  if  some  difficulties  were  re- 
moved, and  that  state  were  invested  with  more 
definite  form.  While  we  believe  in  matter,  diffi- 
culties will,  in  spite  of  every  effort,  obtrude  them- 
selves. We  endeavour  to  overcome  these  by  arguing 
that  no  real  difficulty  can  obstruct  the  purposes  of 


m 


90 


CERTAIN  DIFFICULTIES  ARE 


an  Almiglity  Power.  The  mind,  however,  still 
remains  entangled  in  its  own  perplexities.  The 
scripture  statements  regarding  the  appearance  of 
Closes  and  Elias  on  the  Mount — the  resurrection  of 
our  Lord — his  forty  days'  sojourn  on  earth — his 
repeated  and  sudden  appearances  in  the  midst  of 
his  disciples — and  his  as  sudden  vanishings — his 
final  ascension  above  the  clouds — these  will  proba- 
bly, with  most  men,  be  quite  unintelligible,  or  they 
may  even  become  as  stones  of  stumbling,  so  long 
as  the  risen  bodies  are  regarded  as  material  bodies. 
But  how  entirely  are  the  difficulties  removed  when 
we  cease  to  think  of  heavy  incompressible  matter, 
and  accept  the  theory  of  immaterial  physical  bodies, 
capable  of  every  variety  of  action. 

At  present  we  are  the  slaves  of  our  bodies 
rather  than  their  masters ; — their  wants  are  so 
many,  their  claims  and  complainings  so  pressing, 
their  powers  so  feeble,  their  substance  so  un- 
manageable. All  this  arises,  as  we  have  said,  not 
from  the  nature  of  the  elements  composing  them — 
for  these  are  imperishable — but  from  the  design  and 
method  of  their  present  combination.  If  we  are 
allowed  to  assume  other  combinations  of  the  self- 


REMOVED  BY  THIS  THEORY. 


91 


same  elements  or  principles  of  force,  there  are  no 
conceivable  limits  to  the  powers  and  capacities  which 
we  may  believe  the  body  to  possess.  We  are  at 
present  kept  down  both  by  necessity  and  inclina- 
tion to  the  earth,  like  the  caterpillar  to  the  leaf  on 
which  it  feeds.  But  we  can  apprehend  the  same 
immaterial  and  indestructible  forces  of  Nature 
instantly,  under  a  different  form  of  combination, 
becoming  the  fitting  companion  for  the  human 
spirit — which,  as  it  has  been  educated  under  the 
circumstances  of  a  physical  world,  is  destined,  as 
we  are  led  to  believe,  to  an  endless  or  protracted 
continuation  of  a  like  physical  existence. 

Such  views  of  a  spiritual  and  yet  physical  body 
flow  naturally  from  the  theory  we  have  been  ex- 
plaining. We  offer  them,  as  we  have  already  said, 
not  as  what  we  wish  to  press  as  settled  and  ascer- 
tained on  any  one's  belief,  but  only  as  what  may 
be  lawfully  entertained  as  possible  and  probable. 


92 


PART  II. 

THE  NATURE  OF  PERCEPTION. 


CHAPTER   V. 

INTRODUCTORY  STATEMENTS  AND  SPECULATIONS— 
THE  CONNEXION  OF  MIND  AND  MATTER. 

The  subject  of  perception  is  evidently  very  closely 
connected  with  the  inquiry  which  we  have  been 
conducting  in  the  preceding  chapters.  Besides  the 
interest  attaching  to  it  as  a  much  contested 
topic  of  philosophical  inquiry,  we  enter  upon  it 
here  from  considering  that  our  examination  will 
be  found  to  strengthen  the  theory  we  have  been 
recommending— namely,  that  the  world  is  an  ex- 
hibition, not  of  Material,  but  of  Physical  power': 
physical  when  viewed  in  its  modes  of  action- 
spiritual  when  we  look  to  it  with  reference  to  its 
Nature  and  its  Cause. 


THE  NATURE  OF  PERCEPTION. 


93 


If  we  are  to  discover  the  physical  constitution 
of  the  world,  it  is  evidently  important  not  only 
that  we  examine  the  phenomena  presented  by 
the  senses,  but  that  we  endeavour  to  understand 
the  nature  of  the  faculties  employed  in  the  search. 
This  examination  we  shall  therefore  endeavour  to 
make,  not  arrogating  any  superior  philosophic  in- 
sight, but  simply  by  the  exercise  of  ordinary 
intelligence,  endeavouring  to  clear  up  these  two 
important  questions  which  have  so  long  perplexed 
and  divided  philosophers — the  questions.  What  is 
Perception?  and  What  do  we  perceive? 

If  in  any  measure  we  succeed  in  simplifying  the 
subject,  it  will  be  because  we  adopt  a  simpler 
stand-point  from  which  to  view  it.  It  is  evident 
that  much  difficulty  must  arise  when,  in  a  philoso- 
phical inquiry,  we  begin  by  assuming  an  unsound 
position,  and  thus  viewing  the  matter  throughout 
imder  a  false  light.  It  is  at  least  possible,  that 
this  may  have  been  the  case  with  many  who  have 
undertaken  to  furnish  a  theory  of  the  World  and 
of  the  Perceptive  Faculty. 

To  begin  at  the  root  of  the  matter:  it  is 
evident,  then,  that  we  perceive  something.    This 


94  STATEMENTS  AND  SPECULATIONS  ON 

has  been  denied  by  none.  But  what  it  is  that  we 
perceive  has  ever  been  the  difficulty.  It  is  all  but 
universally  admitted  that  the  mind,  which  is  im- 
material in  its  nature,  alone  perceives.  The  Ideal- 
ist holding  this  sound  doctrine— Ma^  the  mindalo?ie 
perceives^  and  that  it  perceives  nothing  external  to 

itself— concludes  either  that  no  external  world in 

the  common  sense  of  the  term — exists ;  or,  at  least 
that  we  have  no  indefeasible  ground  for  making 
any  dogmatic  assertion  on  the  subject.     This  may 
appear  to  those  who  have  not  studied  the  science 
of  mind,  nothing  more  than  an  evidence  of  the 
imbecility  and  irrationality  of  philosophers,  and 
which  is  only  to  be  accounted  for  as  Festus  ac- 
counted for  the  supposed  madness  of  Paul.     And 
yet  there  are  many  sober  and  learned  men  in  our 
day— and  they  are,  apparently,  an  increasing  class 
— who  proclaim  this  singular  theory -as  tijeir  belief, 
It  is  held  by  them  to  be  the  logical  conclusion 
deduced  from  the  ordinary  statement  of  the  facts 
of  perception.     Thus :  the  mind  is  the  conscious 
principle  ;  it  is  conscious  of  sensations;  these  sen- 
sations are  mental  afiections ;  therefore,  while  we 
imagine   we   are   perceiving   something   external, 


THE  NATURE  OF  PERCEPTION. 


95 


we  are  only  perceiving  a  mental  affection.  Such 
is  the  foundation  on  which  the  Idealist  rests,  and 
beyond  which  neither  his  own  inclinations,  nor  the 
rules  of  logic  permit  or  prompt  him  to  tread. 

Amauld,  the  contemporary  and  friend  of  Pascal 
— the  great  majority  of  Realists  since  his  time — 
and  among  them  our  gifted  countryman  Brown — 
have  held  substantially  the  same  theory  of  percep- 
tion, viz.,  that  the  mind  does  not  directly  perceive 
the  external  world,  but  only  the  affections  or 
modifications  produced  or  evoked  in  itself,  by  the 
impulses  made  by  external  objects  on  the  organs 
of  sense. 

These  last-named  philosophers,  therefore,  and  a 
very  large  and  influential  school  of  disciples,  differ 
from  the  Idealists  mainly  in  this,  that  the  former 
give  credence  to  the  teaching  of  the  senses,  and 
believe  in  an  outer  world  as  the  unseen  cause  of 
the  mental  phenomena  of  which — and  of  which 
alone — they  are  conscious  ;  while  the  Idealists, 
either  from  mental  peculiarities,  or  from  yielding 
to  a  peculiar  process  of  reasoning  on  the  subject, 
come  to  a  different  conclusion,  and  deny  or  doubt 
the  existence  of  everything  but  mind. 


96 


STATEMENTS  AND  SPECULATIONS  ON 


THE  NATURE  OF  PERCEPTION. 


97 


Distinguished  from  the  adherents  of  either  of 
the  above  schools,  and  maintaining  a  direct  per- 
ception or  intuition  of  the  outer  world,  are  Reid, 
Stewart,  and  Hamilton.  We  hope  it  will  be  held 
no  disparagement  to  other  gifted  writers  ^  who  take 
the  same  view  if  we  say,  that  it  is  in  connexion 
with  these  three  names  especially  that  the  Scottish 
school  of  philosophy  has  become  so  extensively 
known  at  home  and  abroad.  The  question  in- 
volved, which  has  divided  so  many  able  men,  is 
eminently  worthy  of  consideration. 

In  examining  into  the  deliverances  of  the  various 
senses,  a  main  difficulty  is  to  discharge  from  the 
mind  all  the  knowledge  and  all  the  judgments  which 
time  and  experience  have  imported  into  it.  If  we 
could  be  men  in  power  of  observation,  but  babes 
in  knowledge,  we  would  then  be  in  the  condition 
most  fit  for  observing  and  recording  the  simple 
forms  of  these  all-important  letters  of  the  universal 
human  alphabet — our  sensations.  But  we  have 
been  through  life  so  accustomed  to  associate  the 

*  Among  these  we  maj  mention  Professor  Mansel  of  Oxford,  who, 
while  he  diflFers  on  some  points,  generally  very  closely  adheres  to 
the  sentiments  of  Hamilton. 


signs  with  the  things  signified — or  rather,  to  direct 
the  mind  away  from  the  sign  to  the  thing  it  comes 
to  represent — that  it  is  with  extreme  difficulty  that, 
in  our  process  of  philosophizing,  we  succeed  in 
holding  them  asunder,  and  viewing  the  element 
apart  from  the  object  it  suggests. 

According  to  the  writer's  views,  we  have  a  direct 
consciousness  of  all  our  Mental  Powers ;  but  the 
Sensations  or  Mental  Affections  which  our  senses  ex- 
cite within  us,  are  the  only  Objects  which  we  perceive 
directly.  We  have  a  direct  intuition  or  cognition  of 
these,  but  we  have  no  direct  cognition  or  intuition 
of  the  Outer  World.  We  may  mention,  however,  at 
the  same  time,  that,  according  to  our  views,  we  are 
able,  by  indirect  means,  to  establish  its  existence. 

These  sensations  of  which  we  speak,  and  which 
are  the  media  of  our  intercourse  with  the  outer 
world,  are  the  product  of  the  connexion  of  mind 
with  the  movements  of  the  nervous  system  j  or,  to 
speak  more  precisely,  with  the  movements  of  that 
subtle  agent  of  which  the  nerves  are  the  channels. 
The  sensations  are  in  the  mind;  they  are  per- 
ceived by  the  mind;  and  the  brain  is  the  sen- 
sorium  where  they  are  so  perceived. 


1^ 


r 


98 


STATEMENTS  ^ND  SPECULATIONS  ON 


When  we  endeavour  to  be  more  specific,  there 
are  two  ways  in  which  our  conceptions  of  the  sub- 
ject may  be  expressed.  We  may  conceive  that  the 
sensations  are  the  forms  of  perception  which  the 
author  of  our  being  has  permitted  us,  of  those  ner- 
vous vibrations,  or  states  of  action  of  which  we 
have  spoken, — or  we  may  view  the  matter  in  a 
somewhat  different  light,  and  hold  that  the  sensa- 
tions are  excited  in  the  mind  by  these  nervous 
movements — the  mind  being,  as  it  were,  passive  in 
being  so  affected — and  intelligent  and  active,  only 
in  so  far  as  it  exercises  its  perceptive  powers,  in 
examining,  comparing,  and  judging  these,  its  own 
sensations, — viewing  them  all  along,  be  it  remem- 
bered, as  external  objects  and  qualities. 

We  state  the  nature  of  this  action  or  passion  ot 
the  mind  in  different  ways,  in  order  that  we  may 
hereafter  examine  the  merits  of  each.  This  inves- 
tigation has  generally  been  evaded  by  Scottish 
metaphysicians,  on  the  ground  that  it  is  impossible 
to  pronounce  any  positive  judgment  on  a  thing  so 
obscure  as  the  intercourse  of  mind  with  matter, 
or  on  the  nearly  equally  obscure  nature  of  the 
internal  actions  of  that  organ  witli  which  the  mind 


THE  NATURE  OF  PERCEPTION. 


99 


is  immediately  connected.  We  feel  disposed,  how- 
ever, to  ascribe  much  of  this  evasion  of  the  subject 
either  to  the  little  interest  which  ardent  students  of 
mental  philosopliy  have  generally  taken  in  physics, 
— or  to  a  traditional  aversion  to  connect  in  any  way 
a  physical  element  with  a  psychological  operation. 

Tiiere  is  a  vulgar  Materialism  which — unable  to 
recognise  anything  unseen  and  unfelt — reduces  man 
to  the  condition  of  a  machine,  and  represents  him 
as  being  affected,  as  such,  exclusively  by  out- 
ward physical  impressions  ;  and  which  regards  him 
as  working  out  thought  by  means  of  the  circula- 
tions and  vibrations  occurring  in  the  brain  and 
nervous  system.  In  censure  of  this  grosser  form 
of  Materialism  we  have  already  spoken. 

But  there  is  a  subtler  form  of  modern  opinion 
probably  gaining  some  ground;  and  it  is  said. 
Why  not  admit  that  the  percipient  principle  and 
the  body  may  be  of  one  essence  ?  and  seeing  that 
by  the  senses  we  can  know  only  the  physical  laws 
of  Nature,  why  not  grant  that  in  physical  objects 
unseen  powers  may  also  be  inherent,  and  that  what 
we  call  matter,  or  material  or  physical  substance, 
may,  besides  the  physical  properties  which  we  know 


100        STATEMENTS  AND  SPECULATIONS  ON 


THE  NATURE  OF  PERCEPTION. 


101 


it  to  possess,  have  also — at  least  when  organized — 
the  power  of  thought  and  feeling,  and  be  thus  as 
capable  of  spiritual,  as  it  is  of  physical  functions? 

At  first  sight,  this  supposition  might  appear  not 
impossible.  It  has  even  a  certain  semblance  of 
philosophical  truth  in  it — the  holding  that  the 
same  material  substance,  about  the  nature  of 
which  we  know  so  little,  may  possess  both  physical 
powers  and  powers  of  thought.  Unfortunately, 
however,  for  such  a  theory,  when  the  Materialist 
comes  to  reflect  on  the  nature  of  this  material  sub- 
stance in  wliich  he  believes,  he  finds  he  has  already 
invested  it  with  a  definite  nature  of  its  own :  he  has 
already  declared  it  insensible,  and  tlie  subject  of 
certain  rigid  physical  properties ;  and  with  all  his 
efforts  he  cannot  succeed  in  combining  with  these 
the  very  different  attributes  involved  in  his  concep- 
tions of  intelligence.  Even  in  the  face  of  his  own 
assertions  to  the  contrary,  he  therefore  mentally 
postulates  a  separate  thinking  being,  connected 
with  the  animal  organism,  but  not  of  its  substance. 

There  is,  indeed,  no  diflSculty  in  hnagining  rocks 
and  trees  to  be  endued  with  human  sensibilities. 
This  was  a  favourite  fancy  of  the  poets.    But  here, 


[ 


as  we  have  said,  it  is  not  matter,  as  such,  that  pos- 
sesses these  powers,  it  is  a  sentient  being  whom  we 
instinctively  install  within  the  insensible  prison- 
house, — the  matter  itself — the  stone  or  the  wood 
we  never  succeed  in  conceiving  as  either  the  pos- 
sessor of  feeling  or  of  thought. 

Many  obvious  objections,  moreover, present  them- 
selves to  such  a  theory.  Thus,  as  it  is  only  in 
so  far  as  this  physico-spiritual  substance  is  or- 
ganized, and  arranged  into  some  one  or  other  of 
the  forms  of  animal  life,  that  it  is  ever  imagined 
to  possess  consciousness  and  thought ;  so  from  this 
it  would  seem  to  follow  as  a  necessary  conse- 
quence, that  the  law  of  the  physical  organism  must 
he  held  to  correspond  with  the  law  of  thought*  The 
physical  machine  is  thus  constituted  the  cause,  and 
constructor  of  every  mental  process ;  and  thought 
becomes  the  immediate  product  of  physical  move- 
ments. How  directly  adverse  to  such  a  theory 
are  all  the  operations  of  mind !  How  can  phy- 
sical movements  be  conceived  to  produce  the 
workings  of  imagination, — the  belief  in  the  future 
and  the  unseen, — the  sense  of  duty — the  con- 
sciousness of  power — the  assertions  of  self-will — 


102 


STATEMENTS  AND  SPECULATIONS  ON 


or  the  mental  bias,  not  only  towards  selfish,  but 
towards  social,  moral,  and  spiritual  objects  ?  All 
these  mental  phenomena  seem  quite  inexplicable 
on  the  machine  theory. 

If  we  are  to  believe  that  we  have  freedom  of 
will,  and  any  direction  of  our  thoughts  and  actions, 
it  would  seem  that  this  must  necessarily  involve 
the  belief  in  a  duality  of  existence — of  a  distinct, 
free,  thinking  being,  to  will  and  act, — and  of  a 
machine  or  organism,  to  be  acted  on. 

Another  objection  to  the  theory  of  the  brain 
being  the  producer  of  thought,  and  which  must 
ever  make  it  unsatisfactory,  even  if  stronger  objec- 
tions to  it  were  awanting,  is,  that  it  implies  that 
there  will  be  a  total  cessation  of  thought  and  con- 
sciousness with  the  dissolution  of  animal  life. 

Some  other  hypothesis  must  therefore  be  sought 
for ;  and  a  speculative  mind  may  be  led  to  theorize 
on  the  nature  of  that  self-asserting  principle  which 
we  call  I, — not  so  much  perhaps  with  a  hope  of  arriv- 
ing definitely  at  any  one  particular  opinion,  as  with  a 
view  to  satisfy  itself  that  other  theories  more  plausi- 
ble and  consistent,  and  less  painful  than  that  of  the 
thought-producing  machine,  may  be  maintained. 


THE  NATURE  OF  PERCEPTION. 


103 


Andjjirst,  let  us  place  ourselves  in  the  position 
of  those  who  hold  the  popular  belief  in  mind  and 
matter ;  and,  assuming  this  position,  we  are  willing 
to   admit   that   we   can   discover   no   insuperable 
obstacle  to  embarrass  the  supporters  of  this  ancient— 
and  shall  we  say  antiquated  ?— form  of  belief,  which 
supposes  an  intercourse  between  these  two  opposite 
essences.     The  larger  section  of  mankind  believe 
that  the  Deity  is  a  spirit :  and  yet  they  experience 
no  difficulty  in  conceiving  him  to  act  on  matter  ^ 
and  to  maintain  the  laws  of  Nature.     They  who 
believe  this  should  certainly,  in  consistency  with 
their  theory,  experience  no  difficulty  in  conceiving 
the  mind  of  man,  which  they  believe  to  be  formed 
of  the  like  spiritual  essence,  to  be  gifted  with  the 
possession  of  a  like  ability,  though  in  an  inferior 
and  subordinate  measure  and  degree ;  and  thus  to     . 
act  on  matter  as  its  author  does— at  least  on  that 
finer  manifestation  of  it  which  pervades  the  body, 
and  which  we  call  the  nervous  medium— an  elastic 
imponderable  agent,  which,  indeed,  obeys  certain 
physical  laws,   but  which,  even  to   the  believer  J 
in  matter,  appears  to  hold  a  place  intermediate 
between  material   and  physical.     Such  an  agent 


104        STATEMENTS  AND  SPECULATIONS  ON 

miist  appear  a  not  unsuitable  medium  for  conduct- 
ing the  action  and  reaction  which  exists  between 
the  spiritual  and  the  material  part  of  our  being. 

If  it  be  objected,  that  the  mind  is  neither  directly 
conscious  of  the  existence  of  this  medium  in  the 
body,  nor  of  the  method  of  its  acting,  we  reply — 
neither  are  we  conscious  of  how  the  heart  expands 
and  contracts  its  chambers,  and  yet  it  does  so 
nearly  100,000  times  every  twenty-four  hours; 
nor  are  we  conscious  of  the  position  or  mode  of 
action  of  any  of  our  internal  organs,  and  yet  our 
lives  are  dependent  on  the  steady  and  continual 
action  of  these  parts.  If,  then,  these  organs  act 
without  our  knowledge  or  direction,  we  may  surely 
admit  it  as  less  difficult  to  believe  that  the  mind 
may  act  on  matter,  and  matter  on  mind,  though 
we  may  not  be  conscious  how  the  power  is  brought 
into  exercise. 

In  the  second  place,  and  as  another  hypothesis, 
we  may  imagine  a  more  refined  Materialism, 
maintaining, — that  the  thinking  principle  is  created 
with  a  constitution  and  organization  of  its  own ; 
that  it  is  material  in  its  essence,  but  that  its  mate- 
riality is  of  a  most  subtle  kind ;  that  it  is  indestruc- 


THE  NATURE  OF  PERCEPTION. 


105 


tible  —all  matter  is  held  to  be  so  in  its  constituent 
elements,  though  not  discovered  to  be  so,  in  any 
form  of  organization  with  which  we  are  acquainted; 
we  cannot  annihilate  one  atom  of  any  object  that 
exists,  though  we  may  re-arrange  the  elements  of 
which  it  is  composed.     This  being  the  case,  we 
may  allow  the  Materialist  to  form  his  theory,  of  a 
thinking  principle,  consisting  of  the  elements   of 
which  we  have  an  acquaintance,  but  combined  and 
organized  on  an  enduring  and  indestructible  basis, 
—possessed  of  a  form  and  individuality  of  its  own, 
—not  nourished  as  is  the  body,— not  depending  on 
the  body  for  its  existence  or  action,— not  subject 
to  disease  or  dissolution,— in  every  respect  a  being 
distinct  from  the  body,  though  held  for  a  time  in 
connexion  with  it;  capable  on  the  one  hand,  by 
virtue  of  its  materiality,  of  being  acted  on  through 
the  body,  and  capable,  by  virtue  of^  this   same 
materiality,  of  giving  effect  to  its  powers  of  thought 
and  volition,  and  thereby  originating  and  directing 
the  movements  of  the  bodily  organism. 

But  let  us  rather  now,  in  the  third  and  last  place, 
introduce  what  appears  to  us  a  more  philosophical 
hypothesis.     If  the  theory  of  an  immaterial  and 


106        STATEMENTS  AND  SPECULATIONS  ON 

dynamical  world  is  accepted,  the  speculations 
which  may  be  suggested  on  this  very  difficult 
inquiry,  assume  form  and  consistency,  and  are 
relieved  of  very  much  of  the  difficulty  which  has 
hitherto  attached  to  all  speculations  on  such  a 
subject;  for,  if  we  recognise  the  world  to  be  a 
manifestation  of  Divine  power,  we  can  experience 
surely  no  difficulty  in  conceiving  the  mind  to 
receive  the  impressions  of  sense,  by  virtue  of 
its  connexion  with  the  outer  world ;  the  Great 
Cause  being  thus  held  to  communicate  to  his 
creatures  a  knowledge  of  external  nature  through 
the  bodily  organs,  which  are  themselves  but 
parts  of  the  one  divine  physical  system.  And  as 
regards  the  reverse  action  of  the  mind  on  external 
nature,  we  can  view  it  in  like  manner,  as — 
by  virtue  of  the  powers  committed  to  it,  acting 
through  the  bodily  organs  on  that  Power  who,  in 
limitation  of  his  absolute  being,  has  constituted 
himself  at  once  the  passive  and  the  active  energy 
of  a  world  ruled  by  physical  law. 

On  this  hypothesis,  of  the  world  and  of  our  bodies 
being  immaterial,  yet  organized  and  physical,  we 
can,  without  any  danger  of  confounding  mind  with 


THE  NATURE  OF  PERCEPTION. 


107 


matter,  admit,  what  is  indeed  very  evident,  that 
the  brain  is  specially  connected  with  the  operations 
of  mind,  and  is  thus,  in  this  restricted  sense,  very 
properly  regarded  as  the  organ  of  thought.  This 
is  very  different,  however,  from  viewing  it  as  the 
producer  of  thought. 

But  a  danger  yet  remains ;  for  even  though  we 
held  that  the  brain  and  all  physical  things  were 
immaterial,  still  if  we  supported  the  theory  that 
its   action  produced  thought,  our  views,  we  con- 
ceive, would  be  nearly  as  objectionable  as  those  of 
the  Materialist;  for  thought  would  thus  still  be 
represented  as  dependent  on  the  working  of  a  per- 
ishable organ  ;  and  thought,  moreover,  being  repre- 
sented by  such  a  theory  as  the  product  of  a  phy- 
sical machine,  the  necessary  inference  would  still 
exist,  that  it  must  follow  the  laws  of  physics,  and 
be   thereby  incapable  of  all  spontaneous  action. 
Who  would  not  regard  this,  both  as  a  degrading 
position  and  as  one  inconsistent  with  the  lessons 
of  our  mental  consciousness  ? 

There  is,  however,  no  necessity  of  approaching 
any  such  mechanical  theory  of  thought.  The 
belief  in  a  Separate  Thinking  Principle  or  Being 


108        STATEMENTS  AND  SPECULATIONS  ON 


ia,  it  would  seem,  both  more  pliilosophical,  and  in- 
finitely more  accordant  with  consciousness.  We  are 
told  in  our  oldest  book  of  Cosmogony,  and  in  very 
striking  language,  that  God  breathed  into  man  the 
breath  of  life,  and  he  became  a  living  spirit.  This 
venerable  tenet,  that  the  thinking  principle  has  an 
individuality  apart  from  the  body,  is  thus,  it  would 
appear,  most  accordant  at  once  with  the  natural, 
the  religious,  and  the  better  philosophical  opinions 
of  mankind  in  general. 

Whether  this  self-conscious  principle  occupies 
the  whole  body,  or  resides  in  the  brain  as  its  special 
organ,  we  shall  by  and  by  consider.  In  either 
view,  we  necessarily  conceive  it  to  occupy  space, 
and,  doing  so,  to  possess  form.  Then,  again,  being 
in  connexion  with  the  terminations  of  the  nerves 
of  sense,  situated  in  the  brain, — in  order  that  it  may 
receive  impressions,  conduct  thought,  and  execute 
its  will,  in  accordance  with  the  laws  of  its  physical 
connexion — it  is  difficult  to  escape  asking  our- 
selves whether  it  may  not  also  have  something 
analogous  to  organization. 

We  conceive  it  to  be  immaterial  and  indestruc- 
tible, except  by  the  Being  who  gives  it  existence. 


THE  NATURE  OF  PERCEPTION. 


109 


It  would  be  rash,  indeed,  to  declare  that  it  has  a 
definite  form;  all  we  would  wish  to  indicate  is, 
that  we  know  it  to  possess  and  occupy  a  special 
physical  organ ;  so  we  must  suppose  it  to  be  pre- 
sent throughout  the  entire  of  that  organ,  and  to 
possess,  in  its  present  physical  connexion,  a  defi- 
nite form  and  definite  bounds. 

From  our  traditional  habit  of  grossly  regarding 
physical   objects  as  material,  instead  of  correctly 
viewing  all  things  as  parts  of  a  divine  system,  we 
naturally  recoil  from  the  idea  of  the  soul  possessing 
certain   physical   powers  or  properties;    and  yet 
there  is  a  propriety  in  holding  that  the  intellectual 
principle,  which  not  only  thinks  but  cwts,  must 
possess  certain  physical  powers ;  indeed,  how  are 
we   to   mark  the   distinction   between   acting   on 
physical  objects   (which  it    does  in   moving   the 
limbs),  and  possessing  physical  powers— between 
being  acted  on  by  the  impressions  of  sense,  and 
possessing  physical  properties  and  susceptibilities  ? 
Do  we  forget  that  we  have  represented  the  whole 
world  as  being  Divine  power  acting  under  physical 
law?      And   if  we    regard  this  view  as  worthy 
of  our  acceptance,  on  what  ground  can  we  reject 


w 


110        STATEMENTS  AND  SPECULATIONS  ON 

the  idea  that  the  subordinate  and  feebler  spiritual 
principle  possessed  by  man,  may  not,  for  the  pur- 
poses of  its  connexion  with  a  physical  world,  be 
likewise  temporarily  subjected  to  certain  of  these 
same    physical    laws,    and    to    the    organization 
or  mode  of  action  which   may  be  necessary  for 
maintaining,  or  rendering  effectual,  its  earthly  and 
physical  connexion  ?  But  this,  so  far  as  regards  its 
organization,  we  merely  moot  as  a  subject  of  thought. 
That  the  nature  of  its  physical  connexion  is  at 
present  limited  in  this  way  would,  it  is  evident, 
be  no  disparagement  to  its  higher  and  spiritual 
nature,  at  least  when  it  is  taken  in  connexion  with 
our  immaterial  theory ;  it  carries  no  dangerous  con- 
sequences with  it— it  contradicts  no  religious  tenets 
—it  falls  easily  in  with  the  general  belief;  and  it 
seems  to  remove  the  difficulty  which  in  all  ages 
has  attached  to  the  subject  of  mind  and  matter,  and 
their  mutual  intercourse.     For,  if  the  mind  is  im- 
material, and  at  the  same  time  has  the  command 
of  certain  physical  powers  in  addition  to  its  higher 
power  of  thought,  we  may  admit  the  intercourse 
between  it  and  the  immaterial  physical  world  to  be 
not  only  possible,  but  in  great  measure  intelligible. 


THE  NATURE  OF  PERCEPTION. 


Ill 


\ 


■*4 

) 


With  reference  to  the  surmise  thrown  out — as  a 
provocative  of  thought— regarding  the  soul  being 
organized:  It  was  offered  merely  to  mark  our 
inability  to  realize  a  true  unity  of  being.  We  do 
not  for  a  moment  imagine  any  organs  in  a  spiritual 
thinking  principle  ;  nor  do  we  imagine  any  localiz- 
ation of  its  different  functions.  We  distinctly 
hold  the  mind  to  be  spiritual,  indestructible,  indi- 
visible,—in  an  absolute  sense  to  be  One.  When 
the  action  of  the  optic  nerve  affects  the  brain,  then 

not  one  part,  but — the  whole  mind  is  filled  wdth 

the  sensation  of  light.  When  the  action  of  the 
auditory  nerve  reaches  the  brain,  and  affects  it — 
then  the  whole  mind  is  filled  with  the  sensation  of 
sound.  Wlien  a  sharp  point  pierces  the  hand,  the 
whole  mind  is  filled  with  pain.  Every  sensation 
thus  belongs  to  the  whole  mind. 

Likewise,  it  is  the  whole  mind  which  wills— it 
is  the  whole  mind  which  acts.  It  is  indeed  fre- 
quently found  to  hesitate  under  conflicting  motives, 
and  to  hang  irresolute  and  uncertain  over  its  ill- 
defined  and  unsettled  judgments ;  but  it  never  ex- 
hibits any  indications  of  being  locally  and  physically 
divided,  or  of  possessing  different  centres  of  action. 


a.j83»iiU8ai 


112        STATEMENTS  AND  SPECULATIONS  ON 

Still,  though  thus  an  individual  unity,  we  must 
remember  that  all  the  physical  impressions  enter 
the  brain  by  distinct  and  separate  portals,— that 
their  action  is  confined  to  particular  lobes  of  the 
brain— that    in    these    lobes    or     chambers    the 
mind  becomes    conscious   of,  or   is    affected    by, 
particular  physical  impressions.     It  must  in  like 
manner  be  kept  in  view,  that  it  is  through  certain 
organs  of  the  brain  the  mind  acts  on  the  diflfer- 
ent  parts  of  the  body.     This,  then,  is  the  only 
species  of  organization  we  can  discover.     It  will 
be  evident,  therefore,  that  it  is  much  more  correct 
to  say  that  the  mind,  in  the  exercise   of  these 
operations,  is  subjected  to  limitations  suited  to  the 
nature  and  objects    of  its  physical   connexion,— 
than  to  say  that  it  is  organized. 

But,  query.  Can  it  be  supposed  to  feel  at  different 
parts  ?  It  has  been  the  error  of  some  philosophers 
to  hold  that  the  mind  perceives  at  the  external 
organs  of  sense  ;  but  this,  as  we  shall  by  and  by 
show,  has  been  recently  disproved  by  the  friendly 
assistance  of  scientific  investigators.  Does  it  then 
feel  at  the  particular  part  of  the  brain  affected?  It 
does  not.  It  is  ever  the  I.   It  is  the  whole  sentient 


THE  NATURE  OF  PERCEPTION. 


113 


being  that  feels.  It  knows  nothing  of  the  portion 
of  the  brain  which  may  be  affected.  It  has  no 
such  discriminating  power ;  and  there  is  evidently 
no  object  to  be  gained  by  its  having  any  such 
knowledge.  The  mind,  on  the  contrary,  seems 
entirely  passive  in  the  reception  of  all  its  physi- 
cal sensations :  all  we  are  certain  of  by  conscious- 
ness is,  that  we  are  so  and  so  affected. 

But  mark  the  active  character  of  the  mind,  in 
the  discharge  of  its  proper  functions.  It  knows 
not  the  part  of  the  brain  affected,  but  it  exercises 
a  higher  and  more  intellectual  power.  It  instantly 
and  entirely  identifies  its  sensations  with  the  ex- 
citing cause  situated  in  the  limb  affected.  So 
thoroughly  does  the  mind  realize  the  fact  that 
the ,  sensation  originates,  not  in  the  brain,  but 
in  an  outlying  department  of  the  body,  that,  as 
a  wise  and  paternal  monarch,  it  thinks  not  at 
all  directly  of  its  sufiering  self,  nor  of  the  official 
agent  which  brought  the  message,  but  solely 
and  exclusively  of  the  distant  cause  of  the  dis- 
turbance. 

It  is  arranged  by  a  law  of  consummate  wisdom 
and  utility  that  it  should  be  so :  and  equally  wise 


ii 


114         STATEMENTS  AND  SPECULATIONS  ON 

shall  we  find  every  other  arrangement  in  nature. 
So  much  is  this  the  case,  that  it  has  ever  been 
one  of  man's  chief  enjoyments  to  discover  causes, 
and  to  mark  laws  and  rules  of  action. 

Exercising  ourselves,  therefore,  in  this  way,  let  us 
remark— That  the  nerves  of  sensation  proceed 
from  nearly  every  part  of  the  body,  and  that  they 
have  their  terminations  in  definite  portions  of 
the  brain.  This  circumstance  at  once  suggests  an 
explanation  of  the  singular  and  important  law  which 
we  have  been  considering— namely,  that  the  mind 
perceives  its  sensations,  not  as  if  they  existed 
in  itself,  nor  as  if  they  existed  in  the  brain, 
but  as  if  they  were  located  in  the  part  of  the  body 

affected. 

By  the  arrangement  of  the  nervous  system  above 
alluded  to,  it  is  evident  that  by  means  of  the  nerves 
entering  the  brain,  the  whole  body  is  practically 
represented  in  that  organ ;— the  body  is  in  fact 
epitomized  in  the  brain. 

We  may  even  conjecture  that  this  epitomizing  of 
the  whole  sensitive  parts  of  the  body  in  the  brain 
is  rendered  efi'ectual  by  means  of  a  grouping  and 
arranging  of  the  nervous  centres,  suited  to  produce 


THE  NATURE  OF  PERCEPTION. 


115 


a  knowledge  of  the  position  of  the  limbs  they 
represent.* 

Then,  as  regards  the  message  transmitted  to  the 
cerebral  organ,  we  can  speak  experimentally ;  for, 
whatever  the  nature  of  their  action  on  the  brain 
may  be,  we  know  the  wonderfully  nice  and  varied 
distinction  of  signs  and  utterances  which  the 
nerves  of  sensation  communicate  to  the  mind. 

The  connexion  of  the  mind  with  the  physical 
world,  we  freely  admit,  is  a  mystery,  but  so  is  every 
operation  in  nature;  we  never  discover  the  ulti- 
mate cause :  we  only  see  certain  links  of  the  chain. 
Let  us  never,  however,  despise  the  knowledge,  be 
it  much  or  be  it  little,  which  we  may  be  permitted 
to  obtain. 

We  would  remark,  then,  in  connexion  with  the 
above  considerations ;  that  man  has  both  instinc- 
tive or  intuitional  knowledge,  and  a  knowledge 
accumulated  by  experience.  It  is  often  exceedingly 
difficult  to  determine  where  the  one  ends  and  the 
other  begins :  or  how  far  both  are  existing  and 
operating  together.     For  example,  how  comes  it 

^  The  internal  organs  of  the  body  generally  have  no  direct  con- 
nexion with  the  brain,  but  with  the  ganglionic  Hystem. 


ll 


116         STATEMENTS  AND  SPECULATIONS  ON 

that  the  mind  should  perceive  its  sensations  as  if 
they  were  situated,  not  in  the  brain,  but  in   the 
precise   part  of  the  body  which  is  affected?    It 
would  be  quite  correct  were  we  to  reply  that  it  is 
by  virtue  of  a  law  of  its   nature  that  the  mind 
|>erceives  at  all,  and  therefore  tliat  we  cannot  doubt 
that  it  is  also  in  conformity  with  a  law  that  the 
niind — we   do   not   say  perceives,    but   seems   to 
perceive,   the   sensations   as  resident  where  they 
certainly  are  not.      Now,  though  this  may  be  a 
correct  answer,  yet   it   should   not  foreclose  fur- 
ther inquiry,  for  when  we  examine,  we  generally 
discover  that  every  law  is  carried  out  by  appro- 
])riate  means ;  and  we  are  frequently  permitted  to 
discover  some  of  those  means  or  outward  steps  by 
which  the  law  comes  into  operation. 

^lay  the  particular  grouping,  therefore,  of  the 
nervous  terminations  in  the  brain  not  be  regarded  as 
a  means  whereby  the  sentient  principle  has  a  know- 
ledge of  the  local  arrangement  of  the  parts  of  the 
external  body  ?  And  may  the  distinction  in  the 
quality  of  the  nervous  sign,  rendered  by  the 
nerves  of  general  sensibility,  not  in  some  measure 
depend  on  the  distance  of  the  part  of  the  body  from 


THE  NATURE  OF  PERCEPTION. 


117 


which  the  nerve  proceeds — in  other  words,  on  the 
length  of  the  nerve  ?   We  may  illustrate  our  mean- 
ing in  this  way :  When  a  submarine  telegraphic  wire 
is  snapped,  those  who  have  acquired  a  knowledge 
of  the  •  outward  manifestation   of   the  wonderful 
power  which  darts  through  the  wires,  can  tell,  by 
the  nature  of  the  return  made  through  the  broken 
wire,  how  far  off  under  the  Atlantic  the  fracture 
occurs.    This  is  beautifully  called  the  answer  from 
the   sea ;  and  this   message   may  illustrate  what 
we  call  the  sensation  from  the  limb  affected.     The 
message  in  the  one  case  is  perceived  and  judged  of 
in  the  telegraphic  office,  and,  in  the  other  case,  in 
the  chamber  of  the  brain ;  but  they  both  speak  of 
conditions   of  being,  existing  in   an   inaccessible 

quarter. 

If  we  can  judge  thus  by  means  of  the  imperfect 
utterances  of  a  damaged  machine  of  man's  construc- 
tion, we  may  see  something  like  a  physical  fact 
to  explain  how  that  intelligent  principle  which 
resides  in  an  organ  not  made  by  human  hands — 
not  damaged— but  put  in  perfect  and  finished  con- 
nexion with  the  body — may  far  more  certainly  and 
nicely  pronounce  on  the  parts  of  the  external  body 


M 


118        STATEMENTS  AND  SPECULATIONS  ON 


i| 


which  are  being  subjected  to  internal  or  externa 
physical  disturbance— and  which  parts  are,  through 
their  own  special  nerves,  transmitting  a  nervous 
action  to  the  brain. 

That  we  have  an  original  and  instinctive 
feeling  of  externality  we  cannot  question.  Every 
part  of  the  body  is  sensitive,  and  therefore  the 
first  bodily  movement  by  an  infant,  must  excite 
an  extended  muscular  and  nervous  action,  which 
will  be  represented  by  a  corresponding  extended 
action  in  the  cephalic  organ.  But  yet  the 
knowledge  thus  acquired  of  an  extended  physical 
body  is  not  at  once  perfect.  An  infant  has  not 
the  same  ready  perception  of  the  site  of  a  bodily 
injury  that  an  adult  has.  We  must  all  have 
observed  that  when  a  child— it  may  even  be  so 
much  as  two  or  three  years  of  age— receives  a 
sudden  sharp  stroke,  it  can  but  very  imperfectly 
tell  in  what  part  of  its  body  the  injury  exists. 
It  appears  rather  as  if  its  whole  being  were  con- 
vulsed with  pain,  than  that  any  particular  part 
suffers.  This  must  lead  us  to  conclude  that  our 
physical  sensations  and  powers  are  at  least  en- 
larged and  perfected  by  experience. 


THE  NATURE  OF  PERCEPTION, 


119 


But  we  have  ventured  further  on  this  inquiry 
than  we  anticipated,  and  we  must  therefore  bring 
this  chapter  to  a  close.     We  submit  these  reflec- 
tions, hoping  they  may  help  to  explain  both  the 
physical  and  the  spiritual  structure  of  our  theory— 
these  two  aspects  in  it  being,  in  our  opinion,  one 
and  inseparable.     By  viewing  the  matter  in  this 
light,   we    think  we   may   form   some  consistent 
notion   both   of  the   actions,  and   of  the  passive 
affections,  of  that  percipient  spiritual  Ego  which, 
in  the  operation  of  animal  life,  acts  and  suffers 
in   conformity  with  the   laws   which   govern   its 
physical  associate,  the  body. 

The  explanations  we  have  given  are  alone  ten- 
able when  taken  in  connexion  with  our  peculiar 
views,  which  regard  the  world— animal  and  vege- 
table—organic and  inorganic— as  but  one  connected 
Divine  operative  system.  Unless  this  is  kept 
constantly  in  view,  our  explanations  of  mental 
perception  and  mental  action  naay  be  misunder- 
stood, and  objected  to  as  appearing  too  much  con- 
nected with  physical  laws. 

The  belief  in  matter  has  had  the  worst  effect  on 
the  mind  of  Christendom.     It  has  frequently  led 


120 


THE  NATURE  OF  PERCEPTION. 


men  to  close  their  eyes  against  the  facts  of  science ; 
and  it  has  prevented  our  forming  a  just  and  com- 
prehensive conception  of  the  method  of  the  Divine 
government  in  the  physical  world.  When  any 
great  cosmical  event  is  explained  by  the  operation  of 
physical  law,  a  terror  is  immediately  experienced  ; 
and  it  is  objected  that  the  explanation  is  making 
matter  do  what  can  only  be  performed  by  Deity. 
The  most  important  discoveries  have,  on  this  prin- 
ciple, frequently  been  refused  acceptance  Now, 
whether  there  be  matter  or  whether  there  be  none, 
is  it  not  evident  that  the  operations  of  Nature  are 
the  operations  of  God  ? 

Much,  indeed,  do  we  prefer  regarding  matter  as 
a  mere  phantasm  of  the  imagination :  but  our  objec- 
tion to  it  is  not  that  of  the  timid,  who  think  that 
matter  does  too  much ;  our  objection  to  it  is,  that, 
while  we  cannot  find  that  it  does  anything  at  all, 
or  even  that  it  exists,  the  belief  in  it  is  constantly 
obstructing  the  course  of  free  inquiry,  and  com- 
pelling timid  but  pious  men  to  dissociate  the 
laws  of  Nature  from  the  Being  who  is  their 
author. 


121 


CHAPTER   VI. 


HAVE  WE  A  DIRECT  AND  INTUITIONAL  PERCEP- 
TION OF  EXTERNAL  NATURE,  AS  HAMILTON 
GENERALLY  ASSERTS  ? 

AVe  quit  now  the  speculations  of  the  preceding 
chapter,  in  order  to  enter  upon  our  special  inquiry, 
which  is  :  What  do  the  senses  teach  us?  and  what 
do  we  really  know  of  the  external  world  ? 

We  have  felt  much  dissatisfaction  with  not  a 
few  who  have  written  on  this  subject,  from  finding 
that,  instead  of  taking  some  pains  to  discover  pre- 
cisely what  the  senses  reveal  to  us,  they  keep 
entirely  to  generalities,  repeating  the  phrases  em- 
ployed in  the  dawn  of  Greek  philosophy.  We 
know  the  world  only,  say  they,  through  sensations. 
Sensations  are  not  like  the  external  realities,  and 
therefore  we  know  nothing  truly  and  certainly 
of  the  world.  This  is  a  mere  repetition  of  the 
lispings  of  philosophy,  and  is  unworthy  of  our 


122 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF 


times.  If  the  senses  reveal  anything  at  all,  why 
should  that  not  be  stated,  that  we  may  judge  of 
its  nature  ?  But  this  these  writers  seem  not  dis- 
posed to  do. 

We  can  imagine  a  gelatinous  animal  of  the 
lowest  order,  whose  destiny  it  was  to  be  rooted  to 
a  rock,  and  to  be  sustained  by  the  involuntary 
absorption  of  the  fluid  in  which  it  was  immersed, 
exercising  itself  simply  in  attending  to  the  quality 
of  its  sensations,  without  inquiry  into  the  fact  of 
their  having  any  external  cause.  Such  an  animal, 
if  such  there  were,  would  acquire  no  knowledge 
whatever  of  the  world,  or  of  anything  external  to 
itself.  It  would  only  know  of  the  quality  of  its 
own  sensations.  Now,  very  much  in  this  position 
does  it  please  some  writers  to  represent  man  as 
being  placed  by  reason  of  the  limitation  of  his 
means  of  knowledge.  But  man  is  not  thus  circum- 
stanced, and  especially  he  acts  not  as  this  imagi- 
nary mollusc.  His  senses  give  him  the  means  of 
knowing  much,  as  we  in  this  nineteenth  century 
should  be  ready  to  acknowledge;  and  his  mind 
prompts  him  to  continual  further  inquiry. 

We  know  the  world,  indeed,  only  through  sen- 


ff 


DIRECT  AND  INTUITIONAL  PERCEPTION.      123 


sations,  and  we  are  told  these  sensations  are  not 
like  the  external  causes  producing  them.  It  is 
said :  How  can  mere  sensations  or  feelings,  which 
are  in  the  mind,  be  like  a  knife,  or  like  salt  or 
pepper,  or  a  pianoforte,  or  a  drum,  or  fife  ?  or  like 
vibrations  of  the  air,  or  of  any  other  medium  ?  We 
admit  that  some  of  our  sensations,  if  we  speak  only 
of  their  character  or  quality,  are  like  nothing  ex- 
ternal— they  are  merely  pleasant  or  unpleasant 
affections  caused  by  impressions  made  on  the  body. 
In  so  far,  then,  as  they  are  such  affections,  they 
neither  agree  with  the  external  cause,  nor  give  us 
any  accurate  knowledge  of  it.  Such  pre-eminently 
are  the  sensations  of  taste  and  smell,  of  heat  and 
cold,  of  sound  and  light.  But  yet  it  is  no  less  true 
that  our  sensations  afford  us  sufficient  data  to 
assign  a  definition  of  the  nature  of  their  exciting 
causes.  For  if  this  is  not  the  case,  science  is 
a  mere  mockery  and  man  is  an  irrational  being, 
the  sport  of  some  higher  power. 

But  before  we  commence  any  examination  of  the 
sensations,  let  us  remark  that,  though  without  our 
sensations  we  could  know  nothing  of  the  world, 
yet  it  is  very  far  from  true  that  sensations  consti- 


124 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF 


tute  the  sum  total  of  our  cosraical  knowledge.  It 
is  in  the  possession  of  Animal  Will  and  powers  of 
locomotion  on  the  one  hand, — and  in  the  resistance 
of  the  world  to  the  free  exercise  of  these  preroga- 
tives of  animal  life  on  the  other — it  is  in  the  oppo- 
sition of  these  two  factors  that  our  consciousness  of 
the  outer  world,  and  of  ourselves  as  parts  of  it, 
arises  and  exists.  The  sensations  without  the  active 
animal  will,  would  be  entirely  insufficient:  with  the 
sensations  alone  we  would  be  lower  and  more 
ignorant  than  the  lowest  mollusc. 

Having  thus  far  cleared  the  way,  let  us,  in  the 
first  place,  observe,  regarding  our  sensations,  that 
they  have  each  and  all  of  them  a  distinctive  cha- 
racter, which  enables  us  to  distinguish  the  one 
from  the  other,  even  as  we  know  one  letter  of 
the  alphabet  from  another. 

Again,  we  can  discover  by  the  judging  faculty, 
that  the  character  or  quality  of  each  class  of  sensa- 
tions is  dependent  not  only  on  the  organ  atfected 
but  also  on  the  nature  of  the  physical  impulse 
given. 

Again,  although  all  we  know,  or  think,  or  feel 
of  the  world  is  in  the  mind,— yet  our  rational  nature, 


DIRECT  AND  INTUITIONAL  PERCEPTION.     125 


applying  itself  to  the  consideration  of  the  phe- 
nomena of  sense,  gives  us  assurance  that  what  we 
know,  and  think,  and  feel,  is  dependent  on  the 
nature  of  the  objects  causing  our  sensations.  We 
can  even,  in  some  measure,  account  for  the  dis- 
tinctive character  of  the  impressions  of  the  different 
senses  :  thus,  taste  is  a  faint  chemical  or  quasi- 
chemical  action  on  the  nerves  in  immediate  prox- 
imity with  the  food,  and,  as  such,  the  sensation  is 
in  harmony  w4th  the  physical  cause.  Taste  has  in 
itself  no  meaning,  except  that  it  affects  the  organ 
agreeably  or  disagreeably ;  and  this  is  all,  judging 
from  the  action  of  the  excitant,  that  we  could 
require  or  expect  of  it. 

Smell  is  nearly  the  same  in  its  nature,  and  in  its 
exciting  cause,  except  that  the  excitant  is  applied 
in  a  volatile,  and  not  in  a  solid  or  fluid  con- 
dition. 

Sound  is  produced  by  a  motion  so  rapid  that  its 
separate  beats  on  the  organ  cannot  be  counted ;  and, 
therefore,  the  sensation  of  sound  has  a  clear,  con- 
tinuous effect,  gentle  or  arousing,  according  to  the 
changes  wrought  in  the  flow  of  the  external 
impulse;    but   we    cannot    distinguish   the   rapid 


126 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF 


beat  given  by  each  pulse  of  vibration — we  can 
merely,  by  means  of  ingenious  contrivances,  ascer- 
tain their  number  and  velocity.  Sound,  therefore, 
though  so  important  a  means  of  transmitting 
knowledge,  and  so  conducive  to  our  enjoyments, 
conveys,  as  a  sensation,  no  special  meaning  to  us, 
and  we  see  the  reason  of  this. 

If  we  might  speculate  on  the  physiological  cause 
of  sound  being  pleasing,  we  might  say,  that  all 
animal  life  and  enjoyroent  largely  depend  on  mo- 
tion— on  the  motion  not  only  of  the  limbs  and 
blood,  but  also  of  the  molecules  of  which  our 
physical  system  consists  (see  Chap.  III.,  pp.  66-70; 
and  the  rapid  movements  caused  in  our  auditory 
nerves,  and  consequently  in  the  brain,  by  the 
vibrations  of  sound,  we  may  reasonably  assign  as 
a  sufficient  explanation  of  the  pleasure  we  expe- 
rience in  attending  to  sound,  simply  as  such? 
irrespective  of  melody  or  any  special  agreeable 
association. 

Light,  or  colour,  is  another  marvellous  exhibition 
of  sensation,  excited  by  a  still  more  rapid  succes- 
sion of  impulses  impressed  on  the  nerve  of  sight ; 
and  we  can  in  part   understand  how  such  rapid 


DIRECT  AND  INTUITIONAL  PERCEPTION.     127 


and  sharp  movements  should  produce  the  pleasing, 
thrilling,  but  pre-eminently  subjective  sensations 
of  colour. 

The  sensation  of  touch — as,  for  instance,  the 
pressure  of  the  hand  on  the  body — is  a  simple 
affection  of  the  parts  in  contact.  A  succession  of 
pats  of  the  hand  is  intelligible  as  a  repetition  of 
the  simple  act  of  pressure.  A  rapid,  light  repe- 
tition of  touch,  passes  into  a  sensation  of  tickling, 
which,  as  it  is  spasmodic,  is  not  so  intelligible 
as  pressure,  or  as  pats  which  may  be  counted. 

All  this  we  give  merely  to  enforce  what  we  have 
said,  that  though  sensations  are  in  the  mind,  yet 
the  difference  in  their  character  or  quality  has  per- 
haps always  a  certain  intelligible  dependence  on 
the  nature  of  their  exciting  cause.  Metaphysicians 
are  sometimes  addicted  to  make  everything  external 
unintelligible ;  our  desire  is  here,  in  as  far  as  pos- 
sible, to  explain  and  simplify  the  nature  of  our 
perceptions. 

Certain  of  our  most  important  sensations,  indi- 
vidually, or  by  themselves,  we  admit  would  impart 
to  us  no  very  distinct  objective  information.  Thus, 
hearing,  to  a  being  unconscious  of  possessing  a 


128 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF 


m 


|! 


physical  body,  without  the  sense  of  touch,  and 
without  the  power  of  locomotion,  would  appear,  we 
imagine,  as  a  purely  subjective,  involuntary  act  of 
consciousness,  and  not  as  proceeding  from  any  out- 
ward cause. 

In  vision  it  is  otherwise ;  a  knowledge  of  exten- 
sion is  communicated  along  with  the  sensation  of 
colour,  or  of  light.     The  sensation  excited  by  the 
impulse  on  the  retina,  is  a  coloured  form.     The 
form  corresponds  with  that  of  the  external  object— 
the  colour  has  no  such  correspondence.     The  colour 
is  the  quality  of  the  sensation  produced  in  the 
mind,  and  it  is  evident  that  colour  is  entirely  unlike 
the  external  cause   exciting  it.     The  cause,  is  a 
succession  of  rapid  impulses,  of  an  invisible  elastic 
medium,  upon  the  retina ;  the  mental  effect,  is  light 
and  colour.     There  is  neither  light  nor  colour  in 
external   nature;    they   are    in    the    mind   alone. 
This  is  a  consideration  calculated  to  create  our 
highest  wonder;  and  we  can  scarcely  escape  per- 
ceiving that  the  transformation  of  a  rapid  vibration 
into  80  glorious  a  mental  phenomenon  as  colour, 
marks,  in  a  very  striking  manner,  the  finger  of 
Deity,  and  his  design  that  our  intercourse  with  the 


DIRECT  AND  INTUITIONAL  PERCEPTION.      129 

world  should  be  one  of  enjoyment  and  admiration, 
and  not  of  intelligence  alone.  Were  it  not  so, 
vision  would  have  presented  Nature  to  us  not  as  a 
picture,  not  even  as  an  engraving,  but  merely  as 
a  refined  apprehension  of  touch  and  motion. 

It  is  by  tlie  exercise  of  judgment  upon  the 
deliverances  of  touchj  that  we  perceive,  or  come 
to  acquire  a  knowledge  of  the  physical  properties 
of  the  external  world.  We  here  employ  the 
term  toucli  in  its  large  and  not  in  that  re- 
stricted sense  applicable  to  skin  sensations,  which 
Sir  W.  Hamilton  has  rather  unhappily  selected 
as  must  explanatory  of  the  direct  intercourse  of 
mind  with  external  nature  ("Lectures  on  Meta- 
l)hysic3,''  chap.  xxv.).  By  touch  we  mean  that 
sense  by  which  we  are  conscious  of  sensations 
when  any  part  of  our  bodily  frame  is  touched, 
whether  forcibly  or  gently— by   which,  also,  we 

have  peculiar  sensations  when  we  move  our  limbs 

by  which  we  have  what  we  come  to  call  a  sensation 
of  tension  and  strain,  or  effort  in  the  limbs  when  we 
exert  them  violently — of  pain  when  we  overtask 
their  powers,  or  when  an  injury  is  inflicted— of 
restlessness   and   irritability   when   we   desire   or 


T^ 


130 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF 


f  f 


m 


l|: 


I 


require  exercise— of  fatigue  and  laogour  when  we 
have  protracted  our  bodily  exercise ; — all  these  we 
would  embrace  under  this  general  term, — the  sense 
of  touch,  or  general  sensibility.  It  is  entirely 
through  these  sensations  that  we  come  to  form  a 
conception  of  the  primary  qualities  of  an  external 

world. 

Py  sight  alone,  especially  if  joined  with  the 
faculty  of  locomotion,  we  would  doubtless  be  led 
to  believe  in  an  extended,  or  external  world,  but 
we  should  evidently  know  nothing  of  its  primary 
physical  properties — its  solidity,  its  hardness,  its 
resisting  powers— or,  in  comprehensive  language, 
its  physical  forces.  Without  these  it  would  appear 
to  us  as  a  mere  picture — a  dream — a  shifting,  un- 
resisting, unsubstantial  mirage.  We  learn  the 
primary  qualities  of  the  world  by  the  opposition 
which  physical  objects  offer  to  our  efforts  to  com- 
press them— to  force  our  way  through  them — to 
draw  their  parts  asunder — to  stop  their  motion— to 
overcome  their  inertia  or  weight. 

We  shall  best  make  the  subject  of  perception, 
as  we  view  it,  intelligible,  by  laying  before  the 
reader,  in  aa  condensed  a  form   a3  possible,  the 


\ 


DIRECT  AND  INTUITIONAL  PERCEPTION      131 

views  of  the  most  distinguished  Realists  our 
country  has  produced — namely,  those  of  Reid, 
Stewart,  and  Hamilton.  We  shall  then  make 
some  comments  on  the  explanations  these  writers 
offer  on  this  important  subject,  dwelling  espe- 
cially on  the  exposition  Hamilton  gives  of  his  own 
views,  which,  it  will  be  found,  differ  in  many 
respects  from  those  of  Reid  and  Stewart,  so  far  as 
these  can  be  ascertained,  a  matter  by  no  means 
always  easy  to  accomplish. 

It  is  by  examining  critically  the  views  of  others, 
and  by  placing  fact  against  fact,  and  argument 
against  argument,  that  we  can  best  elucidate  and 
enjoy  the  subject.  If  in  the  act  of  doing  this, 
there  should  appear  a  lack  of  reverence,  we  fear 
this  can  not  be  always  avoided.  The  subject  is 
pre-eminently  one  on  which  there  can  be  no 
compromise :  each  man  must  speak  as  he  thinks, 
and  with  the  consciousness  that  his  thinking, 
if  it  be  examined  at  all,  will  be  subjected  to  a 
like  unsparing  criticism.  In  conducting  all  such 
examinations,  we  may,  or  we  may  not  feel  the 
temptation  to  be  trenchant ;  but  we  must  feel  that 
there  is  the  obligation  to  be  honest. 


n 


132 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF 


DIRECT  AND  INTUITIONAL  PERCEPTION.      133 


Hamilton  is  undoubtedly  the  most  distinguished 
philosophical  Realist  of  recent  times.     He  has,  de- 
servedly, this  repute  from  his  leaniing,  his  energy, 
and  his  devotion  to  mental  science.  Physically  and 
intellectually  he  was  a  man  to  draw  admiration. 
His  life  was  consecrated  to  philosophy.     He  had 
enriched  his  mind  with  the  axioms  and  the  sen- 
timents of  the  greatest  men  of  former  ages,  and 
with   all  those  questions,  so  curious  and  subtle, 
which  had  occupied  thinkers  from  the  era  of  Plato 
and  Aristotle,  down  through  Roman  and  medieval 
ages,  to  our  own  day.     Far  from  being  oppressed 
by  a  wealth  imported  from  such  various  sources,  his 
stores  were  so  incorporated  as  to  constitute  the 
soul  and  substance  of  his  mental  being. 

It  is  unfortunate,  in  some  respects,  that  it  was 
so  ;  for  we  cannot  help  thinking  -that  a  much 
weaker,  simpler,  less  endowed  man,  with  half  his 
amount  of  zeal,  and  with  a  tenth  part  his  store  of 
erudition,  by  pursuing  carefully  much  humbler 
paths,  might  have  further  advanced  that  branch  of 
philosophy  which  we  are  now  considering.  What 
Hamilton's  writings,  by  following  a  more  careful 
course,  might  have  lost  in  temporary  momentum 


1 


and  grandeur,  we  feel  assured  they  would  have 
gained  in  instructiveness  and  precision. 

Hamilton  will  ever  be  conspicuous  as  a  man 
of  extensive  erudition  on  all  subjects,  and  espe- 
cially  on  Philosophy.     But,  as  an  actor  on  this 
field,  we  are  disposed  to  think  he  will  be  more 
distinguished   as  a  vigorous   assailant  of  adverse 
opinions,  than  as  a  careful  expositor  of  his  own 
views.    He  is  not,  in  any  strict  sense,  a  systematic 
writer.     He   is   everywhere   essentially  and  emi- 
nently combative.     Imbued  with   the  feeling    of 
power,  he  exhibits  ever  tlie  concomitant  love  of 
strenuous    mental   athletics,— eminently,    in    this 
respect,  he  is  a  Scotsman.     His  philosophical  dis- 
cussions, though  everywhere  enriched  with  a  be- 
witching savour  of  antiquity,  as  became  a  disciple 
of  Aristotle,  are  yet  as  thoroughly  instinct  with  the 
energy  and  warmth  of  Polemics  as  if  they  had 
been  forged    in  the   days  of  Baxter  and  Owen. 
In  ranging  through  the  field  of  thought,  it  is  in- 
variably converted  into  the  field  of  strife,  and  not 
only  the  maxims  and  doctrines,  but  the  illustrious 
chiefs  of  past  ages,  are,  by  a  stroke  of  his  pen,  sum- 
moned from  their  dust  to  overawe  and  to  silence  the 


134 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF 


modem  free-thinker.  This  is  particularly  the  case 
when  the  theory  of  perception  is  discussed.  Ha- 
milton, here  armed  with  the  dogmas  of  Aristotle, 
steps  forth  the  uncompromising  champion  of  Real- 
ism— the  upholder  of  the  veracity  of  conscious- 
ness— the  determined  enemy  of  Brown  and  all 
his  illustrious  school ;  determined,  at  any  cost, 
to  cause  the  flag  of  Reid  to  wave  over  the 
slaughtered  theories  of  all  impious  doubters  and 
disbelievers, — yet  not,  be  it  observed,  Reid's  iden- 
tical flag,  but  Reid's  flag  with  a  difierence,  as 
heraldry  expresses  it. 

In  the  heat  of  this  battle,  it  is  not  astonishing 
that  he  should  have  frequently  overstepped  his 
own  views — taking  up  positions  which  he  could 
not  defend,  and  using  language  which  he  was  by 
and  by  to  retract,  or  explain  away.  This  has 
rendered  it  extremely  diflScult  to  apprehend  his 
exact  opinions ;  and  few  men  of  what  has  been  fool- 
ishlv  called  the  common-sense  school  have,  from  this 
cause,  in  spite  of  a  thorough  command  of  racy  and 
vigorous  language,  exposed  themselves  to  more  fre- 
quent thrusts  of  adverse  criticism  than  Hamilton. 

To  the  ordinary  reader,  he  seems  to  regard  per- 


DIRECT  AND  INTUITIONAL  PERCEPTION.     135 

ception  in  the  common-sense  light— even  as  Reid 
did,  or  occasionally  seemed  to  do— that  we  see  the 
sun,   that  we  feel  the   table,   that  we  smell  the 
rose,  and  that  we  hear  the  pianoforte.     His  de- 
clarations  are  so  strong  and   absolute,  that  it  is 
almost  impossible   for  the   out-door  public,  on  a 
perusal  of  ordinary  carefulness,   to  avoid  putting 
this  construction  on  his  language.     And  so,  by 
common-sense   men,   his  views  are  received  and 
revered,  as  embodying  a  substantial  theory  of  what 
is  called  common-sense,  in  opposition  to  the  sup- 
posed   dangerous    and    fanciful    views    of    other 
philosophers.^ 

1  In  1856,  the  writer— then  a  tyro  in  metaphysical  reading  — 
brought  out  a  volume,  "  The  Philosophy  of  the  Senses."     In  this 
treatise,  when  commenting  on  Sir  W.  Hamilton's  views,  he  was  great- 
ly puzzled  by  the  manner  in  which  his  opinions  as  a  Realist  were  ex- 
pressed.  The  writer,  like  the  generality,  interpreted  his  views  in  their 
literality,  as  expressed  in  the  text.     In  this  erroneous  interpretation 
he  was  confirmed  by  one  of  Hamilton's  most  intelligent  and  diligent 
students,  whom  he  consulted  in  order  to  avoid  error  in  handling  views 
90  startling  and  incredible  as  those  apparently  avowed.    An  exam- 
ination of  Hamilton's  works,  while  preparing  the  present  volume, 
has  satisfied  the  writer  that,  with  all  his  reverence  for  that  earnest 
votary  of  philosophy,  it  is  impossible  to  avoid  discovering  what  can- 
not but  prove  misleading  statements  and  contradictions  in  his  writ- 
ings on  perception.      In  confirmation  of  these  strictures,  see  J.  S. 
Mill's  "  Examination,"  and  J.  H.  Stirling's  "  Analysis  "  of  Hamilton. 


136 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF 


Hamilton,   it    is   almost    universally   believed, 
avows  a   direct  perception  of  external  nature  in 
opposition  to  Descartes,  Amauld,  Clarke,  Brown, 
and  most  other   philosophers,   who  hold  that  the 
impressions  from  the  outer  world  on  our   senses 
produce   ideas — mental   sensations — modifications, 
or  affections  of  the   mind — which   mental    states 
they  consider  to  be  the  objects  we  are  directly  con- 
scious  of,   and   not   the   external  material  things 
themselves.     Hamilton,  in  opposition  to  one  and 
all  of  these  views,  declares  that  we  have  a  direct 
intuition  of  matter.     "  The  external  reality  itself," 
says   he,   "  constitutes   the    immediate   and   only 
object  of  perception  "  ("  Discussions,"  p.  59).  "  The 
natural  reality  is  the  object  immediately  known  in 
perception"  ("Lectures  on  Metaphysics,"  p.  279). 
"  In  the  immediate  cognition,  the  object  in  conscious- 
ness and  the  object  in  existence  are  the  same" 
("  Lectures,"  p.  80).     "  That  we  cannot  show  forth 
how  the  mind  is  capable  of  knowing  something 
difF(jrent  from  itself,  is  no  reason  to  doubt  that  it 
is  so  capable"  ("  Discussions,"  p.  63).  "  To  perceive, 
to  know,  and  to  be  conscious  of  a  thing,  are  the 
same  mental  act.     Consciousness  and  immediate 


DIRECT  AND  INTUITIONAL  PERCEPTION.     137 

knowledge    are    terms    universally    convertible" 
("Discussions,"  p.  51). 

"  Knowledge  and  existence  are,  then,  only  con- 
vertible when  the  reality  is  known  in  itself;  and 
this  constitutes  an  immediate  presentative  or  intui- 
tive cognition,  rigorously  so  called."  ("Discus- 
sions," p.  58). 

Then,  in  support  of  the  same  view,  but  on  the  plea 
that  we  are  bound  to  uphold  the  absolute  veracity 
of  consciousness,—"  Consciousness,"  says  he,  "  is 
to  the  philosopher  what  the  Bible  is  to  the  theolo- 
gian. Both  are  professedly  revelations  of  Divine 
truth.  If  consciousness  were,  however,  confessed 
to  yield  a  lying  evidence  in  one  particular,  it  could 
not  be  adduced  as  a  credible  witness  at  aW—falsus  in 
unoy  falsus  in  omnibus  "  ("  Discussions,"  pp.  86-88). 

Tlie  natural  Kealist  is  therefore  bound  to  receive 
the  facts  of  consciousness  without  cavil,  or,  as 
Hamilton  expresses  it,—"  The  facts  of  conscious- 
ness, the  whole  facts,  and  nothing  but  the  facts  " 
("Discussions,"  p.  64).  And  he  argues  cogently, 
that  as  consciousness  testifies  to  a  direct  perception 
of  the  outer  world,  so  we  are  bound,  on  the  score 
of  common  morality,   to   receive   this  as   a   true 


138 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF 


DIRECT  AND  INTUITIONAL  PERCE1*TI0N.     139 


ill 


and  philosophic  theory  of  perception.  In  fact,  when 
he  is  on  tliis  point,  one  would  imagine  that  the  chief 
or  only  article  in  philosophy  was  an  unreasoning  and 
blind  acceptance  of  the  dicta  of  consciousness. 

Hamilton  gives  us,  in  his  "  Lectures,"  an  illus- 
tration of  the  nature  of  direct  perception,  as  he 
understands  it ;  and,  it  will  be  remarked,  that  his 
views  are  strikingly  opposed  to  those  of  Reid  and 
Stewart,  though  as  a  natural  Realist,  he  professes 
to  belong  to  the  same  school. 

To  show  that  this  difference  exists,  he  prefaces 
what  he  has  to  say  by  quoting  an  important  pas- 
sage from  "  Stewart's  Philosophy  of  the  Human 
Mind."  In  order  that  we  may  at  once  perceive 
the  difference  between  these  authors,  and  appre- 
ciate the  difficulty  of  the  subject,  we  shall  tran- 
scribe both  Stewart's  statement  and  Hamilton's 
comments  on  it. 

"  To  what,  then,"  says  Stewart,  "  does  Reid's 
statement  amount?  Merely  to  this,  that  the 
mind  is  so  formed  that  certain  impressions  pro- 
duced on  our  organs  of  sense  by  external  objects 
are  followed  by  corresponding  sensations  ;  and  that 
these  sensations,  which  have  no  more  resemblance 


to  the  qualities  of  matter  than  the  words  of  a 
language   have   to  the    things   they   denote,   are 
followed   by   a   perception   of  the   existence   and 
qualities  of  the  bodies  by  which  the  impressions 
are  made;  that  all  the  steps  of  this  process  are 
equally  incomprehensible ;  and  that,  for  anything 
we  can  prove  to  the  contrary,  the  connexion  be- 
tween the  sensation  and  the  perception,  as  well  as 
between  the  impression  and  the  sensation,  may  be 
both  arbitrary :  that  it  is  therefore  by  no  means 
impossible  that  our  sensations  may  be  merely  the 
occasions  on  which  the  corresponding  perceptions 
are  excited  ;  and  that,  at  any  rate,  the  consideration 
of  those  sensations,  which  are  attributes  of  mind, 
can  throw  no  light  on  the  manner  in  which  we 
acquire  our  knowledge  of  the  existence  and  quali- 
ties of  body.      From  this  view  of  the  subject  it 
follows  that  it  is  the  external  objects  themselves, 
and  not  any  species  or  images  of  these  objects,  that 
the  mind   perceives  ;    and   that   although   by  the 
constitution  of  our  nature  certain  sensations  are 
rendered  the  constant  antecedents  of  our  percep- 
tions, yet  it  is  just  as  difficult  to  explain  how  our 
perceptions  are  obtained  by  their  means,  as  it  would 


140 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF 


be  upon  the  supposition  that  the  mind  were  all  at 
once  inspired  with  them,  without  any  concomitant 
sensations  whatever "  (Stewart's  "  Philosophy  of 
the  Human  Mind,"  part  i.,  chap,  i.) 

Hamilton  truly  remarks, — "  This  view  virtually 
denies  the  existence  of  matter  as  an  efficient  cause, 
making  the  Deity  the  only  efficient  cause  in  per- 
ception." "  What  are  called  physical  causes  and 
effects,"  says  he,  "being  antecedents  and  conse- 
quents, but  not  in  virtue  of  any  mutual  and  neces- 
sary dependence,  the  only  efficient  cause  being 
God,  who  on  occasion  of  the  antecedent,  which  is 
called  the  physical  cause,  produces  the  consequent, 
which  is  called  the  physical  effect ;  so  in  the  case 
of  perception,  the  cognition  of  the  external  object  is 
not,  or  may  not  be,  a  consequence  of  the  immediate 
and  natural  relation  of  that  object  to  the  mind,  but 
of  the  agency  of  God,  who,  as  it  were,  reveals  the 
outer  existence  to  our  perception." 

"  To  this  opinion,"  says  Hamilton, "  many  objec- 
tions occur.  In  the  first  place,  so  far  is  it  from 
being,  as  Mr  Stewart  affirms,  a  plain  statement  of  the 
fact,  apart  from  all  hypotheses, — it  is  manifestly  hy- 
pothetical.    In  the   second  place,  the  hypothesis 


DIRECT  AND  INTUITIONAL  PERCEPTION.      141 

assumes  an  occult  principle.  In  the  third  place, 
the  hypothesis  is  hyperphysical,  calling  in  the 
proximate  assistance  of  the  Deity,  while  the  neces- 
sity of  such  intervention  is  not  established.  In  the 
fourth  place,  it  goes  even  far  to  frustrate  the  whole 
doctrine  of  the  two  philosophers  in  regard  to  per- 
ception as  a  doctrine  of  intuition.  For  if  God 
has  bestowed  on  us  the  faculty  of  visionally  per- 
ceiving the  external  object,  there  is  no  need  to 
suppose  the  necessity  of  an  immediate  intervention 
of  the  Deity  to  make  that  act  effectual." 

Hamilton  then  proceeds    to  indicate    his   own 
opinions  of  perception  thus  : — 

"  Let  us  try,  then,  whether  it  be  impossible,  not 
to  explain  (for  this  it  would  be  ridiculous  to 
dream  of  attempting),  but  to  render  intelligible  the 
possibility  of  an  immediate  perception  of  external 
objects,  without  assuming  any  of  the  three  pre- 
ceding hypotheses,  and  without  postulating  aught 
that  can  he  fairly  refused, 

"  Now,  in  the  first  place,  there  is  no  good  ground 
to  suppose  that  the  mind  is  situated  solely  in  the 
brain,  or  exclusively  in  any  one  part  of  the  body. 
On  the  contrary,  the  supposition  that  it  is  really 


142 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF 


present  whenever  we  are  conscious  that  it  acts :  in 
a  word,  the  peripatetic  aphorism — the  soul  is  all 
in  the  whole,  and  all  in  every  part — is  more  philo- 
sophical, and  consequently  more  probable,  than  any 
other  opinion.  Admitting  the  spirituality  of  mind, 
all  we  know  of  the  relation  of  soul  and  body  is, 
that  the  former  is  connected  with  the  latter  in  a 
way  of  which  we  are  wholly  ignorant ;  and  that  it 
holds  relations  different  both  in  degree  and  kind 
with  different  parts  of  the  organism.  We  have  no 
right,  however,  to  say  that  it  is  limited  to  any  one 
part  of  the  organism  ;  for  even  if  we  admit  that 
the  nervous  system  is  the  part  to  which  it  is  proxi- 
mately united,  still  the  nervous  system  is  itself 
universally  ramified  throughout  tlie  body ;  and  we 
have  no  more  right  to  deny  that  the  mind  feels  at 
the  finger-points,  as  consciousness  assures  us,  than 
to  assert  that  it  thinks  exclusively  in  the  brain. 
The  sum  of  our  knowledge  of  the  connexion  of 
mind  and  body  is  therefore  this — that  the  united 
modifications  '  are  dependent  on  certain  corporal 
conditions}  but  of  the  nature  of  these  conditions 

1  Modification^  a  word  prized  by  Brown,  but  usually  abhorred  by 
Hamilton.     Why  is  it  used  here  ? 


DIRECT  AND  INTUITIONAL  PERCEPTION.      143 

we  know  nothing.      For  example,  we  know  by 
experience  that  the  mind  perceives  only  through 
certain  organs  of  sense,  and  that  through   these 
different  organs  it  perceives  in  a  different  manner. 
But  whether  the  senses  be  instruments,  whether 
they  be  media,*  or  whether  they  be  only  partial 
outlets  to  the  mind  incarcerated  in  the  body — on 
all  this  we  can  only  theorize  and  conjecture.      We 
have  no  reason  ichatever  to  helieve^  contrary  to  the 
testimony  of  consciousness ^  that  there  is  an  action  or 
affection  of  the  bodily  sense  previous  to  the  mental 
perception  ;  or  that  the  mind  only  perceives  in  the 
head,  in  consequence  of  the  impression  on  the  organ. 
On  the  other  hand,  we  have  no  reason  whatever  to 
doubt  the  report  of  consciousness,  that  we  actually 
perceive  at  the  external  point  of  sensation  and  that  we 
perceive  the  material  reality.   But  what  is  meant  by 
perceiving  the  material  reality  ? 

"  In  the  first  place,  it  does  not  mean  that  we 
perceive  the  material  reality  absolutely  and  in  itself; 
that  is,  out  of  relation  to  our  organs  and  faculties. 
On  the  contrary,  the  total  and  real  object  of  per- 

1  Media  is  another  dangerous  word  to  be  used  by  an  author  who 
abjures  the  idea  of  a  mediate  perception. 


144 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF 


ception  is  the  external  object  under  relation  to  our 
sense  and  faculty  of  cognition.  But  though  thus 
relative  to  us,  the  object  is  still  no  representation, 
no  modification  of  the  Ego.  It  is  the  non-Ego— 
the  non-Ego  modified  and  relative,  it  may  be,  but 
still  the  non-Ego.  I  formerly  illustrated  this  to  you 
by  a  supposition.  Suppose  that  the  total  object  of 
consciousness  in  perception  is  =  12  ;  and  suppose 
that  the  external  reality  contributes  6,  the  material 
sense  3,  and  the  mind  3  ;  this  may  enable  you  to 
form  some  rude  conception  of  the  nature  of  the 
object  of  perception"  ("Lectures  on  Metaphy- 
sics," vol.  ii.,  pp.  125-128). 

Hamilton  here  throws  aside  all  learned  and  tech- 
nical language,  and,  in  a  much  more  simple  manner 
than  is  his  wont,  explains  his  views  of  perception. 
But  it  strikes  us  he  is,  in  the  whole  passage,  in 
more  respects  than  one,  remarkably  unfortunate. 
It  is  singular  that  Keid,  in  stating  his  theory  of 
a  direct  perception,  should  have  selected  the  sense 
of- vision  in  illustration  of  his  theory;  a  mistake 
which  Hamilton,  his  friendly  commentator,  is  com- 
pelled, in  his  "College  Lectures,"  to  correct- 
vision  being  a  sense  which  gives  us  no  direct,  but 


DIRECT  AND  INTUITIONAL  PERCEPTION.     145 

only  a  mediate  representation  of  the  external  re- 
ality. It  is  scarcely  less  unfortunate  that  Hamilton, 
in  the  passage  above  quoted  from  his  "  Lectures," 
should  have  adduced,  for  illustration  of  his  views, 
the  sense  of  touch  proper,  and  founded  on  the 
assumption  that  the  mind  feels  at  the  finger-points ; 
and  it  is  equally  singular  that,  after  premising 
that  he  would  not  postulate  aught  that  could  fairly 
he  refused^  the  first  thing  he  does  is  to  postulate 
what  nearly  all  the  world  denied;  it  being  all 
but  universally  held,  at  the  time  he  wrote,  by  men 
of  science,  as  well  as  by  the  vulgar,  that  the  mind 
a€ts  in  the  brain,  and  not  at  the  outer  organs  of 
sense. 

The  correctness  of  the  popular  belief  on  this 
point  has,  since  Hamilton  wrote,  been  established ; 
and  the  time  which  impulses  made  on  the  external 
organs  take  to  travel  from  the  different  parts  of  tlie 
body  to  the  brain  where  they  are  perceived  has,  by 
means  of  several  varieties  of  highly  ingenious  in- 
struments, been  made  the  subject  of  measurement.* 

»  We  are  indebted  for  the  discovery  of  this  fact,  so  important  both 
in  physiology  and  in  psychology,  to  experiments  commenced  by 
Professor  Helmholtz  in  1850,  and  prosecuted  to  the  present  time 
chiefly  by  Harles,  Fick,  Munk,  Bezold,  PflUger,  Dr  Schelske,  and 


146 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF 


We  can  now  state  the  number  of  feet  per  second, 
at  which  nervous  impressions  are  transmitted  along 
the  nerves  to  the  sensorium.      And  we  may  be 
allowed  to  say,  in  passing,  that  it  pleases  us  to  find 
that  the  percipient  principle  which  we  call   the 
mind,  resides  in  the  nobler  part  of  the  body.     For 
on  the  supposition  of  a  belief  in  matter,  the  ascrip- 
tion of  sensibility  and  consciousness  to  all  parts  of 
the  body  has  something  of  a  Sadducean  cast  about 
it ;  and  we  cannot  but  regard  it  as  a  heavy  stroke 
to  Materialism,  that  a  proof  has  been  found,  that 
the  body  has  no  sensibility.     Surgeons  know  that 
even  the  brain  has  none,  or  next  to  none,  except 
under  peculiar  diseases  or  derangements.    If  the  soul 
is  to  rule  the  body,  we  confess  it  seems  to  us  more 
congi-uous  that  it  should  have  its  special  audience 
chamber  in  the  head  where,  seated  alone  in  unap- 
proachable mysteriousness,  it  receives  its  messages 
from  the  outer  parts  of  its  kingdom,  and  whence 

Du  Bois-Reymond  of  Berlin.  B7  these  experiments,  the  fact  seems 
established  that  the  transmission  along  the  nerve  of  the  external 
impulse,  given  in  the  organ  of  sense,  is  at  the  rate  of  95  feet  in  a 
second,  or  less  than  the  eleventh  part  the  velocity  with  which 
sound  passes  through  the  air.  (See  lecture  delivered  at  the  Royal 
Institution,  13th  April  1866,  by  Professor  Emil  du  Bois-Reymond  of 
Berlin.) 


DIRECT  AND  INTUITIONAL  PERCEFI'ION.      147 

it  issues  forth  its  mandates,  to  the  living  and 
obedient  microcosm,  the  body,  saying  to  this  part. 
Come,  and  it  cometh,  and  to  that  part.  Go,  and  it 
goetli. 

If,  then,  the  recent  experiments  alluded  to  are 
to  be  relied  on,  the  theory  of  a  direct  perception 
at  the  finger-points,  or  at  any  other  external 
organ  of  sense,  must  be  abandoned,  and  with  it  all 
idea  of  a  direct  perception  of  external  objects,  in  a 
true  and  literal  sense. 

In  the  second  place,  Hamilton's  illustration  is 
unfortunate,  because  the  sense  of  touch  proper, 
which  is  implied  in  the  delicate  sensations  trans- 
mitted by  these  nerve-bespread  extremities,  the 
finger-points,  gives  us  a  very  imperfect  apprehen- 
sion of  a  material  or  physical  world — in  fact,  no 
apprehension  at  all.  The  physiologist  might 
object  to  it  that  the  apprehension  is  not  direct,  or 
immediate,  for  the  external  impulse  travels  along 
the  nerve  to  the  cephalic  centre,  where  it  is  per- 
ceived, and  that  a  sensible  time  occurs  between  the 
impulse  and  its  manifestation  in  the  brain.  The 
disciple  of  Brown,  or  even  of  Reid  and  Stewart, 
might  also  say, — The  impulse  at  the  finger-points 


148 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF 


creates  a  mere  sensation— a  mental  affection 
entirely  arbitrary  and  meaningless;  and  surely, 
however  perfectly  we  give  objective  significance 
to  such  a  sensation,  and  project  it  outward,  as 
being  the  result  of  an  external  cause,  such  a 
sensation  can  in  no  correctness  be  regarded  as 
an  intuition  of  the  external  cause  producing  it. 

And  lastly,  the  sensation  of  touch  proper,  with- 
out the  application  of  pressure,  could  never  give 
any  man  the  impression  of  the  world  as  a  solid 

external  reality. 

If  Hamilton's  illustration,  and  theory  of  a  direct 
perception,  are  thus  worthless,  are  we  to  adopt 
(the  word  is  used  with  deferential  reluctance) 
the  ridiculous  assumption  of  Stewart,  that  an 
arbitrary  sensation  is  first  given,  entirely  unlike 
the  object  or  cause,  but  yet  by  a  miracle,  this  sen- 
sation enables  us  to  have  a  direct  perception  of  the 
object  ?  Surely  a  very  moderate  amount  of  reflec- 
tion might  have  helped  this  graceful  and  sensible 
writer,  to  a  better  explanation  of  the  riddle  than  this. 

Let  us  then  endeavour  to  examine  the  matter 
for  ourselves.  That  the  sensations  are  entirely 
meaningless,  and  give  us  no  knowledge  of  exter- 


DIRECT  AND  INTUITIONAL  PERCEPTION.      149 

nality,  we  think  is  very  far  from  being  the  case. 
In  the  first  place,  have  they  not  the  quality  of 
duration  ?  Do  they  not  occupy  longer  or  shorter 
intervals  of  time?  And,  secondly,  do  they  not 
succeed  one  another,  either  singly  or  in  groups  ? 
Are  we  not  conscious  of  this  ?  and  is  this  conscious- 
ness not  a  knowledge  of  Time,  and  a  knowledge  of 
Number  ? 

In  the  third  place,  have  they  not  something  of 
the  quality  of  Space  in  them  ?  Do  they  not  declare 
— it  may  be  vaguely,  but  still  absolutely —  We  are 
her€j — not  in  time  only,  but  in  space. 

This  is  eminently  the  declaration  of  the  sense 
of  vision.  Do  the  sensations  of  colour  not  say 
unmistakably,  We  are  here?  Does  each  limited 
coloured  portion  presented  to  the  mind  in  vision 
not  proclaim,  /  ain  here^  ejcternal  to  all  my  neigh- 
hours  ?  I  am  larger  or  smaller  than  this  part  or 
that  part. 

And  if  vision  gives  us  a  representation  of  space, 
which  it  is  impossible  to  deny,  may  we  not,  from 
analogy,  even  if  we  had  no  other  way  of  verifying 
the  fact,  conclude  that  touch  also  presents  us  with 
a  perception  of  sensations  external  to  each  other. 


150 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF 


(t 


That  we  now  think  we  feel  the  whereabouts  of 
the  different  bodily  sensations,  we    admit   is  no 
absolute  proof  that  the  sense  of  touch  gave  us  this 
perception  at  first.      The  knowledge,  it   may  be 
argued,  has  been  acquired  by  experience,  and  judg- 
ment,   reviewing  the    evidences    of  the   different 
senses.    But  that  touch  does,  more  or  less  distinctly, 
reveal  to  us  that  the  sensations  are  extended,  we 
must  naturally  conclude  from  the  knowledge  that 
the   nervous  system   consists  of  threads   diffused 
throughout  the  whole  body,  and  especially  ramified 
over  the  organs  of  sense  ;  and  from  the  knowledge 
that    these    threads,   or    fibres,   all    terminate   in 
different  compartments    of  the  brain, — a  definite 
space  or  area  of  the  brain  being  thus  excited  by 
each  external  impulse.     And  if  we   suppose  the 
mind,  through  the  excitement  of  that  organ,  to  be 
made  conscious  of  sensations,  it  seems  naturally  to 
follow  that  it  will  be  conscious  of  the  quality  of 
extension,  or  size,  according  to  the  extent  of  the 
portion  of  the  organ  which  has  been  excited. 

Though  vision,  then,  gives  us  the  nicest  percep- 
tion of  form  and  space,  we  are  fully  justified  in 
holding  that  the  sense  of  touch,  which  acts  through 


DIRECT  AND  INTUITIONAL  PERCEPTION.      151 

the  nerves  of  common  sensibility,  diffused  over  the 
body,  must  give  us  the  same  discrimination  of 
space,  though  in  an  inferior  degree. 

That  we  at  once  distinguish  a  pain  in  the  foot 
from  a  pain  in  the  hand,  no  one  doubts.     We  per- 
ceive two  or  more  impressions  made  on  different 
parts  of  the  body  at  the  same  moment.     This  is  a 
proof  of  externality  in  our  sensations ;  but  we  have 
a  stronger  proof  than  this.    Many  years  after  a  leg 
has  been  removed,  it  is  not  uncommon  to  experience 
sensations  similar  to  those  which  were  felt  when 
the  leg  was  a  part  of  the  body.     This  is  a  circum- 
stance perfectly  well  known,  and  it  goes  to  estab- 
lish  three   important  facts— first,  that  sensations 
are  felt,  not  in  the  part  affected,  but  in  the  brain  ; 
second,  that  physiological  reasons  exist  in  the  ner- 
vous system,  or  in  the  brain,  producing  the  sensa- 
tion of  externality  and  space ;  and  third,  that  the 
impression  of  externality  does  not  arise  from  the 
mind   pervading    the   entire   body,    and   directly 
taking  cognizance  of  its  states. 

Thus,  then,  we  have  acquired,  directly  through 
our  sensations,  an  idea  of  the  two  first  elements 
of  a  physical  world— Time  and  Space.     But  the 


152 


THE  DOCTRINE  OP 


question  occurs,  have  we  acquired  a  knowledge  of 
the  outer  world;  and  have  we  proved  its  exist- 
ence? The  third  factor  which  we  are  about  to 
name,  we  think  establishes  this  important  point. 

The  third  step  we  make  is  towards  the  knowledge 
of  resisting  qualities  in  nature ;  and  this  completes  * 
our  conceptions  of  the  physical  world.  I  move 
freely  among  the  various  phenomena  around  me  in 
space.  The  Ego  is  here— the  Ego  is  there  among 
them;  but  when  I  come  mio  juxtaposition  with  any 
of  these  coloured  phenomena,  I  find  it  resists  my  will 
— the  power  of  motion  is  at  an  end,  the  Ego  remains 
fixed  among  a  circle  of  unmoving  phenomena. 

This  experiment  of  the  living,  moving  being, 
repeated  in  different  ways,  and  always  attended 
with  the  same  results,  completes  its  knowledge  of 
the  great  fact  of  a  physical  world, — namely,  that  it 
exists  in  time — occupies  space,  and  resists  my  desire 
to  move — in  other  words,  has  physical  power. 

To  the  lawyer,  the  merchant,  the  artisan,  this 
may  appear  simply  puerile,  but  the  philosopher 
will  perceive  that  it  is  a  problem  of  mighty  mean- 
ing. We  know  the  existence  of  a  physical 
world  chiefly  from  finding  that  it  resists  our  will. 


DIRECT  AND  INTUITIONAL  PERCEPTION.     153 

The  question,  whether  we  perceive  its  primary 
qualities  through  the  muscular  sensations,  we  shall 
by  and  by  discuss.  But,  in  the  meantime,  we  view 
our  knowledge  of  the  world  as  the  result  of  an 
actual  conflict  of  Will,  and  Animal  life,  with  re- 
sisting external  nature.  The  battle  of  the  spiritual 
with  the  physical,— things  subject  to  entirely  dif- 
ferent laws  coming  into  collision,— the  self-moving, 
self-willing,  self-conscious  being,  encountering  the 
unwilling,  unmoving,  unconscious  entity. 

This  is  a  knowledge  bought  by  experience,  and 
too  frequently  by  suffering.     The  first  great  lesson 
taught  the  conscious  being,  when  it  tries  to  assert 
its  prerogative  of  animal  life,  is  this  one  :  that  it  is 
destined  to  struggle  with  the  resisting  forces  of  a 
world  ruled  by  laws  different  from  its  own.     And 
from  the  hour  in  which  we  are  enveloped  in  our 
swathing  bands  and  laid  to  the  mother's  breast, 
down   to   the   time   of   surrender,   when   we    are 
wrapped  in  our  winding-sheet  and  enclosed  in  the 
breast  of  mother  earth,  this  is  the  main  employment 
and  struggle  of  ninety-nine  out  of  the  hundred  of 
our  teeming  human  race. 

We  may  remark  here,  that  it  seems  to  us  curi- 


154      DIRECT  AND  INTUITIONAL  PERCEPTION. 


155 


ously  inconsistent  with  the  principles  of  his  Real- 
ism, that  Hamilton,  in   his  "College  Lectures," 
should  deny  that  we  have  any  perception  of  phy- 
sical poicer^  or  physical  resistance  ;    and  that  he 
should  prefer  making  us  perceive  matter  by  the 
finger-points  rather  than  by  the  thews  and  muscles. 
We  have  frequently  wondered  whether  it  ever  oc- 
curred to  him,  as  it  does  to  us,  that  if  we  have  no 
perception  of  Physical  Power,  we  can  have  no  per- 
ception of  a  Physical  World,  the  primary  character- 
istics of  which  are  its  solidity,  or  power  of  resisting 
penetration  and  compression — its  tenacity,  or  powder 
of  resisting  disruption,  and  its  weight, — or  power  of 
drawing  towards  the  earth's  surface.     By  denying 
the  perception  of  physical  force,  in  our  opinion,  he 
destroys  not  only  his  own  theory  of  a  direct  percep- 
tion of  the  world,  but  every  possible  theory  of  a 
real  perception 

We  do  not  mean,  in  saying  so,  to  declare  here 
w^hether  we  perceive  physical  power  directly  or  in- 
directly. We  reserve  this  question  to  a  later  page ; 
we  only  wish  here  to  draw  attention  to  the  fact 
stated. 


i 


I 


CHAPTER   VII. 

power:   do  we  perceive  it,  or  do  we  only 

INFER  its  existence  ? 

Our  Dynamical  Theory  is  founded  on  the  assump- 
tion that  Physical  Power  is  discovered  everywhere 
throughout  the  Physical  Creation,— that  it  is  the 
operation  of  a  spiritual  principle  appearing  in  every- 
thing to  which  we  have  access,  and  that  this  opera- 
tion of  power  is  regulated  and  adjusted  everywhere 
so  as  to  work  out  the  purposes  of  the  physical 

world. 

The  great  majority  of  Metaphysical  and  Mental 
Philosophers  either  deny  that  physical  power 
exist>,  or  they  deny  that  we  obtain  any  perception 
of  it,  so  as  to  prove  its  existence. 

This  is  a  serious  matter  in  itself;  and,  if  proved 
good,  it  is  a  formidable  objection  to  the  principles 
supported  in  this  volume.  We  shall  therefore  de- 
vote the  chapter  following  this  to  an  exposition  of 


I  I 


156 


DO  WE  PERCEIVE  POWER, 


OR  ONLY  INFER  IT? 


157 


the  grounds  which  lead  us  to  believe  that  we  have 
a  direct  perception  of  physical  power ;  and  in  the 
present,  we  shall  merely  state  the  matter  as  viewed 
by  Hamilton,  who  may  be  held  here  as  the  ex- 
ponent of  the  views  of  many  other  philosophers ; 
and  we  shall  then  examine  the  phenomena  which 
accompany  every  putting  forth  of  animal  effort :  and 
shall  consider  whether  or  not  these  phenomena  are 
sufficient,  without  a  direct  perception  of  power,  to 
lead  us  to    the    conclueion   that  we   possess   the 
species  of  power  of  which  we  speak. 
Let  us  first  briefly  state  the  question. 
The  circumstance   that  our  movements  are  de 
facto  either  resisted  or  entirely  stopped  by  contact 
with  external  solid  bodies,  is  not  all  that  is  em- 
braced in   our  apprehension  of  the  outer  world. 
The  element  of  Physical  Power  is  deeply  infused 
into  all  our  conceptions  of  it. 

Notwithstanding  this  universal  impression  and 
belief  in  the  existence  of  Power,  we  find  that 
Hume,  Brown,  Hamilton,  Mill,  Fraser,  Mansel, 
and  a  large  majority  of  philosophers,  deny  that  we 
have  any  consciousness  of  its  existence. 

"It  is  now  universally  admitted,"  says  Hamil- 


ton "  that  we  have  no  perception  of  the  connexion 
of  cause  and  effect  in  the  external  world.  For  ex- 
ample, when  one  billiard-ball  is  seen  to  strike 
another,  we  perceive  only  that  the  impulse  of  the 
one  is  followed  by  the  motion  of  the  other,  but 
have  no  perception  of  any  force  or  efficiency  in  the 
first  by  which  it  is  connected  with  the  second" 
("Lectures,"  pp.  388-391). 

Now,  it  may  be  at  once  admitted  that  the  eye 
has  no  means  of  testing  the  existence  of  physical 
force ;  and  it  is  this  circumstance  which  Hamilton 
here  refers  to.  If  the  hand,  however,  be  applied 
to  stop  the  moving  ball,  then  the  case  is  imme- 
diately altered,  for  we  are  at  once  impressed  with 
the  belief  that  we  perceive  power,  and  that  it 
requires  an  effort  on  our  part,  to  stop  the  motion  of 
the  ball,  or  of  any  other  heavy  body. 

Such  is  the  universal  experience  of  mankind. 
Brown,  indeed,  seems  an  exception  in  this  respect ; 
for,  so  far  as  we  understand  him,  he  alleges  that 
all  that  is  perceived  in  any  case,  is  the  antecedent 
and  the  consequent— the  moving  ball,  the  hand 
interposed,  and  the  ball  at  rest.  He  would  appear 
entirely  to  overlook  the  vital  accompaniments,  viz.. 


158 


DO  WE  PERCEIVE  POWER, 


OR  ONLY  INFER  IT? 


159 


the  mental  and  the  physical  feelings  experienced 
during  the  putting  forth  of  any  animal  effort. 

Hamilton  prosecutes  the  inquiry  in  this  way, — 
"  There  are  many  philosophers  who  surrender  the 
ejcternal  perception  (to  wit,  by  the  eye),  and  main- 
tain  our   internal    consciousness   of    causation   or 

power." 

This  very  careful  statement  of  a  self-evident 
distinction — viz.,  that  the  perception  of  power  by 
vision  is  abandoned,  while  the  doctrine  of  its 
perception  by  physical  contact  is  still  maintained  by 
some — seems  almost  like  a  trifling  with  so  impor- 
tant a  question ;  because  we  can  so  easily  make 
that  which  is  external  or  only  sensible  to  the  eye 
— as  motion — internal  or  sensible  to  the  muscular 
system,  by  the  simple  act  of  laying  hold  of  the 
moving  body,  and  thereby  experiencing  the  mani- 
festation of  power  which  we  call  a  thrust  or  a  pull, 
of  which  we  are  immediately  made  conscious. 

We  continue,  however,  the  quotation,  in  which 
Hamilton  thus  states  the  arguments  used  by  those 
who  differ  from  himself  on  the  question.  "  On 
this  doctrine,  the  notion  of  cause  is  not  given  us 
by  the  observation  of  external  phenomena,  which, 


as  considered  only  by  the  senses,  manifest  no 
causal  efficiency,  and  appear  to  us  only  as  succes- 
sive. But  it  is  alleged  to  be  given  to  us  within — 
in  reflexion,  in  the  consciousness  of  our  operations^ 
and  of  the  power  which  exerts  them,  viz.,  the  will. 
I  make  an  effort  to  move  my  arm,  and  I  move  it. 

"  This  reasoning,"  says  Hamilton,  "  in  so  far  as 
regards  the  mere  empirical  fact  of  our  conscious- 
ness of  causality  in  the  relation  of  our  will  as 
moving,  and  of  our  limbs  as  moved,  is  refuted  by 
the  consideration  that  between  the  overt  fact  of 
corporeal  movement,  of  which  we  are  cognisant, 
and  of  the  internal  act  of  mental  determination,  of 
which  we  are  also  cognisant,  there  intervenes  a 
numerous  series  of  intermediate  agencies,  of  which 
we  have  no  consciousness  of  any  causal  connexion, 
between  the  extreme  links  of  the  chain,  the  voli- 
tion to  move  and  the  limb  moving.  As  the  hypo- 
thesis asserts,  no  one  is  immediately  conscious, 
for  example,  of  moving  his  arm  through  his  voli- 
tion. Previously  to  this  ultimate  movement, 
muscles,  nerves,  a  multitude  of  solid  and  fluid 
parts,  must  be  set  in  motion  by  the  will ;  but  of 
this  motion  we  know  from  consciousness  actually 


160 


DO  WE  PERCEIVE  POWER, 


nothing  "  ("  Lectures  on  Metaphysics,"  pp.  390- 

392). 

Now,  in  the  outset,  and  before  we  touch  on  the 
actual  phenomena  witnessed  during  muscular  ex- 
ertion, or  allude  to  the  physical  steps  involved  in 
the  process,  we  cannot  avoid  expressing  our  amaze- 
ment that  Hamilton,  who  holds  so  strongly  that 
we  perceive  objects  directly  by  the  organs  excited 
by  them,  should,  either  wittingly  or  unwittingly, 
without    one    expression   of  regret,   abandon   his 
favourite  theory  of  a  direct  perception,  and  deny 
that   we  perceive  poicer    by   the    muscles   when 
excited  by  physical  effort. 

That   he   should   have  maintained  that  by  the 
senses  we  perceive  the  ultimate  source  of  power, 
it  would  have  been  wrong  for  us  to  expect ;  but 
that  he  should  affirm  that  the   senses   give  us  a 
direct  perception  of  the  table,  and  should  deny  that 
they  give  us  a  perception  of  its  weight,  or  its  hard- 
ness, which  are  manifestations  of  power— this,  we 
confess,  excites  our   liveliest   surprise.     That  we 
directly  perceive  physical  objects,  he  dogmatically 
insists  ;  but  that  we  perceive  those  primary  quali- 
ties by  which  physical  objects  are  specially  dis- 


OR  ONLY  INFER  IT? 


161 


tinguished,  he  as  positively  denies.  In  so  doing, 
if  we  understand  him  at  all,  he  most  effectually 
overthrows  his  own  theory  of  perception,  and 
every  possible  theory  of  Kealism. 

In  the  passage  just  quoted,  Hamilton  virtually 
denies  that  we  are  conscious  of  the  weight  or  hard- 
ness of  the  table,  or  of  the  momentum  of  a  moving 
body,  because  between  the  will  to  move  the  limb, 
or  to  press  the  table  with  the  hand,  and  the  act  of 
doing  so,  there  intervenes  a  numerous  series  of  in- 
termediate  agencies;    and   because   we   have   no 
knowledge  of  any  causal  connexion  between  the 
extreme  links  of  the  cliain.     Is  it  not  exceedingly 
clear  that  if,  as  he  assumes,  the  mind  pervades 
the   whole    body,    it   should  perceive   the    weight 
and  hardness  of  the  table,  and  the  impulse  of  the 
billiard-ball,  in  the  vmscle,  in  the  same  way  tliat 
it  perceives  the  existence  of  these   bodies  at   the 
finger-points  ?     And  if,  on  the  contrary,  the  mind 
resides   in    the   brain,   is   his    objection   that    we 
have  no  consciousness  of  these  qualities  of  hard- 
ness, weight,   and   momentum,  because  we  have 
no  consciousness  of  the  intermediate  agencies  ex- 
isting  between   the   muscle   and   the   mind, — not 


162 


DO  WE  PERCEIVE  POWER, 


OR  ONLY  INFER  IT? 


163 


equally  valid,  in  regard  to  our  perceiving  objects 

at  all  ? 

It  is  quite  true  that  we  have  no  inner  conscious- 
ness  of  the  physical  operations  involved  in  the 
production   of  muscular  motion.     But  this  is  no 
practical  bar   to  our   establishing   the   connexion 
which  subsists  between  these  insensible  agencies. 
Fortunately,  by   scientific   investigation,  we   can 
lay  open  the  hidden  steps  of  the  process,  and  can 
thus   form   something  like   an  intelligent  theory 
of  their  connexion  and  modes  of  action ;  and  this 
circumstance  is  not  to  be  ignored  by  any  philo- 
sopher, whether  physical  or  metaphysical. 

In  illustration  of  our  meaning :  when  a  piece  of 
fresh  muscle  is  made  a  part  of  a  galvanic  current, 
it  immediately  contracts ;  and  we  are  justified  in 
holding  that,  on  somewhat  the  same  principle,  the 
muscles  of  the  living  body  contract  in  voluntary 
movement,  under  the  influence  of  the  nervous  agent, 
which  is  subject  to  our  mental  control,  and  which, 
frill  we  get  more  light,  we  may  assume  to  be  ana- 
logous in  its  nature  with  the  electric  or  galvanic 
ao^ent.     These  motions  or  contractions  of  the  dead 
and  of  the  living    muscle   are   in   obedience    to 


a  law  of  Nature,  the  ultimate  cause  of  which  we 
can  only  ascribe  to  the  Supreme  Being.  Still,  the 
observance  of  so  curious  a  law  is  important, 
and,  if  studied,  it  may  lead  us  on  to  further  psy- 
chological  discovery:  it  is  therefore  not  to  be 
neglected. 

By  our  senses,  then,  we  are  enabled  to  follow  the 
links  of  the  chain  in  voluntary  movement.     They 
are  three  in  number  :  first,  the  act  or  effort  of  will  ; 
second,  the  action  of  the  nervous  current ;  and  third' 
the  contraction  of  the  muscle.    When  we  are  endea- 
vouring to  solve  a  difficult  problem,  it  is  highly 
important  that  we  endeavour  to  simplify  and  not 
to  complicate  the  question  to  be  solved ;  and  we 
regret  to  find  that  mental  philosophers  are  occasion- 
ally neglectful  of  this  most  useful  rule ;  for,  in  so 
far  as  a  physicist  may  understand  a  steam-engine, 
or  any  other  machine,  nearly  to  the  same  extent  may 
he  hope  to  acquire  a  knowledge  of  the  workings  of 
the  combined  mental  and  animal  organism  ;  and  as 
we  speak  of  the  heat  and  of  the  steam,  and  the  mys- 
terious principle  of  power  by  them  evolved,  and, 
at  the  same  time,  of  the  arrangement  of  the  me- 
chanical parts  of  the  artificial  machine,— even  so, 


■is^^^a^Miwtw?*. 


164 


DO  WE  PERCEIVE  POWER, 


as  philosophers,  may  we,  with  reference  to  the 
operations  of  animal  movement,  talk  of  the  will, 
of  the  nervous  medium,  and  of  the  muscles. 

This  knowledge,  however,  so  important  for  an 
engineer  and  physiologist,  is  not,  it  may  be  said, 
sufficient  to  satisfy  the  deeper  searchings  of  the 
mental  philosopher,  and  this  we  freely  admit.     Let 
the  metaphysician  analyze  as  carefully  as  he  can; 
but  let  him  not  neglect  the  discoveries  of  science,  as 
if  no  assistance  could  come  from  them.     Let  him 
never  turn  with  indifference  from  the  physical  ac- 
companiments of  mental  and  animal  action ;  be- 
cause assuredly  He  who  made  the  mind,  made  also 
the  body ;  and  we  believe  it  will  never  be  found 
possible  to  explain  the  operation  of  the  one  with- 
out  an   intelligent  knowledge   of  the  operations 
of  the   other.     We  hope  we  may,  in  the  next 
chapter,  succeed  in  making  the  truth  of  this  asser- 
tion  more   evident,   at   least  to  such   as  are  not 
prejudiced  against  allying  physical  inquiry  with 
mental  philosophy. 

In  the  meantime,  we  may  approach  the  vexed 
subject  of  cause  and  effect,  and  consider  the  ques- 
tion involved  in  it,  viz.,— Have  we  any  perception  of 


OR  ONLY  INFER  IT  ? 


165 


Power — of  that  occult  principle  which  alone  makes 
the  words.  Cause  and  Effect,  have  any  meaning  or 
significance  ? 

We  all  lelieve  in  the  connexion  of  cause  and 
effect.    If  it  be  so,  we  may  well  join  with  the  bulk 
of  common-sense  men  in  asking.  How  comes  this 
belief  to  be  a  law  of  our   intellectual   nature   if 
there  be  no  foundation  for  it  in  our  experience? 
Would  we  believe  in  the  connexion  of  cause  and 
effect  unless  we  perceived  that  there  were  power 
in  the  cause  to  produce  the  effect?    Would  the 
mere  fact  of  invariable  sequence,  produce  in  us  this 
our   strongest   and   most   persistent    judgment, — 
namely,  that  it  is  Power  which  affects  all  physical 
changes  ?     We  cannot  for  one  moment  believe  it. 

If  our  causal  judgment  were  built  upon  the 
foundation  of  mere  antecedent  and  consequent,  it 
might  indeed  be  called  an  instinct,  but  it  could 
never  be  properly  termed  a  judgment ;  for  it  would 
have  no  foundation  in  reason.  We  moreover 
doubt  exceedingly  whether  a  bare  unvarying  se- 
quence— such  as  we  might  perceive  by  vision — 
would  ever  evoke  in  us  anything  like  the  causal 
judgment  which  we  so   unequivocally  pronounce 


166  DO  WE  PERCEIVE  POWER, 

whenever  we  see  or  hear  of  the  occurrence  of  any 

event. 

It  is  evident  that  this  judgment  must,  either 
arise  from  the  fact  that  we  perceive  power,  as  the 
connecting  link  between  cause  and  effect, — or  it 
must  be  a  judgment  or  inference  founded  on  mere 
circumstantial   evidence,   the  value  of  which,   as 
in  the  case  of  all  indirect  or  circumstantial  evi- 
dence, is  not  absolute  and  conclusive.     Or,  lastly, 
it  must  be  an  unreasoning   instinct,  which  may 
be  true  or  may  be  false.     Which  of  these,  we 
ask,  is  the  most  probable  supposition?     We  de- 
clare for  the    existence    of    a  distinct  judgment 
founded  on  consciousness ;  and  we  hold  that  what 
is  called  the  causal  judgment  is  a  generalization  of 
the  facts  which  are  given  us  by  experience. 

We  hear  a  great  deal  about  what  is  called  the 
causal  judgment,  and  it  has  been  explained  as 
that  principle  which  compels  us  to  believe  that 
every  event  must  have  a  cause.  Now,  what  is  meant 
by  every  event?  Evidently  it  means  nothing. 
We  cannot  form  any  such  abstract  idea  as,  every 
event.  If  we  think  at  all,  we  must  think  regard- 
ing something — some    concrete   thing  or    event. 


'*■-  "■'"■^'"^f  tiiaiiiiiiiirii 


OR  ONLY  INFER  IT? 


167 


And  even  if  we  imagine  an  event  or  thing,  the 
imagination  must  be  formed  of  materials  borrowed 
from  the  records  of  our  experience.  Suppose  that 
the  event  were  one  of  which  we  could  have  no 
possible  experience,  in  this  case  we  might  perhaps 
refuse  to  think  about  it  at  all ;  but  if  we  did  con- 
sider the  question,  would  we  not  of  necessity  class 
the  event  under  some  one  of  the  known  phenomena, 
physical  or  mental,  of  which  we  had  previous  know- 
ledge ?  and  would  we  not  account  for  it  by  some 
one  or  other  known  pliysical  or  mental  law  ? 

Suppose,  for  instance,  the  event  were  the  pas- 
sage of  an  angel  from  one  locality  to  another.  It 
is  perfectly  evident  that,  in  endeavouring  to  ac- 
count for  such  an  event,  we  would  either  clothe  the 
angel  with  somewhat  of  a  physical  nature,  and  ex- 
plain his  flight  on  some  physical  principle ;  or  we 
would  represent  him  as  free  from  physical  laws  (a 
very  difficult,  perhaps  impossible  conception),  and 
imagine  an  act  of  volition  sufficient  to  produce  the 
result.  Our  belief  in  a  cause  for  every  imaginable 
event  must  therefore,  we  believe,  have  its  origin — 
not  from  a  blind  instinct — but  from  the  fact  that 
we  perceive  power  as  the  cause  of  every  event  we 


168 


DO  WE  PERCEIVE  POWER, 


examine,  and  from  generalizing  and  applying  the 
facts  of  this  experience. 

Far  be  it  from  us,  in  saying  so,  to  countenance 
the  idea  that  this  judgment  has  not  its  root  in  a 
deep  instinct  of  reason.  We  hold  that  it  is  only 
by  an  instinct  of  our  intelligence  that  we  predicate 
power  as  an  operative  principle  in  external  nature ; 
and  that  the  mind,  along  with  this  perception, 
should  form  the  causal  judgment,  we  regard  just 
as  a  further  evidence  of  its  being  endowed  with 
reason.  For  we  must  never  cease  to  remember 
that  intelligence  is  allied  to  the  Divine  nature, 
from  which  it  has  its  source. 

Perhaps  there  might  be  another  way  of  coming 
to  a  vague  and  meaningless  belief  in  the  opera- 
tion of  cause  and  effect,  irrespective  of  the  direct 
perception  of  power ;  but  the  conclusion  would  be 
very  different  in  its  nature  from  what  man  and 
all  animals  experience.  Let  us  examine  the  phe- 
nomena which  accompany  animal  effort,  and  see 
whether  or  not  we  might  be  led  by  them  to  form 
this  causal  judgment. 

There  are  four  things  observable  when  we  per- 
form  any   physical   workj—Jirst,   the  volition,  or 


OR  ONLY  INFER  IT  ? 


169 


desire  and  effort  of  the  mind  to  bring  the  limbs 
into  action ;  secoiid^  the  perception  of  a  peculiar 
sensation  in  the  muscles  employed  in  the  work; 
thirdj  a  perception  that  the  muscles  exerted  are 
shortened— I.e.,  that  the  parts  are  drawn  closer 
together,  sometimes  to  such  an  extent  that  they 
appear  as  hard  and  condensed  as  wood ;  fourthly^ 
the  perception  that  the  external  work  is  accom- 
plished—the stone  is  lifted.  During  the  perform- 
ance of  the  work,  we  must  remark,  there  is  a  con- 
tinued Mental  Effort. 

Now,  we  always  observe  these  peculiar  features 
in  connexion  with  animal  exertion :  viz.,  that  the 
intensity   of   the   mental   effort  — the   amount    or 
strength  of  the  muscular  sensations — and  the  quan- 
tity of  work  donBj  are  proportioned  to  each  other. 
Thus,  a  feeble  effort  of  will  produces,  cceterts  pari- 
bus,  feeble  sensations  and  a  small  physical  result; 
a  more  strenuous  mental  volition,  produces  stronger 
muscular  sensations,  and  a  greater  material  result. 
When  a  large  amount  of  work  is  to  be  effected, 
the  Mental  Effort  is  often  violent  and  sometimes 
painful  and  distressing;  and  so  are  the  corporeal 
sensations    which    accompany    it.      And   if    the 


170 


DO  WE  PERCEIVE  POWER, 


efforts  are  long  continued,  they  are  generally  suc- 
ceeded by  exhaustion  both  of  mind  and  body. 
Nothing  is  so  certain  as  that  an  animal  can  only 
accomplish  a  certain  quantum  of  work.  The  abso- 
lute amount  at  any  time,  however,  depends  on  the 
condition  of  the  animal  frame  at  the  time. 

It  is  not,  however,  the  want  of  will,  but  the  want 
of  mental  vigour,  and  of  physical  power,  that  brings 
our  exertions  to  a  stop.  Just  as  a  watch  stands 
still  when  the  mainspring  has  run  out,  or  as  a  steam- 
engine  stops  when  the  coal  or  the  steam  fails ;  in 
like  manner,  the  animal  machine  loses  its  power 
of  working,  when  the  nervous  influence  generated 
in  the  body  is  expended,  or  when  the  muscular 
fibres  are  exhausted  and  attenuated  by  disease,  or 
by  previous  over-exertion,  or  by  lack  of  the 
necessary  nutriment. 

When  we  feel  our  muscular  efforts  to  be  easily 
accomplished,  and  rather  to  be  a  pleasure  than 
otherwise,  we  call  the  feeling  a  consciousness  of 
latent  power  and  strength.  This  is  a  knowledge 
acquired  from  the  experience  that  the  body,  when 
conscious  of  certain  sensations,  will  be  able  to 
discharge  its  part  efficiently.     It  is  positively  irk- 


OR  ONLY  INFER  IT? 


171 


some  for  a  young  person  to  remain  inactive ;  the 
circulation  of  the  blood  is  so  quick,  and  the  nervous 
supply  is  so  superabundant,  that  there  is  a  painful 
sense  of  muscular  irritability  experienced,  and  the 
only  way  of  getting  relief,  is  to  use  up  the  surplus 
quantity  by  violent  bodily  movements. 

Here,  then,  we  have  abundance  of  phenomena 
accompanying,  and  following  the  act  of  volition. 
Is  the  belief  that  we  possess  power  the  result  of  a 
judgment  passed  on  any  one  of  these  phenomena, 
or  is  it  a  judgment  passed  on  the  whole  phenomena 
taken  together?  and  if  so,  which  of  them  is  the 
sine  qua  non  in  forming  and  moulding  our  belief 
in  the  existence  of  physical  power  as  the  operative 
principle  ? 

That  de  facU)  we  possess  the  ability  or  power  to 
move,  can  scarcely  be  doubted.  The  word  ability  or 
power,  however,  is  sometimes  conventionally  made 
to  signify  simply  that  when  we  wish  to  move, 
we  move.  Such  an  ability  we  may  conceive,  for 
instance,  to  be  possessed  by  a  paralytic,  provided 
he  had  a  party  ready  and  willing,  at  any  moment, 
to  move  him,  when  he  signified  his  desire  by  a 
word  or  nod.     Such  an  ability  or  power,  however, 


172 


DO  WE  PERCEIVE  POWER, 


OR  ONLY  INFER  IT  ? 


173 


fl 


as  it  does  not  imply  the  possession  of  physical 
power  on  the  part  of  the  paralytic,  is  evidently  not 
that  feeling  or  principle  which  we  are  conscious 
of  when  we  exert  our  physical  frame  by  an  act 
of  mental  effort,  and  regarding  which  we  are 
inquiring. 

Viewing  power,  therefore,  in  the  meantime,  in 
the  restricted  light  of  an  ability  to  obtain  motion, 
and  assuming,  for  argument's  sake,  that  there  were 
no  consciousness  of  mental  effort  accompanying  the 
simple  act  of  volition.     Suppose,  for  instance,  that 
we  saw  the  motion  of  the  body  invariably  follow  the 
simple  act  of  volition,  unaccompanied  by  mental 
effort,  and  without  our  discovering  any  agent  to 
account  for  it, — is  it  possible  or  likely  that  we  would 
conclude  that  we  possessed  the  ability,  in  some 
way  unknown,  of  moving?     We  think  we  might 
form   this   conclusion.     And  especially  when  we 
took  into  account  the  fact  of  the  muscular  sen- 
sations being  graduated  in  intensity  according  to  the 
amount  of  the  work  performed,  we  think  it  very  pro- 
bable that  we  might,  from  these  data,  come  to  form 
the  judgment  that  we  were  real  agents  in  doing  the 
work.     But  we  could  have  no  conception  of  what 


the  nature  of  physical  work  was ;  we  would  have 
no  apprehension  of  wliat  we  are  in  search  of— that 
element  which  we  call  Physical  Power. 

Let  us  see  what  assistance  the  muscular  sensa- 
tions might  give  us  towards  making  such  a  dis- 
covery.    When  we  have  no  corporeal  sensations, 
we  cannot  be  said  to  be  conscious  of  possessing  a 
physical  body  at  all.     The  more  action  and  sensa- 
tion we  experience,  the  more  are  we  conscious  of 
animal  life,  and  of  corporeal  existence.     By  the 
sensations  experienced  when  we  are   engao-ed  in 
healthful  exercise,  we  are  so  constituted  as  to  feel 
as  if  the  mind  and  the  body,  as  sentient,  are  one 
connected  whole— we  feel  not  only  as  if  we  had  in 
the  body  an  obedient  servant,  but  as  if  it  were  the 
body  and  the  mind  together,  which  constituted  the 
Ego.     The  conception,  we  admit,  may  be  formed 
of  an   animal   enjoying    all   these   emotions   and 
sensations,  even  irrespective  of,  and  without  the 
consciousness  of  an  exercise  of  mental  power  to 
originate  them  :  and  as  these  sensations  followed 
the   simple  act  of  will    (without  the   element"  of 
power   or  effort   in   it),   the   animal   might   form 
the  judgment  that  it  was  in  some  way  or  other 


'-"''*'  '^-^'  •^'••^tiitflfri  mmtihA 


174 


DO  WE  PERCEIVE  POWER, 


OR  ONLY  INFER  IT? 


175 


not  a  sham,  but  a  real  agent  in  bringing  them 

about. 

This  conclusion  or  judgment  would  even  re- 
ceive a  certain  amount  of  distinctness  from  the 
peculiar    and    varying    bodily    sensations    which 
accompanied  the  movements.    But,  we  ask,  would 
the  judgment  not  be  entirely  incomplete,  and  quite 
unlike  what  we  experience,  unless  the  animal  had, 
over  and  above  all  the  phenomena  named,  the 
perception  or  consciousness  that  it  was  exerting  a 
direct  mental  effort,  and  was  thus  the  intelligent 
producer  of  the  physical  effects  observed  ?  Without 
this  perception  of  mental  effort,  all  the  actions  of 
animal   life  would  be  quite   meaningless,  empty, 
and  unsatisfactory— entirely  unsuitcd  to  the  re- 
quirements  of  animal   existence   and  enjoyment. 
Animal   existence  ever   demands  a  free   exercise 
of  will,  and  a  full  employment  of  its  powers.    It  is 
the  direct  feeling  of  physical  and  mental  power 
which  constitutes  the  chief  happiness  both  of  man 
and  of  the  lower  animals,  especially  during  youth, 
when  physical  effort  and  the  lusty  strain  of  the 
limbs  are  the  natural  and  befitting  employment.    It 
is  the  consciousness  of  physical  difficulties  overcome 


by  the  strenuous  exercise  of  Will,  that  constitutes 
their  triumph  ;  and  it  is  this  exercise  of  Will  and 
Mental  Effort,  applied  in  effecting  bodily  move- 
ments, which,  both  in  youth  and  in  manhood,  con- 
stitutes the  element  we  are  in  search  of— namely, 
Physical  Power.  Tlie  sine  qua  non  therefore,  in 
giving  us  the  sense  of  power,  is  the  consciousness  of 
Mental  Effort, 


176 


CHAPTER   VIII. 

THE  DIRECT  PERCEPTION  OF  POWER — THE  MIND 
POSSESSES  POWER,  EXERTS  POWER,  AND  PER- 
CEIVES POWER,  PHYSICAL  AND  MENTAL. 

Such  reflections  on  the  phenomena  of  animal  life, 
with  the  view  of  discovering  how  the  mind  may  be 
supposed  to  form  a  judgment  regarding  the  existence 
of  an  external  world  such  as  ours,  and  regarding  our- 
selves as  real  and  not  sham  agents  in  it,  are  doubt- 
less important;  but  tlie  quation  relating  to  the 
precise  nature  of  the  faculty  of  perception,  and 
especially  regarding  the  direct  perception  of  power, 
we  consider  as  still  more  important — in  fact,  as  the 
most  curious  and  important  question  which  can 
engage  the  philosophical  attention.  And  this,  more 
especially,  since  we  find  that  mental  philosophers 
are  nearly  all  agreed  that  man  has  no  perception 
of  physica  I  po  tcer. 

If  we  were  to  prefix  a  motto   to   the  present 


THE  DIRECT  PERCEPTION  OF  POWER.         1 J  J 

chapter,  it  would  be  this-That  the  Mind  Perceive. 
Directly  all  its  Powers,  and  all  its  Sensations  or 
Affections. 

We  cannot  say  this  of  the  liver  or  of  the  heart 
or  of  other  equally  important  internal  organs  •  but 
with  regard  to  the  Intellectual  Principle,  we  state 
the  proposition  broadly  and  absolutely.    We  regard 
It  as  so  evidently  true,  that  it  is  a  truism.     And 
yet  we  find  that  mental  philosophers  have  disputed 
>t;  for,  so  far  as  we  can  understand  their  langua-e 
tliey  deny  that  man   has  any  consciousness  "of 
Physical  Poweh    ' 

We  confess  we  regret  exceedingi;  that  able  men 
in  the  prosecution  of  knowledge,  should  find  them- 
selves thus  ranged  in  opposition  to  the  natural 
convictions  of  mankind.    Our  regret  is  not  assumed. 
We  feel  ,t  painful  that  philosophy  should  have 
led  the  mind  into  a  position  entirely  opposed  to  the 
natural  belief  of  the  human  race:  and  therefore  we 
venture,  in  the  face  of  all  the  learned  authority 
against  us,  to  make  one  more  appeal,  at  once  to 
philosophy  and  to  common  sense.    After  what  we 
have  said  in  previous  chapters,  a  few  pages,  we 
hope,  may  suffice  to  explain  all  we  can  state,  as 

M 


'  ^' 


178        THE  DIRECT  PERCEPTION  OF  POWER. 

the  grounds  of  our  very  opposite  convictions  on 
this  curious  subject. 

We  preface  our  observations  by  asking,  Has  it 
not  the  aspect  of  being  manifestly  absurd  to  deny 
what  all  the  world  believes?  We,  and  all  men, 
are  convinced  that  physical  power  in  external  ob- 
jects is  just  that  which  enables  us  to  perceive  the 
world.  The  qualities  of  substances  are  admitted 
to  be  what  excite  our  senses ;  and  what,  we  ask, 
are  these  qualities  but  the  manifestations  to  us,  of 
the   active   principles   or  powers  which   physical 

objects  possess  ? 

We  cannot  conceive  any  outward  object,  or  sub- 
stance to  affect  our  bodily  senses,  except  in  so  far 
as  it  possesses  the  power  to  do  so.  The  perception 
of  an  object  is  thus  just  the  perception  of  its  va- 
rious powers  manifested  to  us  through  the  different 
organs  of  sense  ;  and  without  such  power  to  affect 
our  physical  organs,  the  objects  could  not  be 
perceived  by  us  at  all. 

The  position,  therefore,  taken  up  by  metaphysi- 
cal writers,  that  we  have  no  perception  of  physical 
power,  is  a  very  unaccountable  one,  and  cannot  fail 
to  prove  very  bewildering  to  ordinary  men. 


M^MMH 


THE  DIKECT  PERCEITION  OF  POWER.         1 79 

When  I  hold  a  heavy  body  in  my  hand  I  have 
using  the  unvarying  language  of  mankind,  the 
feeling  and  belief  that  it  is  heavy,  or  is  pulled 
downwards.  When  I  arrest  the  progress  of  a 
movmg  body,  as,  for  example,  a  billiard-ball  I 
have  a  similar  feeling  that  I  perceive  force.  When 
I  press  against  a  wall,  I  find  that  it  has  resisting 
power. 

The  power  in  these  instances,  we  admit,  is  not 
d^ectly  perceived,   as   it   exists   in  the  external 
objects.    The  mind  does  not  go  out  of  itself  to 
obtam  an  intuition  of  the  action  of  external  bodies 
No!  we  perceive  raediately  or  indirectly  that  they 
have  power,  by  perceiving  directly  that  v,e  have 
U  ourselves.     The  opposing  force  which  is  in  them 
we  estmiate  by  the  amount  of  power  which  we  are 
conscious  of  exerting  in  opposing  them  through 
our  compound  mental,  and  physical,  organism. 

Is  this  perception  of  our  power,  we  ask,  a  decep- 
tion, or  is  it  a  reality?  The  philosophy  of  mate- 
nahsfc  Realism  declares  that  we  perceive  matter 
and  an  external  world  by  the  senses ;  but  it  denies 
that  we  perceive  power.  It  argues  thus  :-How 
can  we  perceive  power,  a  thing  or  a  principle  of 


180        THE  DIKECT  PERCEPTION  OF  POWER. 


whose  nature  we  know  nothing;  a  thing  occult, 
and  necessarily  unknowable ;  a  thing  wliich,  not 
beipg  material,  is  not  accessible  to  the  senses  ? 

What !  is  it  a  just  assumption  for  a  mental  philo- 
sopher to  make,  that  the  mind,  which  is  itself  a 
spiritual  principle,  can  have  no  cognition  of  an 
immaterial  spiritual  action?  We  should  have 
thought  that  the  reverse  of  this  would  have  been 
the  more  just  and  natural  conclusion  ;  and  yet  this 
is  the  objection  used  by  mental  philosophers. 

Power,  it  is  maintained,  we  cannot  know;  we 
may,  from  perceiving  the  existence  of  certain 
physical  results,  infer  it,  if  we  choose ;  but  we 
cannot  expect  to  know  it,  or  perceive  it. 

The  sensation  I  experience  when  I  hold  the  heavy 
body  in  my  hand,  or  when  I  stop  the  rolling  ball, 
is,  say  they,  not  a  sensation  of  physical  power ;  it 
is  either  a  sensation  entirely  meaningless,  or  it  is, 
at  best,  a  consciousness  of  the  effects  of  that  phy- 
sical power  which  I  infer  to  exist  as  its  cause. 

This  assertion,  in  so  far  as  regards  the  muscular 
sensations,  we  do  not  mean  to  dispute.  We  think 
with  regard  to  these,  the  assertion  is  correct ;  but, 
at  the  same  time,  it  seems  clear  that  in  thus  re- 


THE  DIRECT  PERCEPTION  OF  POWER.         181 

ferring  to  the  muscular  sensations,  when  in  search 
of  power,  these  parties  evince  that  they  are  inquir- 
ing after  it  in  a  wrong  direction. 

We  agree  with  them  that  we  cannot  acquire  a 
knowledge  of  power  in  these  sensations.  We 
hold  that  it  is  to  be  found  directly  only  where  it 
resides,  namely— in  the  mind— where  it  exerts 
the  mysterious  and  effectual  act  of  volition.  When 
it  exerts  this  faculty  effectually,  we  are  conscious 
of  the  effectual  exercise  of  power. 

Hamilton,  who  believed  that  our  sensations  give 
us  a  direct  perception  of  the  physical  world,  lay 
under  peculiar  obligations  to  hold,  that  the  muscu- 
lar  sensations  which  accompany  animal  effort,  give 
us  a  perception  of  physical  power;  yet,  strange  to 
say,  he  denies  that  they  do  so.     Virtually,  accord- 
ing to  his  theory,  we  perceive  the  table  directly  at 
the  finger  points,  by  the  sensations  there  felt;  but 
we  do  not  perceive  the  weight  of  the  table,  or  its 
solidity,  by  the  muscular  sensations.     Philosophy 
is  surely  by  such   contradictions  brought  into  a 
very  disreputable  state  of  confusion. 

When  holding  the  theory  of  a  dynamical  world, 
we  are  led  into  no  such  contradictions;  and  the 


182        THE  DIRECT  PERCEPTION  OF  POWER. 

difficulty   which    probably    confronted    Hamilton, 
Brown,  and  otlier  philosophers,  disappears ;  for— 
if  the  world  is  a  manifestation  of  Divine  power, 
acting  according  to  physical  law — when  we  perceive 
an  object,  we  perceive  at  once  the  object  and  the 
immaterial  cause.     We  do  not  require  to  say  that 
the  power  is  the  occult  cause  of  the  object,  and  of 
its  qualities,  or  that  the  object  is  the  result  of  the 
power,  but  the  one  and  the  other  are  the  same, — 
the  power  is  the  object;  and  in  perceiving  the  object 
we  perceive  the  power.      If  this  view  is  correct, 
there  exists  neither   room   nor  necessity  for  the 
paradox,  which  metaphysicians  are  not  ashamed  to 
admit  into  their  philosophy,  namely—that  we  per- 
ceive the  physical  object,  but  do  not  perceive  any 
of  its  powers  or  properties ;  and  the  equally  un- 
satisfactory position,  that  we  believe  in  power,  but 
arc  not  conscious  of  it.  The  dynamical  theory  infers, 
on  the  contrary,  that  in  perceiving  the  primary 
qualities  of  an  object,  we  perceive  physical  power. 

Again,  it  has  ever  been  an  unsurmountable 
difficulty  to  comprehend,  or  even  to  believe,  that 
matter  should  act  on  mind,  or  mind  on  matter. 
We  have   already  attempted  to  explain,  that  in 


THE  DIRECT  PERCEPTION  OF  POWER. 


183 


connexion  with  our  theory,  no  such  difficulty  oc- 
curs ;  for  what  reluctance  can  possibly  be  expe- 
rienced in  admitting,  that  principles  of  the  self- 
same spiritual  immaterial  nature  should  directly 
influence  each  other  ?  What  difficulty  can  we  have 
in  believino:,  that  the  world,  which  is  a  manifesta- 
tion  of  Divine  power  (and  therefore  spiritual  in  its 
nature,  though  exhibiting  itself  to  us  according 
to  physical  law),  may  thus  be  perceived  by  the 
spiritual  principle  which  man  and  other  animals 
possess. 

When  we  say  we  perceive  physical  power,  let 
us  not  be  misunderstood.  We  do  not  directly 
perceive  its  Divine  or  ultimate  cause.  We  per- 
ceive this,  it  is  true,  but  we  perceive  it  only  under 
its  physical  manifestations.  We  only  feel  external 
power  in  so  far  as  it  meets,  and  manifests  itself  to 
the  spiritual  principle  which  we  possess,  and  in  so 
far  as  it  opposes  and  limits  our  will ;  but  we  know 
power  directly  J  as  it  exists  within  ourselves;  and 
we  are  enabled  to  declare  it  to  be  the  operation 
within  us  of  a  spiritual  endowment  or  principle. 
It  is  a  mental  endowment,  and  therefore  we  are 
drectly  conscious  of  it. 


184        THE  DIRECT  PERCEPTION  OF  POWER. 

This  view  of  a  subject,  long  held  so  difficult,  we 
think  is  worthy  of  consideration,  if  it  were  for  no 
other  reason,  than  that  by  it  our  natural  and  our 
philosophical  beliefs  are  reconciled,  and  a  consist- 
ency is  established  which  we  have  not  discovered 
in  any  previous  system  of  Realism. 

If  we  are  called  to  explain  more  precisely  the 
extent  of  this  our  knowledge  of  Power,  and  how 
we  acquire  it,  we  readily  comply  with  the  request. 
In  order  that  we  may  do  so,  let  us  recur  to  the 
physical  steps  which  precede  and  accompany  the 
act  of  perception ;  we  thus  narrow  the  field,  and 
by  availing  ourselves  fully  of  the  parts  of  the 
process  which  we  know,  we  are  in  a  more  favour- 
able position  for  judging  aright,  regarding  the 
part  that  is  considered  unseen  and  unknown. 

And,  first,  as  to  the  muscular  sensations,  and 
alpng  with  them  we  may  be  allowed  a  word  regard- 
ing all  sensations  ;  for  the  nature  of  animal  sensa- 
tion is  generally  but  imperfectly  apprehended. 
.  When  my  arm  is  employed  in  the  act  of  raising 
a  heavy  weight,  there  is  physical  power  in  the 
violently  contracted  muscle  of  that  limb.  Its  parts 
are  powerfully  drawn  together. 


THE  DIRECT  PERCEPTION  OF  POWER.        185 

The  sensitive  nerves  with  which  the  muscle  is 
furnished,  are  at  the  same  time  excited  to  action 
by  the  muscular  contractions,  and  this  action 
is  by  them  propagated  to  the  appropriate  por- 
tion of  the  brain.  The  action  upon  the  brain 
thus  serves  as  an  indication  of  the  abnormal 
condition  of  the  muscle.  This  nervous  action  the 
mind  recognises  as  muscular  sensation.  We  have 
come  by  association  to  regard  these  muscular  sen- 
sations as  sensations  of  power,  of  strain,  of  effort. 
But  this  seems  just  another  instance  how  natur- 
ally we  take  the  sign  for  the  thing  signified ;  for 
we  think  that  in  the  sensation  itself  we  discover 
nothing  informing  us  of  power  exerted  in  the  limb. 

What  the  sensation  seems  to  contain  and  to  com- 
municate is  merely  a  peculiar  feeling,  as  if  situated 
in  the  muscle ;  and  this  sensation  is  most  useful, 
as  it  serves  by  its  varying  intensity  to  be  an 
appropriate  index  of  the  amount  of  action  in  the 
muscle  at  the  time.  If  the  muscular  effort  be 
violent,  the  sensation  is  increased,  and  is  largely 
mixed  with  pain,  or  a  feeling  of  distress ;  and  we 
judge  that  with  a  little  more  effort,  the  machine 
would  fail,  and  a  disruption  or  injury  to  the  part, 
or  to  the  brain,  would  ensue. 


V 


1 


} 
'i 


186        THE  DIRECT  PERCEPTION  OF  POWER. 

Examining  as  closely  as  we  can,  and  judging 
as  honestly  as  we  can,  we  cannot,  however,  discover 
that  these  peculiar  muscular  sensations  communi- 
cate to  the  mind  the  knowledge  of  power.     They, 
and  all  other  sensations,  are  well  and  wisely  suited 
for  the  ends  they  respectively  subserve ;  but  many 
of  them  we  shall  find  are  quite  arbitrary.    We  have 
called  them  animal  sensations,  because  all  that  they 
primarily  indicate  is,  that  the  animal  frame  is  some- 
where and  somehow  afiected.   Without  an  exercise 
of  judgment  they  teach  us  nothing  beyond  this. 
The  sensations  produced  in  us  by  the  secondary 
qualities   of  objects   are   purely   arbitrary  —  such 
as  taste,  smell,  hearing,  colour,  heat,  cold,   etc. 
These  are  subjective,  and  inform  us  of  nothing 
external  which   correspond  with  themselves.     As 
regards   the  sensations  produced  by  the  primary 
qualities  of  physical  bodies,  it  is  different.     These 
contain  within  them  a  representation  of  size  and 
form,   and  thus  they  instruct  us  in  the  element- 
ary lesson  of  external  physical  reality. 

We  do  not,  as  we  have  said,  find  that  the  mus- 
cular sensations,  if  we  separate  them  carefully  from 
judgments  by  habit  associated  with  them,  contain 


^ 


THE  DIRECT  PERCEPTION  OF  POWER.         187 

any  representation  of  physical  power.  No  amount 
of  strain  or  of  injury  to  the  muscle  by  pressure,  or 
by  external  force  of  any  kind,  would  cause  them 
to  contain  this  element,  of  power,  or  force. 

If  the  mind  does  not  perceive  power  through  the 
muscular  sensations,  neither  does  it  perceive  the 
nature  of  the  Nervous  Action  or  Movement  trans- 
mitted from  the  excited  muscle.  It  is,  indeed, 
entirely  unconscious  of  its  existence.  Surely,  then, 
we  may  remark,  as  regards  the  muscular  and  all 
other  sensations,  that  it  is  much  more  correct  to 
say  that  the  mind  is  affected,  or  influenced,  or  in 
some  way  modified  by  the  action  of  the  nervous 
agent,  than  that  it  perceives  that  action.  All 
that  it  perceives  are  its  own  affections  or  sensa- 
tions. 

Sensation,  be  it  observed,  is  not  a  voluntary  act : 
on  the  contrary,  the  mind  cannot  escape  from  the 
affection  which  we  call  a  sensation.  When  a 
severe  external  pressure  or  strain  is  applied  to  a 
limb,  the  mind  is  thrown  into  a  state  of  pain  which 
it  cannot  banish  by  any  voluntary  act.  It  would 
seem,  then,  there  is  some  correctness  in  the  form  of 
expression  we  formerly  used  when  we  said  that,  to 


I 


188        THE  DIRECT  PERCEPTION  OF  POWER. 


!' 


a  certain  extent,  the  mind— besides  its  power  of 
voluntary  action  and  thought— appears  as  if  also 
amenable  to  physical  impression,  or  to  the  influ- 
ence of  certain  physical  laws.  But  it  is  evident 
that,  according  to  our  theory,  this  implies  no  more 
than  that,  in  its  susceptibility  to  the  impressions 
of  physical  movements,  it  is  susceptible  to  the 
spiritual  agent  which,  by  and  through  these  move- 
ments, acts  on  it. 

If,  then,  the  muscular  sensations  do  not  inform 
us  of  physical  power,  but  only  help  to  indicate  its 
amount  after  we  know  its  existence,  we  can  have 
no  difficulty  or  hesitation  in  declaring  where  we 
acquire  our  knowledge  of  power. 

We  have  already  said,  and  we  here  repeat  it, 
that  we  are  informed  of  power  by  the  mind,  the 
undoubted  possessor  of  it.  When  the  mind,  as  an 
active  operative  principle,  exerts  its  voluntary 
powers,  we  are  then  necessarily  conscious  of  Power. 
Of  this  the  reader  will  be  convinced  if  he  takes  the 
'  trouble  to  follow  us  in  the  examination  we  have 
commenced. 

If  the  nervous  impulse  from  the  excited  muscle 
has  permeated  the  brain,  and  produced  in  the  mmd 


THE  DIRECT  PERCEPTION  OF  POWER.         189 


the  affection  which  we  call  a  muscular  sensation,  the 
mind,  on  the  other  hand,  through  the  power  with 
which  it  has,  for  that  very  object,  been  endowed, 
exerts  the  faculty  it  possesses,  and  generates  free 
physical  force  in  its  special  organ,  in  the  way  we 
shall  immediately  explain,  and  sends  it  forth  on 
its  mission  through  the  appropriate  nerves  towards 
the  muscle,  and  thus  makes  the  action  of  that  or- 
gan effectual  in  overcoming  the  external  force  or 
weight  which  may  be  opposed  to  it. 

If  the  weight  is  considerable,  a  strong  mental 
effort  is  employed ;  if  the  weight  is  less  consider- 
able, a  less  mental  effort  suffices,  and  a  less  eflux 
of  free  cerebral  power  is  required.  The  mind  is 
here,  it  will  be  seen,  a  real  agent,  in  producing 
and  in  directing  the  action  of  physical  force ;  and 
it  has  a  perfect  consciousness  of  itself  in  this  rela- 
tion :  in  other  words,  it  directly  perceives,  or  is 
conscious  of  its  own  power:  and  through  the  amount 
of  power  or  successful  effort  which  itself  is  conscious 
of  exerting,  it  estimates  the  external  opposing  power 
which  it  encounters.  This  external  opposing 
power,  which  exists  in  dynamical  equipoise  alike 
in  the  nervous  medium,  in  the  muscle,  and  in  the 


190        THE  DIRECT  PERCEPTION  OF  POWER. 

external  heavy  body  (or  which,  at  least,  has  a 
quantitive  relation  in  them  all),  is,  as  we  have  re- 
peatedly explained,  the  action  of  the  spiritual 
principle  of  force  which  rules  throughout  Nature ; 
and  the  power  which  the  mind  exerts  in  conduct- 
ing the  animal  effort  is  the  action  of  that  same 
spiritual  principle  of  force  with  which  itself  is 
specially  endowed  for  the  exercise  of  its  physical 

functions. 

Hamilton  argues  that  we  have,  in  the  efforts  al- 
luded to,  no  consciousness  of  power ;  because,  if  the 
nerve  be  paralyzed,  we  put  forth  the  act  of  will, 
but  no  physical  result  follows.     Therefore,  argues 
he,  in  the  act  of  will  there  is  no  consciousness  of 
operative  power.    We  ask,  why  is  it  so  in  the  case 
supposed  ?     For  the  very  simple  reason  that  there 
is  no  external  operative  power  exerted.     External 
operative  power  only  manifests  itself  where  it  ex- 
ists ;  and  it  can  only  exist,  and  be  felt,  when  it  is 
exerting  itself.    In  the  instance  supposed,  the  physi- 
cal chain  which  connects  the  act  of  will  with  the 
muscle,  and  through  it  with  the  external  resisting 
object  is  sundered  or  impaired ;  and,  as  a  necessary 
consequence,  neither  the  nervous  agent  nor   the 


THE  DIRECT  PERCEPTION  OF  POWER.         191 


muscular  force  are  brought  into  action,  or  into  op- 
position with  the  external  object  to  be  raised. 

If  I  am  drawing  a  weight  along  by  a  string,  I 
am  conscious  of  exerting  power.  If  the  string 
snaps,  I  instantly  cease  to  exert  force,  and,  of 
course,  I  instantly  cease  to  be  conscious  of  force ; 
though  I  may  be  conscious  of  the  will  to  draw  the 
stone. 

The  subject  is  undoubtedly  a  difficult  one.  Let 
us  endeavour  to  deal  with  it  dispassionately.  In 
the  case  of  paralysis  of  the  nerve,  or  in  the  case  of 
the  nerve  being  suddenly  severed,  or  compressed, 
we  do  not  mean  to  assert  that  the  mental  effort 
may  not  be  made.  We  think  it  may — we  think 
even  a  violent  effort  may  be  made.  But  the  effort 
will  be  a  very  brief  one.  It  is  not  followed  by  the 
usual  sensational  accompaniments  of  successful 
physical  action,  and  the  mental  effort  will  there- 
fore instantly  cease.  It  seems  a  law  of  animal 
nature — a  very  marked  instinct — that  immediately 
we  are  conscious  of  a  serious  injury  to  an  organ, 
or  a  total  obstniction  to  its  action,  we  as  imme- 
diately shrink  from  all  attempted  action  of  that 
organ. 


192        THE  DIEECT  PERCEPTION  OF  POWER. 

In  all  healthy  and  successful  physical  exertion, 
the  amount  of  mental  effort  is  in  strict  proportion 
to  the  physical  work  which  is  being  done ;  and 
when  the  work  goes  on,  we  are  conscious  of  the 
power  we  are  continuously  exerting;  but  when 
we  are  made  conscious  of  total  incapacity  from 
physical  injury  to  the  organ  through  which  power 
is  exerted,  the  mental  effort  at  once  ceases. 

Let  us  suppose,  however,  that  notwithstandmg 
the  injury  to  the  motor  nerve,  the  mind  were  to 
continue  its  accustomed  efforts ;  in  this  case,  the 
channel  being  closed,  there  would  be  no  efflux  of 
force  through  the  nerve,  and  the  action  of  the  brain 
would  consequently,    and  we    may   suppose    of 
necessity,  cease.    We  do  not  deny  that  the  mmd 
may,  even  in  these  circumstances,  have  the  power 
of  continuing  its  efforts ;  but,  at  the  same  time,  it 
is  evident  that  the  mind  in  such  circumstances 
would   be  painfully   conscious   of  its  power  not 
being   effectual.      A   man   who    is   bound    hand 
and  foot  may  exert  physical  power,   or  a  man 
buried  in  a  sand-pit  may  exert  physical  power, 
but  it  is  entirely  ineffectual ;  he  cannot  move  a 
finger  or  a  limb ;  and  yet  he  is  conscious  of  exertmg 


THE  DIRECT  PERCEPTION  OF  POWER?        193 

his  utmost  power;  and  so,  we  think,  may  it  be 
with  the  mind  in  the  case  of  paralysis  of  the  nerve. 
It  may  be-  conscious  of  exerting  power,  but  it  is 
equally  conscious  that  its  efforts  liave  no  external 
efficiency,  owing  to  the  injury  to  tlie  link  whicli 
connects  the  internal  with  the  external. 


N 


194 


CHAPTER    IX. 

THE  PHYSICAL  POWERS  OF  THE  MIND 

That  the  world  is  governed  by  Power  is  a  reli- 
gious truth.     It  is  also  a  physical  fact,  and  one 
of  the   most  curious  which  science   has  yet   at- 
tempted  to   develop.      The   subject  of  Power  or 
Force   has   been,   in  our   day,   investigated   with 
more  ardour  and  success  than  almost  any  branch 
of  natural  science ;  and  the  votaries  of  pure  physics 
—such  men  as  Faraday,  Helmholtz,  Mayer,  Liebig, 
Thompson,   Grove,  and  others    too  numerous  to 
name— have  been  led  by  it  out  of  their  own  field 
into  a  region   where   experimental   investigation, 
instead  of  excluding,  rather  solicits  the  help  of 
metaphysical  thought.      Such  a  result  is  inevit- 
able  when  we  come  to   consider  the  subject  of 
Power,  which  is  necessarily  viewed  not  as  a  sub- 
stance, but  as  an  influence,  or  an  action.     The 


THE  physical  POWERS  OF  THE  MIND.       195 

metaphysician  must  not  recoil  from  this  inva- 
sion of  his  province :  rather  let  him  hail  the 
fact  that  a  point  of  contact  has  been  estab- 
lished between  phenomena  wliich  liave  hitherto 
been  considered  as  destined  to  remain  for  ever 
apart. 

It  need  not  surprise  us,  that  the  subject  of  phy- 
sical power  should  very  readily  lay  hold  of  the 
imagination,  when  we  have  once  reflected  on  the 
nature  of  this  principle.  But  so  soon  as  we 
realize  the  fact,  that  Power  may  be  contemplated 
not  merely  as  an  abstract  idea,  but  as  an  action 
which  may  be  traced  step  by  step  throughout 
Nature, — that  it  may  on  the  one  hand  be  made  to 
submit  itself  to  scientific  manipulation,  while,  on 
the  other  hand,  it  invites  the  metaphysical  mind 
to  ponder  the  nature  of  its  existence,  as  the  phy- 
sical yet  immaterial  copula  wliich  binds  together 
cause  and  effect, — we  say,  when  these  new  and 
startling  aspects  of  the  subject  are  considered,  it  is 
impossible  to  avoid  the  conclusion  that  a  very 
great  expansion  of  our  views  upon  the  physical 
constitution  of  the  world  must  thereby  be  brought 
about,  and  that  much  of  that  diflaculty  which  has 


196      THE  PHYSICAL  POWEKS  OF  THE  MIND. 

hitherto  encompassed  philosophy  will  thereby  be 
removed. 

In  a  volume  on  the  World  as  Dynamical,  it 
might  be  expected  that  we  would  largely  avail 
ourselves  of  the  new  science  of  Force.  This,  how- 
ever, is  not  our  intention.  It  would  fill  our  pages 
with  difficult  and  imperfectly  digested  matter,  and 
w^ould  lead  us  into  a  too  extensive  and  intricate 
labyrinth  of  thought. 

The  subject  is  one,  the  importance  of  which 
we  cannot  too  highly  estimate.  Its  principles  are, 
however,  as  yet  far  from  being  fully  and  clearly 
established  ;  and  the  writer  regrets  it  is  one  which 
he  has  not  in  any  adequate  measure  made  a  subject 
of  study. 

Some  of  the  leading  opinions  or  surmises,  so  far 
as  we  can  gather  them,  we  may  however,  state, 
throwing  ourselves  on  the  indulgence  of  the  better 
instructed  reader  in  case  of  his  discovering  any 
misapprehension  or  unintentional  errors  in  our  ex- 
position. 

Every  change  in  mass,  and  every  change  in 
the  chemical  constitution  of  bodies,  is  effected  by 
power ;  heat,  light,  electricity,  magnetism,  gravity, 


THE  PHYSICAL  POWERS  OF  THE  MIND.       197 

chemical  affinities — all  these  different  manifesta- 
tions may  be  regarded  as  in  whole  or  in  part,  con- 
vertible the  one  into  the  other,  and  in  every  case 
we  may  best  explain  them,  not  as  separate  entities, 
but  as  varying  exhibitions  of  that  principle  or 
action  which  we  call  Power. 

Physicists  are  led  to  believe  from  the  laws  which 
they  observe,  that  there  is  a  definite  amount  of 
power  which  conducts  the  operations  of  the  phy- 
sical universe.  The  writer  of  this  volume,  in  con- 
formity with  his  theory,  expresses  the  fact  some- 
what differently,  though  the  result  is  the  same, 
namely,  that  the  physical  universe  is  a  manifesta- 
tion of  power,  working  according  to  physical  law, 
both  as  regards  amount,  and  mode  of  action. 

Physical  power,  in  the  world,  is  subject,  so  far 
as  we  have  experience,  neither  to  augmentation 
nor  diminution. 

Physical  power,  in  all  physical  operations,  may 
be  transferred  from  one  object  to  another,  but  it  is 
never  lost. 

We  may  regard  physical  power  as  an  immate- 
rial  or  spiritual  agent,  or  we  may  consider  it 
merely  as  a  mode  of  action  j   but,  as  its  name 


193       THE  PHYSICAL  POWERS  OF  THE  MIND. 

implies,  the  action  of  physical  power  is  always 
subject  to  what  is  called  physical  law. 

Here  then,  apparently,  is  that  occult  principle 
which  has  always  been  believed  in  by  mankind 
when  following  their  natural  instincts,  and  the 
teaching  of  the  senses.  Here  is  power,  which  has 
always  been  disallowed  and  slighted  by  meta- 
j)iiy3icians  as  a  crotchet  of  superstition,  tabled,  and 
brought  before  the  public  for  a  scientific  and 
searching  examination  ;  and  we  are  invited  to  pro- 
nounce a  judgment  upon  it,  and  to  settle  and 
declare  its  nature. 

Its  measure  is  alleged  to  be  the  measure  of  all 
the  physical  changes  which  occur  in  the  world. 
It  is  a  One  Power,  though,  Proteus  like,  it  exhibits 
itself  under  a  thousand  shifting  guises.  At  one 
moment  it  is  dissolving  metals  in  water — at 
another  moment,  that  which  was  overmasterinc: 
the  cohesion  of  iron  or  zinc  is,  at  our  option,  pass- 
ing through  wires,  and  dissipating  the  most  obdu- 
rate materials,  with  the  accompaniment  of  bril- 
liant corruscations  of  light.  Anon,  that  we  may 
satisfy  ourselves  that  this  invisible  and  immaterial 
power  is  the  same  and  unchanged,  we  wrap  the 


THE  PHYSICAL  POWERS  OF  THE  MIND.       199 


wire  round  a  heavy  bar  of  iron,  and  the  power 
which  was  tearing  the  particles  of  iron  asunder 
exhibits  itself  in  that  form  with  which  we  are  most 
familiar — namely,  as  Mechanical  Force.  It  con- 
verts the  iron  bar  instantly  into  a  powerful  magnet, 
capable  of  sustaining,  it  may  be,  many  tons  weight. 

Let  us  now  consider  those  manifestations  of 
power  which  will  lead  us  to  understand  what  is 
called  Animal  Force,  with  which  our  subject  is 
more  immediately  connected. 

All  solid  bodies,  whether  simple  or  compound, 
are  bound  together  in  mass  by  that  force  which 
we  usually  call  the  power  of  cohesion.  In  the  case 
of  compound  bodies,  the  elements  are  bound 
together  by  the  power  which  we  call  chemical 
attraction. 

When  mechanical  force  is  employed  to  overcome 
the  cohesion  of  solid  bodies,  there  is,  it  is  supposed, 
the  liberation  of  a  certain  quantity  of  the  force 
which  bound  their  parts  together.  We  have  evi- 
dence of  this  in  a  flash  of  light,  when  we  break 
a  piece  qf  loaf  sugar  and  grind  the  pieces  together 
in  the  dark ;  and  we  observe  it  still  better  when 
we  disintegrate  the  substance  of  two  pieces  of  white 
quartz  by  rubbing  the  one  against  the  other. 


200 


THE  PHYSICAL  POWERS  OF  THE  MIND. 


When,  instead  of  mechanical  force,  we  employ 
chemical  agents  to  dissolve  simple  or  compound 
bodies,  the  result  is  the  same.  There  is  a  dis- 
turbance of  the  dynamical  equilibrium,  and  either 
a  certain  amount  of  free  force  is  liberated,  or  there 
is  a  vacuum  of  power  produced  ;  and  the  necessity 
for  an  equipoise  is  exhibited  to  us,  in  that  transfer 
of  power,  which  we  have  been  in  the  habit  of 
calling  electrical  or  galvanic  action. 

In  the  decomposition  of  animal  and  vegetable 
compounds,  and  of  organic  bodies,  the  same  phe- 
nomena are  presented,  and  a  balance  of  free  force 
shows  itself  in  the  transfer  of  force  to  or  from  the 
body  decomposed. 

This  free  force  may,  in  many  cases,  by  the  use 
of  appropriate  contrivances,  be  brought  fully  under 
our  control,  and  be  made  available  for  the  production 
of  heat,  light,  and  mechanical  work. 

It  can  be  sent  through  wires,  and  made  to  ex- 
hibit the  various  phenomena  which  accompany 
what  are  called  electricity  and  magnetism.  As  heat, 
this-  imponderable  power  can  be  sent  into  water, 
when  the  mechanical  movements,  which  would 
otherwise  be  radiated  into  space  and  lost,  are  ex- 


THE  PHYSICAL  POWERS  OF  THE  MIND.      201 

pended  on  this  ponderous  atomic  substance,  which 
its  vibratory  movements  beat  into  parts  so  small 
as  to  be  invisible ;  and,  fortunately^  we  can  con- 
duct the  power — and  the  steam,  with  which  it 
is  in  close  connexion — in  any  direction  we  wish. 
The  power  set  free  by  the  decomposition  of  the 
coal,  and  the  motion  generated  by  the  force  of  the 
new  combinations  which  result,  are  thus  utilized 
by  man,  and  they  become  the  staple  of  our  national 
wealth,  and  our  national  power. 

The  sparks  which  pass  between  the  points  of  an 
interrupted  electrical  circuit,  are  not  exhibitions  of 
a  separate  principle  called  electricity.  They  are 
the  mere  results  of  physical  force  in  rapid  passage 
between  the  points.  Flame  is  the  exhibition  of 
power  obtained  by  chemical  combination,  and 
which,  in  its  movement,  shakes  the  elastic  ethereal 
medium  with  which  all  things  are  encompassed. 

As  the  world  is  governed  by  the  operations  of 
force,  power,  though  a  spiritual  act,  is  necessarily 
subjected  to  law.  It  is  thus  alone  that  we  could 
have  a  world  such  as  ours  suited  to  the  purposes 
of  animal  and  vegetable  life.  It  is  because  power 
is  directed  by  intelligence  that  it  is  available  for 


202        THE  PHYSICAL  POWERS  OF  THE  MIXD. 

tlie  uses  of  intelligent  beings ;  and  it  is  because 
we  are  intelligent  beings  that  it  is  put,  to  a  certain 
extent,  under  the  control  of  our  will. 

It  is  from  tlie  same  circumstance  also  that,  as 
philosophers,  we  can  obtain  a  scientific  control 
over  it — that  we  can  procure  it  in  its  pure  or 
abstract  form,  by  our  galvanic,  electrical,  and  mag- 
netic machines,  and  can  transmit  that  which  is 
imponderable,  invisible,  intangible,  and  immaterial, 
through  wires. 

In  speaking  of  the  transmission  of  force  through 
wires,  we  are  very  apt  to  lose  the  proper  concep- 
tion of  it  as  an  immaterial  thing,  and  to  conceive 
it  as  sent  tlirough  the  wire  as  water  or  air  is  sent 
through  a  tube.  This  is  not  the  way  in  which 
power  can  be  transmitted.  The  world  is  bound 
together  by  power,  as  we  have  said.  The  force, 
then,  which  binds  atom  to  atom  in  the  wire  is, 
when  we  are  enabled  to  direct  force  tlirough  it, 
transferred  or  shifted  along  the  line  from  atom 
to  atom,  each  atom  successively  borrowing  from 
its  nearest  neighbour  on  one  side,  and  giving 
up  to  its  neighbour  on  the  other,— and  so  on, 
to  the  next,  and  the  next,  this  immaterial  prin- 


THE  PHYSICAL  POWERS  OF  THE  MIND.      208 


ciple  passes  along.  It  is  supposed  to  be  in  this 
way  that  atomic  power,  disturbed  at  one  end  of  a 
telegraphic  wire,  is  with  more  than  the  speed  of 
light  transmitted  through  the  wire,  even  though  it 
cross  the  Atlantic  or  girdle  the  earth. 

The  decomposition  of  the  animal  tissues,  and  of 
organic  compounds  within  the  body,  is  the  source 
of  Animal  Power.  The  subject  of  voluntary 
animal  motion — whether  the  mental  philosopher 
will,  or  whether  he  will  not — is  thus  forced  upon 
his  attention  ;  for  physics  and  metaphysics  here 
become  indistinguishable. 

So  far  as  we  have  discovered,  it  is  held  by  those 
who  have  prosecuted  the  subject,  that  animal  power 
is  derived  exclusively  from  the  decomposition  of 
the  muscular  tissues.  We  cannot  help  thinking 
that  this  is  a  mistake.  The  organ  which  is  under 
the  immediate  influence  of  the  mind,  in  the  volun- 
tary movements  of  man  and  other  vertebrate  ani- 
mals, is  the  brain  ;  and  we  shall  give  our  reasons 
for  believing  that  the  brain  is  the  chief  source  of 
animal  power. 

We  believe  that  animal  power  is  obtained,  either 
entirely  or  chiefly,  by  the  decomposition   of  the 


204       THE  PHYSICAL  POWERS  OF  THE  MIND. 

substance   of  the   brain.      Our  grounds   for   this 
opinion  are  exceedingly  simple  and  apparent. 

The  office  of  the  blood,  which  is  sent  to  every 
part  of  the  body,  is  to  remove  the  substance  of  the 
decomposed  tissues,  and  to  supply  the  materials 
for  their  recomposition  and  restoration. 

Wherever  we  find  an  organ  to  be  abundantly  sup- 
plied with  blood,  we  may  safely  infer  not  only  that 
that  organ  is  an  important  one,  but  also  that  its  de- 
composition and  restoration  are  proportionally  rapid. 
Now,   one   of  the   most  striking  circumstances 
connected  with  the  brain  of  man,  is  the  quantity 
of  blood  which  is  constantly  being  poured  through 
it.     Diflferent   estimates    have   been   made;    but 
taking  a  medium  view  on  a  subject  so  difficult  to 
determine,  we  may  hold  that  one-eighth  part  of 
the  entire  blood  of  the  body  is  directed  through 
this    important     organ,    whose    weight    is    only 
about  one-fortieth  part  of  the  body.      According 
to  this  calculation,  the  brain  gets  five  times  the 
average  supply  of  the  other  parts  of  the  body, 
weight  for  weight. 

We  are,  from  this  fact,  justified  in  holding,  that 
the  amount  and  rapidity  of  decomposition  which 


THE  PHYSICAL  POWERS  OF  THE  MIND.       205 

goes  on  in  that  organ,  must  be  very  remarkable, 
and  that  the  quantity  of  free  force  generated  in  it 
is  proportionally  great. 

We  have  also  to  note  this  specialty,  that  the 
brain  is  peculiarly  subject  to  decomposition.  After 
death,  this  most  honoured  portion  of  the  body  is 
the  first  which  falls  into  disorganization. 

From  these  circumstances,  then,  we  are  led  to 
regard  the  brain  as  the  chief  source  of  animal 
power.  And  we  regard  the  mind,  not  only  as  the 
principle  which  directs  the  free  force  through  the 
appropriate  motor  nerves  of  the  body,  but  as  the 
agent  through  whose  mysterious  action  power  is 
generated  In  the  way  we  have  stated.^ 

*  We  do  not  doubt  that  the  muscular  tissues  also  undergo  rapid 
decomposition  ;  for  while  the  muscles,  by  their  toughness  and  motor 
l)ower,  are  eminently  adapted  to  stand  the  tear  and  wear  which  is 
thrown  upon  them,  they  must  yet  from  their  continual  working  be 
as  constantly  requiring  the  operation  of  the  restorative  process. 

The  nerves,  on  our  theory,  only  transmit  that  force  to  the  muscles 
which  calls  them  into  action  ;  but  they  are  themselves  far  too  tender 
to  perform  any  direct  work.  This  is  done  entirely  by  the  muscular 
movements ;  but  that  it  is  the  muscles  that  generate  the  force,  we 
cannot  help  strongly  doubting.  If  one  who  professes  no  acquaintance 
with  the  secrets  of  chemical  science  may  be  allowed  an  opinion,  it  is, 
as  we  have  already  said,  that  muscular  force  is  generated  in  the  brain, 
and  we  found  this  opinron  on  the  reasons  which  we  have  stated. 

That  the  parallel  direction  of  the  muscul{.r  fibres  may  serve  to 


K«iiifeaa,aaaiaaiMMitoMtMaiiia 


206 


THE  PHYSICAL  POWERS  OF  THE  MIND. 


We  are  in  the  habit  of  believing,  without  any 
inquiry,  that  the  mind  moves  the  limbs ;  and  it  is 
only  when  we  come  for  the  first  time  to  consider 
the  probable  means  by  which  so  wonderful  a  phe- 
nomenon is  accomplished,  that  a  hesitation  is  ex- 
perienced by  the  believer  in  matter.     But  when  we 
are  enabled  to  take  a  mo  'e  comprehensive  view  of 
the  world  as  a  complete  system— not  mind  and 
matter— but  power,  organized  to  fulfil  the  purposes 
of  physical  existence,  we  view  the  whole  in  a  much 
clearer  and  more  satisfactory  light,  and  with  an 
undoubting  and  unembarrassed  spirit. 

Where  do  we  ever  observe  any  want  of  efficacy 
in  any  of  the  established  links  of  Nature's  chain  ? 
Though  all  are  equally  mysterious,  are   not   all 

intensify  the  operation  of  cerebral  force  probably  on  the  principle 
that  the  coil  intensifies  action  in  the  electro-magnetic  machine,  we 
also  consider  very  probable;  but  this  we  suggest  in  our  ignorance 
of  the  subtleties  of  electric  action. 

If  animal  power  comes  from  the  brain,  may  this,  we  ask,  not  help 
to  settle  the  question,  so  warmly  contested,  whether  the  oils  and  fats 
taken  as  food  contribute  toward  sustaining  animal  force  ?  The  brain, 
besides  albumen,  contains  various  oleaginous  products,  and  it  occurs 
to  us  that  this  may  account  for  fatty  foods  directly  helping  animal 
force,  as  has  been  asserted  by  some  chemists,  and  not  easily  set  aside 
by  those  who  plead  for  nitrogen  and  flesh  formers  as  the  only  source 
of  strength.  May  not  a  considerable  portion  of  the  fats  taken  as  food 
go  directly  to  support  the  substance  of  the  brain  ? 


THE  PHYSICAL  POWERS  OF  THE  MIND.      207 

equally  effectual  for  bringing  about  the  ends  de- 
signed ? 

The  mind  is  the  most  largely  endowed  of  all  the 
works  of  God,  and  by  far  the  most  various  in  its 
powers.     No  doubt  it  is  not  conscious  of,  and  does 
not  attend  to,  the  inner  organic  workings  to  which 
it  is  so  close.     It  is  quite  possible  the  mind  may 
have  no  ability  to  attend  to  these  ;  but  this  is  in 
analogy  with  what  we  know  of  its  habits   and 
faculties.    In  almost  every  instance  the  mind  looks 
to  the  end,  and   not   to   the   means.     When   an 
accomplished   musician  is   performing  a  piece  of 
music,  he  thinks  not  of  his   fingers,  which   are 
eliciting  the  notes  from  the  violin — we  may  al- 
most say  he  is  unconscious   of  their   movements 
—his  mind  is  entirely  occupied  with  the  musical 
theme,  and  his  whole  efforts  are  enirafred  in  o-iv- 
ing   expression   to   the   sentiments   and   harmony 
of  the  piece.     And  so  it  is  with  the  mind  in  the 
case  we  are  considering.     As  a  consummate  artist 
it  embodies  fully  the  object  it  has  in  view  ;  but  it 
remains  quite  unobservant  of  the  steps  by  which 
it  is  working  out  the  desired  effect.     This  circum- 
stance, however,   in   no  way   disproves   the   fact 


208       THE  PHYSICAL  TOWERS  OF  THE  MIND. 

that  it  is  the  real  agent  throughout  the  whole  per- 
formance. 

We  may  hesitate  as  to  the  precise  nature  of  the 
operation  effected  by  the  mind,  in  the  mental  effort 
imperfectly  expressed  by  the  word  volition.  Thus, 
we  may  conceive,  that  the  mind  directly  deals 
with  the  force  which  holds  the  substance  of  the 
brain  in  organic  combination,  and  that  it  directs  it 
through  tlie  motor  nerves  to  the  muscles,  thereby 
causing  their  action  ;  the  force  being  finally  ex- 
pended on  the  outward  work,  which  we  may,  for 
simplicity,  suppose  to  be  the  raising  of  a  heavy 
weight.  On  this  assumption,  the  force  of  organic 
combination  being  by  the  mental  effort  discharged 
from  the  portion  of  the  brain  acted  on,  decom- 
position of  that  part  would  be  the  result. 

We  may,  however,  view  the  mental  act  in  a 
somewhat  different  light,  and  suppose  it  exerted 
not  directly  on  the  organic  force,  but  on  the  sub- 
stance of  the  brain,  and  as  thus  directly  dissociat- 
ing its  molecules,  and  setting  free  the  force  which 
held  them  in  previous  combination.  We  prefer, 
however,  viewing  the  mental  act  in  the  former  of 
these  two  aspects ;  but  in  either  case  the  mind  is 


THE  PHYSICAL  POWERS  OF  THE  MIND.      209 

represented  as  exerting  direct  power,  and  as  being 
conscious  of  so  doing.     What  can  we  call  that 
mental   effort  which   we   put  forth    and    sustain 
during  the  accomplishment  of  any  heavy  bodily 
exertion,  but  an  exercise  of  mental  power  ?     The 
whole  soul  is  engaged  in  any  difficult  bodily  evo- 
lution, and  the  whole  body  shows  that  it  is  so. 
Every  emotion  and  action  of  the  mind,  whether 
moral,  intellectual,  or  physical,  is  faithfully  repre- 
sented in  the  action  of  the  bodily  muscles.  Observe 
the  face  of  a  man  about  to  perform  some  difficult 
feat  of  physical  power ;  the  mind  anticipates,  the 
mind  arranges,  the  mind  executes  the  whole  ;  and 
all  the  emotions  of  that  inner  principle  are  duly 
and  fully  reported  in  the  facial  muscles,  which  are 
thus  the  exponents  of  its  secret  and  invisible  work- 
ings.    The  smile  dies  quickly  from  the  face,  the 
lips  are  compressed,  the  forehead  gathers  an  ex- 
pression of  anxious  and  determined  preparation, 
and  the  blood  for  a  moment  retreats  to  the  heart, — 
this  pause,  the  mind  allows  before  hazarding  the 
sudden,  extreme,  and  difficult  display  of  its  utmost 
powers. 

In  every  light,  then— whether  metaphysical  or 


lillliiiiWiBiMiMrfifii-iiirii  iililiiiffiiiillttitfMiiiiiiiiiiii  ifirtiM^liMi^iill 


210       THE  PHYSICAL  POWERS  OF  THE  MIND. 


211 


physical— in  which  we  may  choose  to  view  the 
matter,  we  come  to  the  same  conclusion,  which 
we  may  thus  sum  up :— The  mind,  besides  the 
possession  of  moral  and  intellectual  powers,  is  also 
endowed  with  the  command  of  physical  power ; 
were  it  not  so,  it  could  not  command  or  direct 
the  body,  with  which  it  is  connected.  The  mind 
is  conscious  of  possessing,  and  of  exerting  physical 
power,  as  well  as  of  possessing  power  of  thought 
and  will ;  and  as  it  directly  perceives  its  own 
powers,  so  it  indirectly  perceives  external  power, 
as   that  which,  having  the   same  essence,  meets 

and  opposes  it. 

To  reconcile  metaphysicians  to  this  view,  we 
have  only  again  to  remind  them  that  we  regard 
physical  power,  in  the  World,  as  the  expression  of 
the  Supreme  Will;  and  physical  power  in  the 
Creature,  as  the  expression  of  the  creature's  will, 
rendered  effectual  by  the  control  which  has  been 
given  him  over  the  forces  of  his  own  body,  and 
through  them  over  the  forces  of  external  nature. 


CHAPTER   X. 

Hamilton's  modified  views  on  direct  percep- 
tion.—concluding  REMARKS. 

After  so  much  written  by  Sir  W.  Hamilton  on 
the  direct  perception  of  an  external  world,  it  is  time 
that  we  examine  the  ultimate  and  more  careful  ex- 
position of  his  views,  which  fortunately,  after  the 
fervour  of  contest  had  subsided,  he  had  time  to 
record.  They  are  contained  in  some  of  the  last 
notes  corrected  by  his  hand,  and  appended  to  his 
edition  of  Reid's  Works.  If  these  views  are  ex- 
pressed elsewhere,  we  have  not  come  upon  them. 
In  note  D*  we  discover  the  difficulties  he  evidently 
experienced  in  reconciling  his  theory  of  a  direct 
perception  with  the  facts  he  encountered ;  and  we 
discover  the  much  narrower  meaning  he  is  led  to 
assign  to  the  words  which  were  blazoned  very 
large  in  the   text  of  his  previous  writings.      No 


j 


ii 


SHMnaftwaMtieaaaftai 


feiBaaSift«iai^riT&ifflfilmigiriinilri 


212 


Hamilton's  modified  views 


ON  DIRECT  PERCEPTION. 


213 


I 


doubt  the  stout  controversialist  still  keeps  to  the 
words  mtwition  and  direct  perception;  but  even 
in  the  restricted  sense  in  which  he  now  uses  these 
words,  it  will  be  seen  how  greatly  he  still  com- 
plicates and  perplexes  the  subject. 

"  Sensitive  perception,  or  perception  simply,'' 
says  he,  "  is  that  act  of  consciousness  whereby  we 
apprehend  in  our  body, 

"  1st  J  Certain  special  affections ,  whereof,  as  an 
animated  organism,  it  is  contingently  susceptible." 
(Note  D*,  p.  376.) 

Here  is  a  flood-gate  of  controversy  thrown  at 
once  fearlessly  open.  Is  the  word  animated,  whicli 
he  puts  in  italics,  meant  to  imply  that  the  body 
perceives  its  affections  ?  Surely  not,  else  Hamil- 
ton is  to  be  ranked  with  the  Materialist, — a  position 
which  the  whole  tenor  of  his  previous  writings 
disallows.     He  continues  thus : — 

"  2nd,  Those  general  relations  of  extension  under 
which,  as  a  material  organism,  it  necessarily  exists. 

"  Of  these  perceptions,  the  former,  which  is 
thus  conversant  about  a  subject- object,  is  sensation 
proper ;  the  latter,  which  is  thus  conversant  about 
an  object- oh/ect J  is  perception  proper."     (P.  877.) 


We  inquire,  Does  he  mean  that  these  two  per- 
ceptions are  two  distinct  intuitions,  or  merely  two 
different  directions  given  to  the  attention?  But 
to  continue  our  quotations — 

"  All  perception  is  a  sensitive  cognition  :  it  there- 
fore apprehends  the  existence  of  no  object  out  of 
its  organism,  or  not  in  immediate  correlation  to  its 
organism."     (P.  879.) 

"Thus,  a  perception  of  the  primary  qualities 
does  not,  originally  and  in  itself,  reveal  to  us  the 
existence  and  qualitative  existence  of  aught  beyond 
the  organism  apprehended  by  us,  as  extended, 
figured,  divided,"  etc.     (P.  881.) 

"  The  primary  qualities  of  things  external  to 
our  organism,  i.e.,  their  extension  and  solidity,  we 
do  not  perceive,  i.e.,  immediately/  know.  For  these 
we  only  learn  to  infer  from  the  affections,  which 
we  come  to  find  that  they  determine  in  our  organs 
affections,  which  yielding  us  a  perception  of  or- 
ganic extension,  we  at  length  discover  by  ob- 
servation and  induction  to  imply  a  corresponding 
extension  in  the  extra-organic  agents."    (P.  881.) 

This  seems  to  us,  at  last,  the  truth,  honestly 
though  not  very  simply  expressed,  namely — that 


214 


HAMILTON'S  MODIFIED  VIEWS 


!i 


"by  the  impeded  voluntary  movements  of  our 
body,  we  infer  the  existence  of  the  world  as  ex- 
tended and  solid,  or  resisting.  This  is  very  differ- 
ent from  an  intuition  or  direct  perception  of  the 
external  object,  and  is  therefore  in  striking  contrast 
with  his  voluminous  writings  on  direct  perception. 
In  Chap.  VI.  we  quoted  enough  to  show  that  in 
his  Lectures  (XXV.  and  XXIX),  he  maintained 
that,  at  the  finger-points,  the  mind  had  a  direct 
perception  of  the  table,  and  that  it  is  the  object  in 
"  immediate  contact  or  relation  with  the  organ  that 
is  perceived."  He  now  makes  our  perception  of 
the  table  an  inference  of  the  judgment,  and  not  an 
intuition  of  sense.     He  continues  thus : — 

"  The  existence  of  an  extra-organic  world  is 
apprehended  not  in  perception  of  the  primary 
qualities,  but  in  a  perception  of  the  ^wtm-primary 
phases  of  the  s6CM7ic&?-primary — that  is,  in  the  con- 
sciousness that  our  locomotive  energy  is  restricted, 
and  not  resisted  by  aught  in  the  organism  itself; 
for,  in  the  consciousness  of  being  thus  resisted  is 
involved,  as  a  correlative,  the  consciousness  of  a 
resisting  something  external  to  our  organism.  Both 
are,  therefore,  conjunctly  apprehended."  (P.  882.) 


ON  DIRECT  PERCEPTION. 


215 


We  only  inquire,  with  reference  to  this  passage, 
should  the  word  consciousness,  which  we  have 
marked  in  italics,  not  have  been  the  word  inference, 
to  be  in  harmony  with  the  previous  passage  quoted  ? 
The  question  he  is  considering,  is  regarding  the 
precise  nature  of  the  faculty  of  perception,  and 
precision  is  therefore  all  important. 

Let  us  now  discover,  if  possible,  Hamilton's 
explanation  of  the  distinction  between  sensation 
and  perception,  regarding  which  we  have  observed 
a  great  deal  of  rather  vague  writing  throughout 
his  works, — as  if  the  subject  were  all  important, 
but  as  if  it  were  at  the  same  time  so  obdurate  and 
inexplicable,  as  not  to  be  reducible  to  simple 
language. 

"  The  organism  (p.  880)  is  the  field  of  appre- 
hension both  to  Sensation  proper  and  Perception 
proper;  but  with  this  difference,  that  the  former 
views  it  as  of  the  Ego,  the  latter  as  of  the  non-Ego 
— that  the  one  draws  it  within,  the  other  shuts  it 
out  from  the  sphere  of  self.  As  animated,  as  the 
subject  of  affections  of  which  I  am  conscious  the 
organism  belongs  to  me ;  and  of  those  affections 
which  I  recognise  as  mine,  sensation  proper  is  the 


216 


Hamilton's  modified  views 


apprehension.  As  material,  as  the  subject  of  ex- 
ternal figure,  divisibility,  and  so  forth,  the  organism 
does  not  belong  to  me,  the  conscious  unit :  and  of 
these  properties  which  I  do  not  recognise  as  mine, 
perception  proper  is  the  apprehension." 

This  seems  to  us  culpably  vague.  Does  Ham- 
ilton mean  that  the  body  feels,  or  does  he  remain 
steady  to  the  principle  that  the  mind  alone  feels  ? 
or  do  they  possess  a  power  of  feeling  conjunctly, 
though  not  separately  ?  If  the  body  is  sensitive  in 
strict  philosophical  language,  it  possesses,  so  far, 
the  attribute  of  mind.  If  sensation  and  percep- 
tion are,  as  seems  to  be  inferred  in  this  «ote,  two 
diflferent  perceptions,  or  cognitions,  or  intuitions, 
the  one  is  made,  by  the  above  explanation,  to  be 
an  intuition  of  bodily  affections  existing  in  my 
body  as  a  sensitive  part  of  me — i.  e.,  of  my  soul 
— and  the  second  intuition  regards  the  affections 
as  no  part  of  Twe,  but  as  movements  or  disturb- 
ances in  the  flesh,  bones,  or  nerves  of  my  body. 
Surely,  as  we  have  remarked,  it  is  better  to  stand 
steady  to  the  doctrine,  that  the  mind  alone  per- 
ceives sensations,  or  is  affected  by  the  nervous 
vibrations  transmitted  to  the  brain  j  the  statement 


ON  direct  perception. 


217 


regarding  the  nature  of  sensitive  perception  would 
then  stand  thus : — That  sensations  are  entirely  in 
the  mind ;  but  that  when  we  direct  our  attention 
to  the  affection  as  caused  by  a  physical  action 
existing  in  the  body,  we  assign  it  a  physical  cause, 
and  call  it  a  bodily  affection;  and  that  when  we 
yield  to  the  practical  bias  of  our  nature,  and  fix 
the  attention  on  the  extra  organic  cause,  we  call 
this  same  bodily  affection  a  perception  of  the  ex- 
ternal object  or  cause  ;  which  last  is,  however,  not 
a  direct,  but  a  mediate  perception — or,  in  more 
correct  language,  a  judgment  or  inference  of  reason 
passed  on  the  phenomena,  mental  and  physical, 
voluntary  or  involuntary,  of  which  we  are  simul- 
taneously conscious. 

Without  doubt,  the  question  of  real  importance 

is  this  simple  one :  What  is  presented  to  the  mind, 
and  what  does  it  perceive  ?  Now,  here  we  think 
there  can,  be  only  one  answer,  namely  thisy^A 
vibration  is  transmitted  to  the  brain  along  the 
nerves,  and  the  mind  is  conscious,  not  of  this  par- 
ticular movement,  but  of  a  sensation  or  mental 
affection.  The  mind  takes  the  sensation  up,  and 
assigns  an  external  physical  cause  for  it.     Cause 


218 


Hamilton's  modified  views 


thus,  by  the  law  of  our  nature,  becomes  synony- 
mous with  the  outer  object,  which  comes  thus 
chiefly  to  occupy  the  attention  in  ordinary  cases. 
This  directing  of  the  attention  to  the  external 
cause  we,  in  common  language,  call  perception 
while,  correctly,  perception  is  the  consciousness  of 
the  mental  affection. 

That  all  sensations  appear  to  exist  in  the  body, 
or  more  correctly  in  the  extremity  of  the  nerves  of 
sensation,  and  sometimes,  as  in  vision,  in  points 
external  to  the  nervous  extremities  affected,  is  un- 
doubted.     This  is  a  striking  peculiarity  in  the 
character  of  our  sensations.     From  our  inability  to 
account  for  it,  it  is  usually  assigned  to  a  physio- 
logical cause ;  the  object  and  importance  of  the  law 
in  animal  life  is,  however,  very  apparent.     Even 
years  after  a  leg  has   been   amputated,   as   pre- 
viously observed,  sensations  are  experienced  which, 
though  in  the  mind,  are  referred  to  the  foot  or  the 
toes  of  the  lost  limb.     This  should   have   made 
Hamilton  hesitate  in  founding  his  theory  of  direct 
perception,  on  the  hypothesis  of  the  mind  pervading 
the  body,  and  perceiving  the  bodily  aff'ection  where 
it  existed.     In  vision,  we  refer  the  sensations  not 


ON  direct  perception. 


219 


to  the  points  of  the  retina  affected,  but  to  points  ex- 
ternal, and  at  right  angles  to  their  position  on  the 
retina.  Thus — from  some  law,  original  or  acquired, 
but  quite  invariable — in  the  case  of  the  amputated 
limb  we  falsify,  and  in  the  case  of  vision  we  invert, 
the  position  of  the  nervous  affection ;  for  the  affec- 
tion or  impression  is  perceived  or  conceived  by  us 
as  an  external  object  in  an  erect  position,  though 
it  stands  inverted  on  the  retina. 

But  let  us  see  how  much  further  into  difficulties 
Hamilton's  peculiar  views  lead  him, 

"  It  may  appear  not  a  paradox  merely,  but  a 
contradiction,  to  say  that  the  organism  is  at  once 
within  and  without  the  mind — is  at  once  sub- 
jective and  objective — is  at  once  Ego  and  non- 
Ego.  But  so  it  is,  and  so  we  must  admit  it  to 
be,  unless,  as  Materialists,  we  identify  mind  with 
matter.  The  organism  as  animated — as  sentient — 
is  necessarily  ours  ;  and  its  aff*ections  are  only  felt 
as  affections  of  the  indivisible  Ego.  In  this  respect, 
and  to  this  extent,  our  organs  are  not  external  to 
ourselves."     (Foot  note,  p.  880.) 

Here  is  indeed,  as  the  author  admits,  a  very 
glaring  paradox.     The  body  is  at  one  moment 


220 


».T» 


HAMILTON  S  MODIFIED  VIEWS 


made  conscious  of  its  states  and  affections — ergo  is 
a  self-conscious  principle — and  the  next  moment  it 
is  converted  into  mere  flesh  and  blood  and  bones. 
This  is,  indeed,  establishing  the  doctrine  of  direct 
perception,  but  it  is  doing  so  at  a  fearful  sacrifice 
of  consistency;  for  if  the  body  perceives  its 
own  states,  the  point  is  no  doubt  carried,  but  only 
by  abandoning  our  most  cherished  views,  and 
declaring  the  body  to  possess  those  perceptions 
which  are  usually  ascribed  to  the  mind  alone.  We 
doubt,  however,  whether  the  meaning  of  the 
author  is  what  the  enigmatical  language  employed 
would  lead  us  to  conclude.  He  probably  means 
no  more  than  that  the  mind  being,  as  he  assumes, 
everywhere  present  throughout  the  body,  it  takes 
note  of  all  the  affections  that  occur  in  this  domain ; 
and  that  at  one  time  it  regards  them  as  they  affect 
itself,  the  conscious  lord  and  owner ;  and,  at  an- 
other time,  regards  them  as  they  affect  the  extended 
organism  to  which  it  has  access. 

If  Hamilton,  when  studying  the  subject  of  per- 
ception, had  been  content  to  view  the  mind  as 
successively  in  three  different  attitudes,  he  would 
have  escaped  the  very  awkward  predicament  into 


ON  DIRECT  PERCEPTION. 


221 


which  he  allows  himself  to  fall.  Had  he  regarded 
tiie  mind  as  at  one  moment  in  the  act  of  attending 
to  the  quality  of  its  sensations,  i.e.^  philosophizing ; 
at  another  moment  as  in  the  act  of  considering 
these  sensations  as  located  ia,  or  caused  by,  physi- 
cal affections  in  the  body;  and  then,  thirdly,  as 
disregarding  altogether  tlie  sensations  as  such, 
and  occupying  itself  with  the  external  cause  or 
object, — had  he  been  content  to  take  this  simple 
view  of  perception,  he  would,  we  think,  have  ex- 
hausted the  subject,  and  without  the  help  of  any 

paradox. 

No  one  but  a  Materialist,  in  this  country,  holds 
that  matter  feels,  and  it  is  a  pity  that  Hamilton 
should  have  given  any  countenance  to  a  view 
which  elsewhere  he  very  earnestly  rejects. 

It  seems  now  to  be  established,  by  the  physio- 
logical experiments  which  we  have  alluded  to  in  a 
previous  chapter,  that  the  mind  does  not  feel  in 
any  of  the  outward  organs,  but  in  the  brain.  It 
has,  moreover,  long  been  known  that  sudden  and 
sharp  injuries  inflicted  by  the  knife  of  the  experi- 
menter, on  the  substance  of  the  brain  of  the  lower 
animals,  can  scarcely  be  said  to   be  felt.     It  is 


222 


HAMILTON  S  MODIFIED  VIEWS 


ON  DIRECT  PERCEPTION. 


223 


highly  probable,  therefore,  that  this  central  organ, 
which  itself  does  not  feel,  excites  sensations  in  th*e 
mind  chiefly,  if  not  only,  when  it  is  itself  excited 
in  a  particular  way  through  those  nerves  of 
sensation,  which,  with  this  special  view,  are 
made  to  converge  to  it  from  the  different  parts  of 
the  body.  So  curiously  and  wonderfully  are  we 
framed ! 

We  admit  that  certain  diseases  in  the  brain  fre- 
quently produce  paroxysms  of  acute  pain ;  but  this 
is  a  peculiar  case,  and  the  effect  is  special  and  ex- 
ceptional, and  the  object  of  the  specialty  is  evident. 

Feeling  or  sensation  is  thus,  by  the  decisions 
of  science  as  well  as  of  reason,  to  be  viewed  as 
driven  back  from  matter,  from  flesh,  and  from 
nerve,  to  its  proper  position  in  the  mind,  and  let 
us  rejoice  that  it  is  so. 

Let  us  remember,  however,  that  though  all  sen- 
sations are  in  the  mind,  yet  our  faculties  are  given 
us  for  practical,  not  for  philosophical  purposes. 
In  perception,  therefore,  the  child  very  soon  be- 
comes  the  man ;  probably  long  before  he  is  ushered 
into  the  world  he  learns  to  objectify  his  sensations, 
assigning  them  a  place  either  in  his  own  minute 


microcosm,  or  in  the  organic  world  in  which  he 
lives. 

Certain  sensations — such  as  physical  pleasure 
and  pain,  the  sense  of  heat  and  cold,  of  smell  and 
taste,  and  other  purely  animal  feelings — are  given 
us  that  we  may  be  induced  to  observe  the  condi- 
tions of  animal  life.  These,  by  a  wise  law  of  our 
nature,  we  objectify,  and  feel  as  having  their  seat 
in  the  body.  Other  sensations,  capable  of  being 
applied  to  more  intellectual  purposes — such  as 
those  of  vision,  hearing,  and  some  of  those  con- 
nected with  touch — carry  the  mind  at  once  out- 
ward ;  and  we  attach  the  sensation  to  the  object 
exciting  it,  and  these  are,  fortunately,  the  most 
constantly  present  to  the  mind. 

And  thus  it  is  that,  by  a  law  of  our  mental  con- 
stitution, we  live  not  within  ourselves,  not  in  our 
thoughts  and  sensations  merely,  but  amidst  the 
thousand  external  interests  of  Nature.  Each  object 
solicits  attention  by  a  distinctive  appeal ;  and  the 
mind  instantly  not  only  recognises  the  appeal,  but 
clothes  the  outer  object  with  the  quality  of  its  own 
sensations.  The  grass  it  thus  makes  green,  the 
sky  blue,  the  mountains  gray,  the  sugar  sweet,  the 


laiitrnVifiiiimtiiihiiitiiiiiTiBiiihiiim  ifi'nr  iiriTfiril 


224 


HAMILTON  S  MODIFIED  VIEWS 


fire  hot.  The  murmur  of  the  river  it  makes 
drowsy,  the  blare  of  the  trumpet  hold  and  defiant, 
and  all  nature  it  largely  stamps  with  mental  sen- 
sations, and  not  with  material  qualities.  This  is 
the  poetry  of  our  nature,  and  it  is  given  by  the 
liand  which  formed  us. 

But  this  by  itself,  however  beautiful  we  must 
regard  the   provision  to   be,  is   not   sufficient   to 
account  for  all  the  charms  we  find  in  Nature  ;  and 
we  may  well  inquire.  If  all  we  obtain  by  the  senses, 
are  certain  sensations  more  or  less  pleasing  or  more 
or  less  disagreeable? — if  all  we  perceive,  is  that 
external  objects  are  hard  and  unyielding  or  soft 
and  pliable,  and  that  they  have  certain  colours  and 
smells ;  that  some  substances  are  sweet  and  others 
bitter;    that   some   give   us  strength   and  others 
deprive  us  of  it?     If  this  most  meagre  knowledge 
is  all  we  gather  from  physical  objects,  what  is  it 
that  gives  the  world  its  hold  of  us,  and  makes  it  a 
field   of  never-ending  interest?     It  is  the  mind 
still  which  has  this  power.     It  is  the  living,  ever- 
active  principle  given  us  by  God  which  transmutes 
the  dust  of  the  world  into  gold.    It  takes  up  the  dry 
lifeless  materials  of  sense,  and,  bringing  them  into 


ON  DIRECT  PERCEPTION, 


225 


alliance  with  its  own  incomprehensible  spiritual 
nature,  endows  even  inanimate  things  with  its  own 
life  and  feeling,  and  converts  arbitrary  signs  and 
symbols  into  the  living  language  of  thought.  The 
mere  symbols  it  esteems  of  little  moment  in  them- 
selves ;  it  uses  them  but  as  helps  to  deal  with 
higher  truths.  It  speculates  on  causes;  it  dis- 
covers laws;  it  is  warmed  with  affections;  it  is 
charmed  with  the  beautiful;  it  is  elevated  with 
hope ;  it  lives  in  human  sympathies. 

How  much  of  life  is  dependant  not  on  self,  or 
on  the  impressions  of  sense,  but  on  the  lives  of 
other  beings,  who  are  counterparts,  more  or  less 
close,  of  ourselves !  How  much  is  our  knowledge 
—  our  moral  nature  —  our  daily  occupation  —  and 
the  value  we  ascribe  to  things,  influenced  and 
directed  by  the  souls  of  other  men !  They  add 
it  may  be,  not  a  letter  to  the  alphabet  of  sense, 
but  how  immensely  do  they  add  to  the  range  of 
our  thoughts,  and  to  the  sum  of  our  enjoyments  ! 
It  is  in  the  world  of  living  men  that  the  mind 
finds  the  largest  exercise  for  all  its  faculties.  For, 
while  in  inanimate  objects  we  everywhere  dis- 
cover order,  beauty,  and  power,  it  is  in  the  region 


I 


i.3BfcliJrt>»a»».-     ■J--''-'--     ^■■-  -■.^lj^i^:Ajl^-■!kf■a■f:;.--»-^^^^^faj^«Q»V»^:S3BKtelisi^i 


226 


Hamilton's  modified  views 


of  life  that  we  discover  the  world  to  possess  its 
great  moral  meaning,  and  to  abound  in  interests  of 
substantial  and  enduring  value. 

Man  possesses  no  more  perceptive  senses  than 
the  irrational  animals;  but  by  the  exercise  of 
Reason,  he  turns  the  materials  with  which  he  is 
supplied  to  much  better  account,  and  to  much 
more  various  uses  than  they  do:  and  he  is  led 
also,  by  this  higher  faculty  of  his  mind,  to  many 
conclusions  which  they  cannot  apprehend.  One 
of  the  most  singular  of  these  is  the  conclusion 
which  leads  him  to  believe  in  an  unseen  cause, 
and  to  put  trust  in  a  Bei\^g  he  has  never  seen. 

The  mind  of  man  is,  by  this  principle  of  faith, 
evidently  formed  to  rise  above  the  earth  and  the 
objects  of  time  and  space; — it  views  things  not 
merely  as  they  are, — it  sees  many  things  which 
are    not   revealed    to    it   by   the    senses, — ^it    re- 
ceives,   and   more    or    less    shapes    and    colours, 
everything    according    to    the    law    of   its    own 
spiritual  nature.      Thus   it  is,  that  even   amidst 
the  mingled  turmoil  of  the  world,  and  the  solicita- 
tions of  sense,  man  looks  ever  instinctively  upward 
to  the  things  which  are  unseen :  and  reverently. 


ON  DIRECT  PERCEPTION. 


227 


and  more  or  less  trustingly,  he  ever  addresses  him- 
self to  the  great  Paternal  Being  whom  no  finite 
being  has  seen-whom  no  finite  mind  is  able 
adequately  to  comprehend. 


EDIMBDBOH  :   PBIMTKD  BT   OUVEB   AKD  BOTD. 


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